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This study takes one aspect of the post-conflict peace-building process 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995 - the recognition of three official but 
mutually comprehensible languages - and examines the way in which the 
international community's approach to it has impacted on broader peace-
building goals for the country. The originality of this thesis lies in the fact that 
it views post-conflict peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the lens 
of the language issue. Taking the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) as the 
starting point I look at the way in which its provisions have largely dictated the 
international community's approach to the language issue and created the 
political environment in which language operates. Further, applying the 
concept of societal security I explain how the language issue is used by 
domestic elites to frustrate attempts at reconciliation by the international 
community; I argue that the international community's approach, based on the 
equality of the three languages, only feeds into the divisive ethnic politics of 
present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina and ultimately undermines the security and 
stability of the country. 
I also look in detail at two very different but complimentary areas of 
ongoing post-conflict reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and analyse the 
international community's approach to language in each: refonn of the 
education system and defence reform. In the fonner the language issue cannot 
be divorced from the identity-fonnation goals of domestic elites in the 
education refonn. The international community's approach to language in this 
regard has been counterproductive and has only bolstered attempts to maintain 
segregation in schools. In the area of defence reform the focus of language 
policy is not on issues of identity but on the translation and interpretation 
policy of the international military force which is guided by locally-hired 
interpreters and trmslators. I use narrative theory (Baker, 2006) to explain how 
they negotiate issues of identity, loyalty and ethics and argue that through their 
influence policy has been more flexible and able to adapt to the requirements 
of the defence reform. 
Finally I contend that the international community has tended to view 
language as an unimportant element of its activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
This study argues that far from this beiQg the case the international 
community's approach to language holds importai1t1t!Bh; for future peace-
building endeavours elsewhere. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an address to a conference entitled Crossing Frontiers: Languages 
and the International Dimension, held at Cardiff University in July 2006, 
Professor Hilary Footitt bemoaned the fact that consideration of languages is 
largely absent from international relations. According to her, 'a tradition of 
analysis which tends to position languages as unproblematic, as obvious' has 
developed which renders the issue of language and communication invisible in 
international contexts. 1 This thesis is intended to give visibility to the language 
issue in one specific context, that of the external peace-building process in 
post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition it is intended to demonstrate that far 
from being 'unproblematic' and 'obvious' language requires serious and 
considered attention and should therefore be seen as an important part of post-
conflict peace-building endeavours. 
The focus of this study will be on the role language has played in the 
efforts of the international communitY to build peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In considering this role the study will investigate the ways in which issues of 
language have been approached among sections of the international community 
and the extent to which these approaches helped or hindered the ultimate goals 
of the peace-building process. 
The Thesis 
The thesis of this study is that since 1995 international organisations 
have not had a well thought-out and coordinated approach to language issues as 
part of their peace-building efforts in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
this has militated against overall external peace-building goals. 
An important part of contemporary peace-building is about creating 
new identities in the post-conflict society. Ideally, in an ethnically-divided 
society this means developing a common identity that will transcend divisions 
along ethnic lines and engender a feeling of loyalty to the new integral multi-
1 The proceedings of the conference are available at www.llas.ac.ukIcardifJ2006. 
2 This study uses the World Bank definition of the international community as 'a loose 
coalition of international governmental institutions. national governments and 
nongovernmental organizations that has bound itself to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dayton 
Accords and the period of reconstruction' (1999: 2). 
6 
ethnic state. It does not necessarily mean doing away with self-identification on 
an ethnic basis but 'refers to the feeling of sharing a common destiny' (Hansen, 
1997:87). As a key marker of ethnic identity language can play an important 
role in an ethnically-divided state and as such it could be expected that 
consideration of language would be part of peace-building endeavours. 
Instead, I contend that the international community considered 
language in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be 'unproblematic' and 'obvious' and 
therefore very little thought was given to dealing with language issues. Rather, 
language policy has essentially developed on an informal, ad hoc basis with no 
attempt to coordinate it in the major international organisations. It has thus 
been reactive in the sense of responding to other non-linguistic issues rather 
than more proactively feeding into the identity-formation goals of the peace-
building process. In this sense, there has been no language policy in the 
international community that would bolster the creation of a Bosnian identity 
either as an alternative to or in parallel with self-identification on a narrower 
ethnic basis and encourage loyalty to the state rather than to a particular ethnic 
group. 
The research concentrates on the period since the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, which brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was 
signed in December 1995 as it could be said that this marks the beginning of 
the peace-building efforts by the international community. 3 The agreement 
provides the starting point for this study as its provisions shaped not only the 
contours of the future state but also guided the activities of a plethora of 
international, governmental and non-governmental organisations and agencies. 
It thus provided the framework for the interaction between domestic and 
international actors. More broadly, it is the provisions of the agreement that 
have to a great extent created the political environment in which language 
operates. 
In the context of the thesis, the research questions that will be addressed 
in the study are: 
3 The Dayton Peace Agreement is otherwise known as the General Framework Agreement for 
Pea<:e in Bosnia and Herzegovina, available from: http://www.ohr.intlgfalgfa-home.htm 
[accessed on 20 November 2007] 
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1. Do the international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina have a 
language policy? 
2. If so, what fonn does this language policy take, how is it fonnulated 
and conducted and by whom? 
3. If not, how has the international community approached issues to do 
with language in Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
In order to answer these questions I look at provisions of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement which are most directly relevant to language issues and how 
they are operationalised in the political environment created after the end of the 
conflict. I also investigate two areas which are important for the peace-building 
process and in which the international community has played a significant role 
- refonn of the education system and the defence refonn. The fonner was 
chosen because of the role education plays in identity fonnation and the latter 
because the bulk of the Dayton Peace Agreement itself concerns the military 
aspects of the peace. 
This Introduction is in three sections. The first section consists of a 
discussion of the key concepts of language and ethnic identity which underpin 
the issues dealt with in the study. The second section discusses the methods 
and sources I used in carrying out this study and the third section outlines the 
structure of the whole study with a brief description of each chapter. 
Language and Ethnic Identity 
Language, dialect or variant? 
When the tenns 'language issue' and 'language situation' are used in 
the study they refer specifically to the fact that since 1995 three languages have 
been officially recognised in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Each of these languages 
corresponds to each of the three main ethnic groups: Bosnian for the Bosniaks, 
Croatian for the Croats and Serbian for the Serbs. It was not ever thus and the 
present-day language situation cannot be seen in isolation from the situation 
prior to 1991. After World War Two and until the break -up of the fonner 
Yugoslavia, it was considered that the people of the Socialist Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina spoke one language which was called Serbo-Croat or 
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Croatia-Serbian. The name Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian designated the 
language of the constituent peoples (konstitutivni narodi) of the Croats, 
Montenegrins, Muslims (in the sense of an ethnic rather than a religious group 
after 1974) and Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia. Up until the 1970s 
this language was considered to have two variants: the eastern and the western 
variants. The eastern variant was centred around Belgrade and the ekavian 
pronunciation and the western variant was centred around Zagreb and the 
ijekavian pronunciation. The variants differed in several ways. There were 
differences, for example, in certain lexical items (thus the word for train in the 
western variants is vlak but voz in the eastern), the construction of infinitives 
(the root of some verbs being the same in both variants but with different 
endings, thus, to criticise is kritizirati in the western variant and kritikovati in 
the eastern) and the extent to which foreign loanwords were accepted. One of 
the most striking differences was in the inclusion or exclusion of the reflex of 
the proto-Slavic vowel jat so, for example, the word for child is dijete in the 
ijekavian or western variant as against the ekavian or eastern variant which is 
dete. Another key difference was in the use of alphabet with the Latin alphabet 
predominating in the western variant and the Cyrillic in the eastern although 
this was not a hard and fast distinction as the Latin alphabet was generally used 
in Montenegro and by the Serbs in the Krajina. 
The binary distinction between the variants was, however, an 
oversimplification of the real language situation, failing as it did to take 
account of the characteristic speech of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, 
but the 1974 Constitution did recognize four 'standard linguistic idioms 
(standardni jezicni izrazi)' each of which corresponded to the speech of the 
four republican capitals where the language was spoken: Belgrade, Zagreb, 
Sarajevo and Titograd. The Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom was 
intended to denote the speech of the entire population of the republic and not 
just that of one of the main ethnic groups recognised in the republic. However, 
as the population of the former republic split into their ethnic groups during 
and after the war they each worked to establish their 'own' language. The 
Serbs and Croats were able to look to their neighbours over the border in 
Serbia and Croatia respectively for their linguistic standards while the language 
planners among the Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks as they began to call 
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themselves after 1993, took the linguistic features that had been characteristic 
of the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom and set about creating a 
separate linguistic standard called Bosnian (or bosansld). This process of 
standardisation involved the compilation of a grammar, orthographic manual 
and dictionary for the Bosnian language, as well as its elevation in status to an 
official language of the post-conflict state. 
The essential question here is whether the three officially recognised 
languages should be classified as distinct languages or as variants of one, the 
former Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian standard language. Answering this 
question is problematic as there is no generally accepted definition of a 
language but it is nonetheless useful to apply John E Joseph's description of a 
language, 'In general, a language is understood to be a system of elements and 
rules conceived broadly enough to admit variant ways of using it' (1987: 1). 
This is the way in which Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian was conceived and, 
despite the best efforts of the language planners, the speech of the population 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina can still be seen in this way. Linguistically, the official 
languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina are all based on the same sub-dialect of 
stokavian, ijekavian, 4 and as such are part of the dialect continuum that extends 
from the Slovenian-Croatian frontier in the north-west to the Serbian-
Macedonian and Serbian-Bulgarian borders in the south-east (Bugarski, 2004: 
24). Ijekavian is the most widely spoken dialect in this region and can be 
found not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia, Montenegro and 
parts of Serbia 
Being part of a dialect continuum means that the boundaries between 
the speech communities are 'soft' because there are no barriers to 
comprehensibility and 'the consciousness that they are dissimilar is not self-
evident' (Skiljan, 2001: 90). An example of these soft borders can be found in 
an analysis that Robert Greenberg made in 1996 of two studies5 on the speech 
4 The name §tokavian is based on the dialectal word for 'what' which is 'sto'. There are other 
dialects present in the area, kajkavian and atkavian which are also based on the word for 'what' 
in these cases kaj and ca respectively. It is §tokavian which has the vast majority of speakers 
whereas the other two dialects are spoken only by Croats outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
S 'Ikavian-SCakavian Dialects ofWestem Bosnia I' (Ikavsko§Cakavsld govori zapadne Bosne I) 
by Asim Peco published in 1975 which is concerned with the speech of the Muslim population 
and 'Western Bosnian Ijekavian Dialects' (Zapadnobosanski ijekavski govori) by Milorad 
Odic published in 1976 which concentrates on the speech of the Serbian population. 
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of the multi-ethnic population of western Bosnia. The speech of the Croats and 
Muslims was found to be 'nearly identical' and it was the speech of the Serbs 
that was 'maximally differentiated from that of the Muslim population' 
(Greenberg, 1996: 412). That notwithstanding Greenberg comes to the 
conclusion that the differences are so minor that they 'hardly should warrant 
separate monographs on the dialects within the same geographic region' (1996: 
412).6 
In the same vein, E.A. Hammel suggests that 'it is virtually impossible 
to distinguish Serbs from Croats from Muslim Slavs by their speech, if they 
come from the same village or neighbourhood, unless they seek to signal their 
ethnicity by stressing particular linguistic features' (2000: 25). In this case 
linguistic similarities are regional rather than ethnic so that in small ethnically-
mixed communities non-linguistic factors would distinguish members of the 
different ethnic groups. Family names and first names are a strong indicator of 
ethnic identity but it would also be known in a small community who belonged 
to which ethnic group on the basis of local historical knowledge or the 
religious festivals a person chose to observe. 
Similarly, if we look at differences in accent between different parts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina it could be said that it is easier to discern the area a person 
comes from on the basis of their accent rather than the ethnic group they 
belong to. So, for example, the distinctive Mostar accent will tell us that a 
person comes from Mostar rather than, say, Sarajevo but it would not 
necessarily tell us that person's ethnic affiliation. 
Looking at the language situation in this way - similarities based on 
region rather than ethnicity - is also helpful in understanding the differences 
that exist within the three official languages. For example, although the Croats 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina look to Zagreb for their standard language and call their 
language Croatian they may have more in common linguistically with members 
of other ethnic groups in their immediate vicinity than with fellow ethnic 
Croats in Croatia proper, for example, the speakers of the kajkavian dialect 
around Zagreb. Similarly, the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not use ekavian 
6 Greenberg asserts that the two studies were carried out for political reasons to demonstrate 
that the ethnic groups in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina were so different that they even bad 
their own dialects (1996: 413) 
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which is the Belgrade norm but ijekavian. Although ijekavian has been 
recognised by Serbian linguists as part of the Serbian norm, in Serbia it is only 
spoken by Serbs in western Serbia (Greenberg, 1996: 401}.7 This means, if 
nothing else, that they are differentiated from fellow Serbs in Serbia by the way 
they sound. 
If borders between dialects or variants are 'soft,' in order to increase 
mutual incomprehensibility, language planning is embarked upon to make 
these borders 'hard' and eventually create a distinctive standard language. Out 
of the three ethnic groups, the Bosniaks have been most active in this and they 
have seized upon two key features to distinguish Bosnian from Croatian and 
Serbian. These are the use of the phoneme Ix! and the greater presence of 
loanwords from Turkish, Persian and Arabic which are often called Turkisms. 
The phoneme Ix! is most conspicuous in everyday words such as kahva 
(coffee) instead of kava (Croatian) or kala (Serbian) and lahko (easy) instead of 
lako (Croatian and Serbian). While Ix! is only found in the speech of the 
Bosniaks, Turkisms are not exclusive to their speech as these loanwords are 
also found in Serbian and to a lesser extent in Croatian (Ford, 200 I: 83). 
Another distinguishing feature of the languages is in the use of 
alphabets. Before the conflicts of the 1990s both the Cyrillic and Latin 
alphabets were in official use in Bosnia-Herzegovina as elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia. Famously, before the war the daily Osloboilenje used the 
two scripts on alternate pages and books published in Bosnia could be printed 
in either script. Vanessa Pupavac also asserts, 'Such was the previous 
familiarity and interchangeability of the Latin and Cyrillic scripts that students 
in Bosnia barely had a consciousness of whether a text was in Latin or Cyrillic' 
(2006: 122). Now, however, Croatian and Bosnian are written exclusively in 
Latin script and Serbian generally in Cyrillic. I n d ~ ~ using the Cyrillic 
alphabet for written Serbian is the most obvious way of distinguishing it from 
Croatian and Bosnian. 
The foregoing discussion serves to show that there is little linguistic 
justification for considering the three official languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
7 Ijekavian is also spoken by the Muslim Slav community in the SanM.ak region of Serbia and 
Montenegro. The members of this community call themselves Bosniaks and their language 
Bosnian. 
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as separate languages based as they are on the same dialect and being mutually 
comprehensible. The language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina goes beyond pure 
linguistics as it is primarily a political issue. The extent to which differences 
in the speech of the three ethnic groups are highlighted depends on the political 
circumstances prevailing at any given time and the actions of political and 
intellectual elites in stressing language differences to distinguish the groups. 
Since the early nineties the separation of the former single language of Serbo-
Croat or Croato-Serbian into three official languages has been a linguistic 
reflection of the division of the population into their separate ethnic groups. 
Public and political discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina therefore revolves around 
the assertion that the three official languages are separate standard languages 
no matter how linguistically justified that assertion is. The value of the separate 
languages is therefore in their symbolic function as a marker of ethnic identity. 
There are many such possible markers including religious affiliation, skin 
colour, dress, social mores and customs but in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
language is key. The reason for this must be sought in the German 
Romanticism of the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century and the idea 
that a nation is nothing without its own language that was first put forward by 
Johann Gottfried Herder in 1772. Reacting to the fear of French domination 
that was present in Germany at the time he made a case for considering a 
nation in terms of its natural boundaries designated above all by that nation's 
own language. It was the national language that embodied the nation's 
distinctive traditions, culture and historical memory. This was made explicit in 
1808 by Johann Gottlieb Fichte who argued: 
The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt 
their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to 
each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before 
any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of 
continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they 
belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole (Fichte 1968 
[1808]: 109-10, as quoted in Joseph 2004: 11). 
These almost mystical ideas explain the emotional power that language has in 
individuals' identification with a given group and feeling of belonging to it. 
This linking of language and nation was crucial in the awakening of national 
consciousness in the Balkans in the early nineteenth century and this link has 
been an important consideration in the regulation of inter-ethnic relations in the 
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region ever since. In contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina where, politically, 
ethnic identity is the pre-eminent identity it is particularly significant. The next 
part of this section will therefore discuss concepts such as identity, ethnic 
group, nation and nationalism and the way the symbolic function of language is 
used in Bosnia-Herzegovina to bolster ethnic identity. Because of the 
importance of the symbolic nature of language in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
fact that the variant ways of speaking of the three ethnic groups are portrayed 
as separate languages by political and intellectual elites, the terms 'language' 
and 'official language' will be used in the rest of this study to denote the 
variant ways of speaking of the three main ethnic groups. 
Language, ethnic identity and nationalism 
Identity is what makes us who we are. It is what Ranko Bugarski 
describes as 'a set and continuation of essential characteristics with which a 
human group or individual defines themselves against others, thus ensuring 
their own "sameness". It is therefore a feeling of belonging to a given 
collective (we) and the consciousness of one's own personality (1)' (2005: 67).8 
These two aspects highlight two different definitions of identity. On the one 
hand identity is all about the 'I' or our own personal or subjective identity. It is 
how we see ourselves as individuals different from everyone else. On the other, 
the 'we' is our social identity and the way others see us or 'construct' us and 
how we relate to what is ascribed and attributed to us by other human beings 
(Riley, 2007: 86). The different characteristics of this 'I' and 'we' can be seen 
as different kinds of identity that are based on such things as our age, gender, 
religious belief, occupation, place of birth and political affiliation. In this sense, 
we all have multiple identities. Some of these identities are immutable such as 
gender (notwithstanding gender-reassignment surgery) but other aspects of 
identity such as religious affiliation, choice of profession or marital status are 
subject to change or construction by others. 
8 Sirup i kontinuitet suJtinskih svojstava kojima se neka Ijudska grupa iii jedinac definiAu 
naspram drugih. obezbedujuci talco svoju 'samoistovetnost'. To je. dalde, oseeanje pripadnosti 
datom kolektivu (ml), odnosno svest 0 sopstvenoj lifnosti (ja). 
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The identity that is most important for this study is ethnicity or ethnic-
group identity. Scholars have found it difficult to define what an ethnic group 
is and to distinguish it from other concepts such as nation, tribe, nationality and 
race. A definition of an ethnic group pertinent to this study comes from 
Anthony Smith who defines ethnic groups as 'named units of population with 
common ancestry, myths and historical memories, elements of a shared culture, 
some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least 
among the elites' (1995: 57). In this definition an ethnic group is clearly part of 
a larger population whose members are linked through a sense of shared 
culture and common descent associated with a given territory. According to 
this definition an ethnic group is based on cultural elements that bind the 
members together, however, one way that an ethnic group is distinguished 
from a nation in the scholarship is that a nation has the added element of 
political aspiration. Joseph, for example, stresses that a nation needs political 
borders and autonomy (2004: 163). The drawing of political boundaries may 
mean a nation has a particular status within a wider federation or confederation 
or it could mean that a nation aspires to having its own state. Indeed the 
concepts of nations and states are frequently confused. The United Nations, for 
example, is not an organisation of member nations but of member states. 
Furthermore, a nation can be defined as including 'all the people who form part 
legally of the territory of a sovereign state, regardless of their ethnic 
characteristics' (Stavenhagen, 1996: 3). The United States of America is an 
example of one such nation.9 
While Smith's definition of an ethnic group is concerned with the 
objective criteria that may make up an ethnic group, another element that 
makes it difficult to defme an ethnic group or nation is subjective in the sense 
that an ethnic group or nation can really only be defined subjectively by its 
members. This is clear from Hugh Seton-Watson's definition of a nation in his 
seminal work, Nations and States. For him, 
a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider 
themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one. It is not 
9 In Bosnia-Herzegovina dte word norod means either nation or people. Even though dte status 
ofa norod has political significance, I have chosen in this study to use the term 'ethnic group' 
to describe the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. This is because this study deals not just with 
present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina but also widt periods when dtey did not have the status of a 
norod. It also avoids confusion with Stavenhagen's cited definition of a nation. 
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necessary that the whole of the population should so feel, or so behave, and it 
is not possible to lay down dogmatically a minimum percentage of a 
population which must be so affected. When a significant group holds this 
belief, it possesses 'national consciousness' (1977: 5). 
Here, it is members of the nation itself who decide when it exists and, by 
extension what the criteria defining that nation, or 'elements of a shared 
culture', shall be. It is also the members of a nation who decide the boundaries 
with other groups, the 'us' as against the 'them'. In this sense a nation should 
be seen as a constructed entity. This is in contrast to the primordialist view that 
nations have existed since ancient times and that ethnic identity is something 
that each of us is born with and is immutable. 
Robert Greenberg highlights the contingent and mutable nature of 
ethnic identity in the Balkans where historically members of a given ethnic 
group would have 'switched their ethnic allegiances over time' (2004: 7) 
depending on the prevailing social and political circumstances and gives the 
example of the changing ethnic allegiance of a Muslim Slav born in the 
Serbian SandZak around 1930. In similar vein and applied to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, a Slav of the Muslim faith born in the first half of the twentieth 
century could have changed his ethnic affiliation several times during his 
lifetime: During the Second World War he may have self-identified as a 
Muslim Croat, in Communist Yugoslavia he could have self-identified first as a 
Yugoslav and then as a Muslim and after 1992 as a Bosniak. Linguistically 
also, he may have said in the first case that he spoke Croatian, in the second 
Serbo-Croat and in the third Bosnian. 
National consciousness, as mentioned by Seton-Watson above, is what 
leads the individual to self-identify as a member of the ethnic group or nation. 
It also forms the basis of nationalism which is a doctrine that holds ethnic 
identification to be an individual's preeminent identity. Much has been written 
about nationalism and there have been myriad attempts to define precisely 
what constitutes it. lO Andrew Heywood, however, sums up the dilemma by 
contrasting opposing views of what nationalism is intended to achieve. As he 
puts it, 'On the one hand, nationalism can appear to be a progressive and 
liberating force, offering the prospect of national unity or independence. On the 
10 Andrew Heywood, for example, pinpoints four types of nationalism: liberal nationalism, 
conservative nationalism, expansionist nationalism and anticolonial nationalism (2002: Ill). 
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other, it can be an irrational and reactionary creed that allows politica1leaders 
to conduct policies of military expansion and war in the name of the nation' 
(Heywood, 2002: Ill). The rise of nationalist sentiment in recent decades, 
especially since the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, mean that nationalism tends to be seen more in the sense of the 
second half of the quote, as an 'irrational and reactionary creed' driven by the 
aspiration to create from the ethnic group or nation a distinct political entity by 
any means necessary. It is, however, important to remember that the Romantic 
cultuml nationalism of the nineteenth century gave the ethnic groups of the 
Ottoman and Habsburg empires an important 'feeling of groupness' (Edwards, 
1985: 15) which meant they could identify themselves as distinct from the 
imperial powers. As Joshua Fishman puts it, 'Through nationalism masses of 
people attain and maintain a new and a constantly renewed sense of identity 
and purpose' (1972: 55). 
As suggested by the above, then, ethnic identity can be easily 
manipulated and in this regard 'it is politics and politicians who clarify and 
emphasize the criteria of ethnic assignment as a way of mobilizing support and 
allocating both demands and benefits' (Hammel, 2000: 26). Here language 
performs an important function. It can be used as a device to circumscribe the 
boundaries of a given ethnic group. It provides what Joshua Fishman calls 
'contrastive self-identification via language' (1972). This means that the 
members of an ethnic group are not only unified from within because of their 
use of a common language but this language also makes it possible for them to 
distinguish themselves from other groups. It marks the line separating Us from 
Them, or, as Fishman succinctly puts it: 'It is the shibboleth that differentiates 
friend from foe' (1972: 53).1l 
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where we have seen that there is 
very little of substance linguistically to differentiate one language from another 
the shibboleths that are used are the names of the languages. Croatian historian 
and commentator Ivan Lovrenovic has commented that when someone from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is asked what language they speak they are really being 
11 It is not always necessary for an ethnic group to have a separate language as a marker of its 
distinct identity. In Wales, for example, the English-speaking members of the population do 
not consider themselves any less Welsh because they speak only English. 
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asked what ethnic group they belong to (2002, paragraph 9). And even though 
people may not have changed their speech habits since the war they have 
'ethno-linguistic' awareness of the necessity to change the label they use for 
their language (Bugarski, 2005: 170). 
Fishman pinpoints a second function for language in ethnic 
identification as 'the authenticating device for finding, claiming and utilizing 
one's inheritance' (Fishman, 1972: 45). According to him, modem-day 
nationalism emphasises the importance of the ethnic past as it contains 'both 
the link to greatness as well as the substance of greatness itself' (1972: 44) and 
therefore provides an ethnic identity with authenticity. This hearkening back to 
the glorious linguistic past can be seen in the way Bosniak language planners 
stress the historicity of the language, claiming that a Bosnian language can be 
traced back to at least the fifteenth century. This stress on the historical nature 
of the language also led the Bosniaks to choose to call their language bosanski. 
This has caused controversy (which continues) because the word bosanski is 
the neutral adjectival form for Bosnia so any language called by that name 
should refer to the entire population and not just one ethnic group. Croats and 
Serbs believe that it would be better for the language to be called bosnjacki 
(Bosniak) which derives from the noun Bosnjak or Bosniak originally meaning 
a native of Bosnia but now denotes a Slav of Muslim faith. They argue that 
using Bosniak as a designation for the language would make it clear that it was 
the language of one ethnic group only. They also consider that use of the 
designation bosanski implies that the Bosniaks want to deny them their own 
linguistic identity. 
Using language as a link to the past is also a way of 'bridging 
immediate loyalties with transcendent ones' (Kelman, 1971: 31) and provides 
a continuity and scope without which a sense of overarching nationality could 
not be constructed; it provides concrete, emotionally significant products that 
the individual received from previous generations and will pass on to the 
future ones and that, in the present, link him to a widely dispersed population, 
most of whose members he does not, and never will, know personally' 
(Kelman, 1971: 31). 
Another way of putting this is that the individual is part of an 'imagined 
community,' as Benedict Anderson (1983) has described it. The group is 
imagined because one member will never meet all the other members of the 
group but it is a community because its members are tied together by a 
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common language. This idea is important for understanding the dynamics of 
ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats and Serbs feel that they are 
in an 'imagined community' with the Croats and Serbs in the neighbouring 
states of Croatia and Serbia and this community may transcend any kind of 
feeling of community they might have with non-Croat or non-Serb members of 
the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, their allegiance to their respective 
kin states is stronger than to the unified state. In this respect, a common 
language functions as a way to justify the bonds with the kin states. For the 
Bosniaks the 'imagined community' is more limited in scope although the 
language still provides a link with both past and future generations. They do 
not have a kin state so their 'imagined community' is made up of other 
members of the Bosniak ethnic group in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Being part of 
this community allows them to have their own distinct group identity which 
means they cannot so easily be co-opted by the Croats and Serbs as members 
of their groups. This refusal on the part of the Croats and Serbs to accept the 
Bosniaks as a separate ethnic group has been a feature in the relations between 
the three ethnic communities since the nineteenth century. In this regard the 
Croats and Serbs argue that ethnically the Bosniaks are really Croats and Serbs 
who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. 
The foregoing discussion has been intended to explain the language-
ethnic identity link that is crucial in contemporary language politics in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. An understanding of this link is essential when considering 
language issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is easily manipulated by local 
elites as a way of hampering broader peace-building endeavours and post-war 
reconciliation. This is the background against which any approach to linguistic 
matters taken by the international community plays out, and any international 
involvement with the contemporary language situation necessarily feeds into 
these efforts of the local elites. Much of the rest of this study is concerned with 
the interaction between the actions of the international actors and the 
nationalist discourse of the domestic elites in the area of language politics. 
Methods 
I have used a combination of sources to research the questions posed 
earlier on in this Introduction. In my data collection I looked at primary sources 
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such as official documents produced by various international organisations on 
subjects germane to the topics dealt with in this thesis and the domestic 
legislation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as international legal instruments 
such as the European Charter of Human Rights. I also drew on primary 
research concerning various aspects of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina 
conducted by other researchers. For example, much research has been done on 
issues of identity in the education system in Mostar (HromadZic, 2006; 
Wimmen, 2004; Owen Jackson, 2008) and I have made use of this research in 
Chapter 4 which looks at language issues in education reform. I also made use 
of newspaper articles as a source of additional evidence to verify data from 
other sources. Additionally, at the end of Chapter 3 I use newspaper articles for 
the purposes of a detailed linguistic analysis in the discussion on societal 
security in order to illustrate how political elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina use 
rhetoric to undermine societal security. 
Empirical data was gleaned from interviews that I conducted mostly in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the rest of this section will detail these and issues 
related to the purpose of the interviews, my choice of interviewee and my 
positionality. Traditionally, social researchers are expected to be 'value free 
and objective' (Bryman, 2008: 24) in their research. Increasingly, however, 
there is a recognition that the researcher 'carries personal ideas, feelings and 
stereotypes into the field' (Armakolas, 2001: 174) which influence the way in 
which data is collected, analysed and interpreted. Bearing this in mind I will 
start this section by explaining my own previous personal experience which 
has undoubtedly impacted on the course of my research. 
The impetus for embarking on this study came from my own 
experience as a professional translator and interpreter working for various 
international organisations dealing with the languages of the successor states of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1987 and most recently as the chief of the 
language service of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) HQ for four years 
from April 2000 to June 2004. This study and its development have therefore 
been informed to a great extent by my previous professional experience. For 
example, I knew from the beginning that the research would focus on the 
implications of the recognition of three official languages in post-Dayton 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as this had been an important element of day-to-day 
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operations in the HQ SFOR language service and I wanted to explore the wider 
impact of this. 
My experience as a professional linguist also meant I had an interest in 
how translators and interpreters deal with issues to do with working between 
English and three mutually comprehensible languages as is the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. While there has been other research done on interpreters and 
translators working in a conflict situation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Stahuljak, 2000; Baker, 2009) there was nothing specifically highlighting this 
issue. It was therefore clear early on in the research that part of my research 
would involve interviews with linguists in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, 
because of my previous professional experience dealing with language matters 
I was aware that in investigating the development of the language policies of 
international organisations it would be necessary to interview linguists as the 
actors with the most direct involvement in language issues. 
The bulk of the interviewees for this study can be divided into two 
categories: linguists working for international organisations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and experts involved in education matters at the OSCE 
(Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the OHR (Office of the 
High Representative) and at an international NGO. All these interviews were 
conducted during a research trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina that took place 
between 25 May and 8 June 2008. Two other interviews were conducted 
subsequently: one over the telephone with an interpreter living in the US who 
had been engaged at the negotiations that led to the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (3 August 2008) and the other in London on 21 October 
2009 with Lord (Paddy) Ashdown who was the International Community's 
High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina from May 2002 to January 2006. 
Interviews with linguists 
Interviews were conducted with linguists from the Headquarters of the 
European military force (EUFOR) in Sarajevo (13), the OHR (four), the OSCE 
( one) and the Sarajevo office of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Fonner Yugoslavia (one). These organisations were chosen because they each 
have an organised translation and interpretation service which have dealt with 
language matters since 1995 and even before. There have been myriad other 
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international organisations and agencies active in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
past 14 years but only the largest organisations have employed or employ 
linguists in large numbers and would therefore be most likely to have 
established a specific language service. As one purpose of these interviews was 
to investigate how language policy as it relates to translation and interpretation 
practices has developed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, I 
worked from the premise that the organisations with an actual language service 
would be most likely to have an established language policy. 
Another reason for choosing to interview the linguists in these 
organisations rather than non-linguists was because of their longevity in their 
posts as many of them had begun their employment in 1995 or even before. 
They therefore had the 'institutional memory' that is lacking among other, 
especially international, staff who tend to spend shorter periods in post. This is 
especially true of the international military force whose members spend an 
average of six months in theatre before they are rotated out again. 
The second purpose of the interviews with these linguists was to 
investigate their views regarding the way language usage mayor may not have 
changed since the war. As language experts working with language on a daily 
basis and having to deal with three officially separate but mutually intelligible 
languages on a daily basis, I assumed in this regard that they would be more 
likely to be attuned to any change in language usage and would be more likely 
to have an opinion on language matters than a non-language professional. The 
responses to questions on these issues from the linguists at HQ EUFOR yielded 
useful data that was analysed using narrative theory following Mona Baker 
(2006) in Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
Interviews with military linguists 
The interviews with the linguists at HQ EUFOR threw up various 
issues to do with the interviewer-interviewee relationship given that all those 
interviewed were former colleagues of mine and, additionally, I had been their 
boss. This led to the question of whether I could be considered an insider or an 
outsider. In the strictest sense, I am not an insider because I am not from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina nor do I have any family ties with the country nor am I 
resident in the country. But nor am I a complete outsider as I worked with the 
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interviewees for four years and therefore have particular knowledge of their 
experiences. My position of a fonner superior, t h o u ~ ~ makes this relationship 
more complex because of its essential inequality and this could have meant a 
certain distance between us or at least a certain reserve on the part of the 
interviewees. If this were the case the four years that had elapsed since I left 
HQ SFOR may have meant I was viewed more as an equal. Finally, I hoped 
that the interviewees' attitude toward me would be a generally positive one 
because in my time I had managed to preserve their jobs from the downsizing 
that was going on when I arrived in post and overall I had improved their 
conditions of employment. On balance, therefore, I would position myself 
somewhere between an outsider and an insider. 12 
Labaree pinpoints four advantages to being an insider: 'the value of 
shared experiences; the value of greater access; the value of cultural 
interpretation; and the value of deeper understanding and clarity of thought for 
the researcher' (2003: 103). My research has benefited from all four of these 
values. For example, I was especially helped by having access to a large 
number of linguists in the international military force and because of prior 
acquaintance there was already an established rapport which facilitated the 
interviews (Keats, 2000) and trust between us. This meant that the course of 
the interviewing process ran smoothly. 
There are, however, also pitfalls to being an insider especially as 
regards the question of familiarity. The risk during the interviews was that the 
interviewees may assume that I would automatically understand something that 
they meant but did not explicitly explain which might lead me to make 
erroneous assumptions. The only way I could see to guard against this 
happening was to be on alert throughout the interviews to anything I might 
have misinterpreted and to then ask follow-up questions. I chose to conduct 
semi-structured interviews as this allowed me to ask particular questions that 
12 Tamar Hermann in her analysis of researchers in violently divided societies, mentions the 
category of 'involved outsider' which she describes as someone who 'is personally connected 
to the conflict by virtue of belonging to one of the national, religious or ethnic groups involved 
in it, or because of an identification with a general political stance such as anti-racism, anti-
colonialism or non-violence that is relevant to the analysis of the specific conflict' (200 I: 79). 
Neither of these definitions fits my personal circumstances although I am personally connected 
to the region because of my previous professional experience and current academic interests. 
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were focussed on the very specific issues I was interested in but it also meant 
that I could ask additional clarifying questions if need be. This method also 
gave an interviewee the opportunity to speak for as long as they wanted but 
within the confines of the question. This meant that the duration of the 
interviews ranged from 20 minutes to more than an hour. 
I did not attempt to make a selection of the HQ EUFOR linguists I 
wanted to interview prior to the interviews as I was aware that I would be 
constrained by who was available on the days that I was in Sarajevo, however, 
I did manage to interview linguists with a range of experience and opinions. 
Interviews with non-military linguists 
The main issue regarding my interviews with the non-military linguists 
in the OHR and the OSCE was to do with access as I had been unable to 
contact them prior to my research trip. Access to the OHR linguists was 
facilitated through a friend who was employed there at the time, and I made 
contact with the OSCE linguist through the ICTY linguist who I also 
interviewed. This last interpreter was a former colleague and friend of mine 
from the time I was employed at the ICTY in The Hague (1994-2000). 
All these linguists were very willing to take the time to talk to me and a 
rapport was quickly established. This may have been because they saw me as a 
kindred spirit because of my previous experience as a linguist in Sarajevo or 
because I had come recommended by others. I also gained the impression that 
they were glad that they were finally being asked about their experiences and 
opinions as linguists. 
Interviews with non-linguists 
The other main group of interviewees were people working in the field 
of education. I interviewed two staff members of the OSCE Education 
Department, a staff member of the OHR working on education reform, the 
national director of an international NGO and two staff members working in its 
office in Zenica The respondents from the OSCE and the OHR were selected 
because these are the international organisations that have the lead role in 
education reform in the international community. The respondents from the 
NGO were chosen because this organisation bas had an important role in 
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improving conditions in local communities since 1995. For example, it has had 
projects constructing homes for returnees, it is supporting community-based 
groups to strengthen civil society and is working on economic development 
with micro-finance loans to poor rural families, among other initiatives. Its 
focus is on children and in 2007 it assisted more than 1,500 children with 
clothing, shoes, basic literacy support and extra classes. The NGO also repaired 
six schools in neglected rural areas and gave educational supplies to 19 
schools. I therefore thought that since the NGO, as a faith-based 13 organisation, 
was more directly involved with local communities on the ground its staff 
melDbers may have a different view of the issues considered in this thesis to 
those held by staff members of the international organisations who are 
involved more with the policy-making level. This was borne out early on in the 
interviews with the two staff members in Zenica who talked a lot about the 
overt and hidden poverty experienced by ordinary people in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
I arranged the interview with one of the interviewees at the OSeE by 
email prior to departing for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This interviewee had 
published and presented several papers at international conferences on Bosnia-
Herzegovina and I was able to obtain their email address through one of these. 
This interviewee then suggested for interview a colleague in the education 
department with a particular interest in language matters. The interview with 
the interviewee at the OHR was arranged through a contact in another 
department while the national director of the NGO was already an 
acquaintance of mine. They then suggested I interview the two staff members 
in Zenica 
The purpose of these interviews was two-fold. First, they were used to 
glean additional information about the education refonn activities of the 
particular organisation the interviewee belonged to and to offset the 
information and opinions contained in official reports by these organisations as 
regards education refonn. I considered this to be important bearing in mind that 
the author of a particular report always has a certain point of view that they 
13 This NGO describes itself as: a Christian relief: development and advocacy organisation 
dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and 
injustice. 
25 
want to put across (Bryman, 2008: 522) so there may be alternative viewpoints. 
These interviews were thus a way of forming a more complete picture of 
developments and activities in the field of education. 
The second purpose of this group of interviews was to gauge to what 
extent issues of language are present and considered in the work of the various 
organisations and specifically in an area where issues of identity-formation are 
important. More specifically some of the questions dealt with the effect 
language issues have on on-going reform of the education sector in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. I also wanted to ascertain whether the interviewees, as experts in 
their field and with the status of 'insiders' in their organisations, would 
consider that the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina had any kind 
of language policy in the field of education reform. 
Other interviews 
As I have taken the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement as the 
starting point for this study since it recognises three official languages in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina it seemed important to attempt to ascertain the extent to 
which language issues were considered during the negotiations that were held 
at the Wright Patterson airbase which produced the agreement In August 2008 
I therefore interviewed by telephone one interpreter who had worked at the 
talks and was based in the United States. I had previously worked with this 
interpreter so it was relatively easy to gain access to this person. However, it 
took some weeks to finally set up the interview because for security reasons the 
interviewee had to first gain permission from the US State Department, which 
had engaged them for the negotiations, to talk to me. Permission was granted 
although the interpreter was not allowed to talk about anything to do with the 
actual content of the negotiations i.e. what a particular participant may have 
said on a certain issue. The interview therefore focussed on organisational 
matters regarding the negotiations. 
My final interviewee was Lord (paddy) Ashdown who, as stated above, 
was the international community's High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
between May 2002 and January 2006. The reason for interviewing him was a 
comment he made in his book Swords and Ploughshares: Building Peace in 
the 21st Century about the linguistic nationalism that he believed had been 
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encouraged with the recognition of three official languages in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (Ashdown, 2007: 99). His comments on this seemed to 
suggest that he had given serious thought to the language issue in post-Dayton 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and its implications for stability in the country. This is in 
contrast to much of the writing on Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of 
the 1990s where language issues are either completely absent or are treated in a 
much more superficial way (see Holbrooke, 1998 and Glenny, 1992). Access to 
Lord Ashdown was facilitated by Dr. Catherine Baker, post-doctoral research 
assistant on the Languages at War project at the University of Southampton 
which is researching language contacts in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
I did not anonymise the quotes I cite from the interview with Lord 
Ashdown as he was speaking in his capacity as a former High Representative 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina which gives weight to his comments. All other 
interviewees have been anonymised and no more information on them will be 
provided in order to preserve their anonymity. 
The language of the interviews 
All the interviews apart from two were conducted in English. This was 
particularly important for the interviews with the linguists as I interviewed 
them in their offices and I wanted them to think about language issues in their 
professional capacity as employees of an international organisation. Because of 
their high level of competence in English there was little danger that they 
would not be able to express themselves adequately. 
The two interviews that I conducted in the local language were with the 
two staff members of the NGO in Zenica. I had been told prior to the 
interviews that they were unconfident about their level of competence in 
English and on meeting we immediately struck up a rapport speaking the local 
language, and this is how we continued the interviews. Because these two staff 
members were not employed as linguists and their interviews would not be 
compared with those conducted with linguists it was not imperative that the 
interviews be conducted in English. 
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Presentation of interview material 
In presenting the interview material I have chosen to apply what 
Thompson calls a 'cross-analysis' approach where 'the oral evidence is treated 
as a quarry from which to construct an argument. .. This will normally require 
much briefer quotations, with evidence from one interview compared with that 
of another, and combined with evidence from other types of source material' 
(1978: 239). This means that data from the interviews are to be found 
throughout the study although material from interviews with the education 
experts is to be found mainly in Chapter 4 on education reform and the data 
from interviews with the military linguists are mostly in Chapter 5. Interview 
material is interspersed with evidence from the other sources detailed at the 
beginning of this section. In this sense the presentation of material is driven by 
the argument I want to present rather than a desire to present a series of life 
histories14• 
Structure of the Study 
The study consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is a literature review 
related to language policy and planning in general and specifically regarding 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It concentrates on the language policy and planning 
activities of the three main ethnic groups themselves but concludes with a 
review of current scholarship on the approach the international community has 
taken as regards linguistic matters in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Chapter 2 provides historical background to the contemporary 
language politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It focuses on three distinct periods in 
the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina - the period of Hapsburg rule from 1878 to 
1914, the fascist regime of the Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945) and 
the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1990) - when a 
language planning process was embarked upon. It will analyse the historic link 
between ethnic identity, linguistic nationalism and language planning, drawing 
14 In some of the interview extracts I have inserted explanatory notes between forward slashes. 
In some cases these notes explain something that was said or are an addition by me for the sake 
of clarification. In one instance where something the interviewee said was unclear from the 
recording I have put the words I think. they said between forward slashes with a question mark 
in front. 
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comparisons among the three periods and highlighting issues that are still 
important for the contemporary situation. 
As stated above, this study takes the Dayton Peace Agreement as the 
starting point for the peace-building activities of the international community 
so Chapter 3 looks more closely at the provisions of the agreement. It begins 
with an explanation of what is meant by the term peace-building. It then 
analyses the state structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina to show how post-Dayton 
state arrangements have led to a situation where an identity based on loyalty to 
a particular ethnic group rather than the joint state is the dominant identity in 
the political system. Then focussing on language, it will look at the status of 
the languages in the constitutions and the impact of a 2000 decision of the 
Constitutional Court which led to constitutional amendments providing equal 
rights, including equal language rights, for all the ethnic groups. As a multi-
ethnic state Bosnia-Herzegovina lends itself to analysis within the framework 
of the concept of societal security which in turn helps us to understand how 
language issues can be manipulated to undermine the integrity and stability of 
the state. 
The next two chapters deal with two contrasting aspects of the peace-
building endeavour that were treated very differently in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. These are two sectors that can be expected to be the focus of any 
peace-building endeavour: the education system and defence reform. The 
education system was mentioned hardly at all in the agreement but the 
international community has nevertheless been involved to a significant degree 
in its reform. Given the importance of the education sector in identity 
formation, the local elites have also involved themselves in education reform in 
order to maintain linguistic and other distinctions between the three main 
ethnic groups and thereby hinder external peace-building efforts and 
reconciliation. Chapter 4 therefore looks at the activities of the international 
community in this sector focusing on its approach to language and analyses 
how these activities feed into the wider efforts of the local authorities to hinder 
reconciliation. 
In contrast, the bulk of the Dayton Peace Agreement is devoted to the 
military aspects of the peace. Chapter 5 therefore looks at the way in which 
the international military force approached the language issue in its dealings 
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with the local military forces, specifically in the area of defence reform which 
is generally seen as one of the successes of the external peace-building effort in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast to language policy in education reform, in 
this field it is related to the internal policy and practice of the international 
military force (which led the defence reform) as regards translation and 
interpretation. Drawing on interviews with linguists employed by the 
international military force the chapter will trace the way in which this 
language policy was formed and endeavour to assess its impact on the ultimate 
goals of the defence reform. It will be shown that this policy was guided to a 
great extent by the linguists themselves so there will also be a discussion of 
translator and interpreter ethics applying narrative theory as suggested by 
Mona Baker in her monograph Translation and Coriflict: a narrative account 
(2006). 
The concluding chapter draws compansons between the two case 
studies - education reform and defence reform - and the way in which 
language was approached in the two areas. I then endeavour to answer the 
questions posed at the beginning and test the contention that if the international 
organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina have had a language policy it has 





This study is about language policy and language planning in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It is concerned primarily with investigating the language policy 
of the international organisations currently present in the country as part of the 
peace-building mission since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
December 1995. There is considerable general scholarship on the activities of 
the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina dealing with various 
aspects of the peace-building project. For example, certain scholars (inter alia 
Chandler, 1999; Bieber, 1999; Hayden, 2005; Bose, 2002) focus on the 
implications of the constitutional arrangements put in place by the agreement 
for the future stability of the post-war state and its democratic development. 
Others (inter alia Sebastian, 2009; Recchia, 2007) focus on the relationship 
between the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and one particular international 
actor, such as the European Union. In contrast, very little writing has as its 
focus the language policy activities of the international community in post-
Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. This literature review identifies just two scholarly 
works, Greenberg (2004) and Monnesland (2005), which give any 
consideration at all to actions by the international organisations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as regards language issues. This study is therefore intended to go 
some way in filling this gap in the scholarship. 
The scholarship that does exist on language planning and policy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is mainly concerned with the language planning activities 
of the Bosniaks in standardising their language. The Serbs and Croats in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina have been able to look to Serbia and Croatia respectively 
for their own language standards and have therefore needed to take fewer steps 
in shaping their own linguistic identity. As a consequence there is far less 
written on the language policy activities of these two ethnic groups. In contrast, 
the Bosniaks have had to mould their own standard language by themselves, 
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and Bosniak language planners have been more active in establishing a distinct 
linguistic identity for the Bosniaks as a way of underpinning their separate 
ethnic identity. Much of the scholarship on these language planning and policy 
activities of the Bosniaks is concerned with the particular features that make up 
the corpus of the new Bosnian standard and distinguish it from Croatian and 
Serbian; discussions on these features and the extent to which they are present 
in the Bosnian language can be found in Ford (2001), Monnesland (2004 and 
2005), Lehfeldt (2003), Volkl (2002) and Greenberg (2009). This purely 
linguistic aspect to the scholarship will not be dealt with in much detail in this 
literature review because we are primarily concerned with the socio-linguistic 
aspects of the language situation, that is the interaction between aspects of 
language and societal circumstances and developments. 
Given the lack of scholarship on the specific topic of the influence of 
international actors on the language issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the greatest 
part of this literature review takes the general scholarship on language policy 
and language planning and relates it to the language policy and planning 
undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina by domestic authorities and elites. In this, it 
will also make use of the scholarship that is available regarding language 
policy and planning in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This approach provides the 
theoretical and conceptual context for the language planning and policy actions 
of the domestic authorities and elites, as well as those of the international 
community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the scholarship on which will be discussed 
in the final section of the literature review. 
Looking at the language planning and policy activities of domestic 
authorities and elites also provides the domestic context in which to consider 
the language policy actions of international organisations. The international 
community's approach to the language issue should not be seen in isolation 
from the activities of domestic language planners and elites because the actions 
of international organisations in this regard feed into the concerns, motivations 
and actions of the domestic actors. It is therefore necessary to understand the 
activities of the domestic language planners in order to fully comprehend the 
implications of the actions of the international community in addressing the 
language issue. 
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The first section of this chapter looks at what is meant by language 
policy and planning and gives a brief overview of the historical development of 
language planning and policy and the related scholarship. It will then move on 
to considering the language planning activities of the three main ethnic groups 
as they relate to this scholarship. The review focuses necessarily on the 
language planning activities of the Bosniaks for the reasons touched on above. 
The final section of this chapter looks at the only two works, (Greenberg, 
2004) and (Monnesland, 2005), which deal in any detail with the activities of 
the international community as regards the language issue in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
What do we mean by Language Policy? 
In the scholarship there is no one specific definition of language policy. 
Scholars use the term to describe different things and it is often used 
interchangeably or in tandem with the term language planning. Put at its 
simplest, the term 'language policy' denotes 'all forms of intervention in 
language' (Grin, 2003: 28). This is the broadest possible defmition of the term 
as it gives no indication of what form a language policy takes, nor who 
implements it and how, nor what the possible outcomes of policy 
implementation might be. This lack of specificity means, however, that 
language policy can encompass a broad range of different activities carried out 
by a variety of possible actors. Many discussions of language policy place it at 
the national level, as something that is done by 'politicians, statesmen or 
policy-making bodies' (Cobarrubias, 1983: 62). However, as Robert Cooper 
(1989) argues, seeing language policy only in these terms rules out the 
activities carried out more at the grassroots, for example, activities initiated by 
the Women's Movement in the United States aimed at promoting non-sexist 
usage. Nor, according to Cooper (1989: 31), would it include the language 
reform efforts of individuals such as Ben Yehuda in Palestine and Samuel 
Johnson in England. Similarly, Bji>rn Jernudd considers that agencies that are 
not governmental or national 'can obviously concern themselves with language 
in an orderly fashion' (1973: 18). He cites as examples of these national but 
nongovernmental agencies, associations of professionals who coin or spread 
terminology, non-national and nongovernmental agencies such as large 
33 
specialised corporations which might provide its own tenninology for a 
specific field or encourages the use of a specific language, newspapers with 
their proof-reading function and the production of style guides and the writings 
of individual authors (Jemudd, 1973: 19). Finally, there can even be language 
policy at the level of the family, for example, when a family member is 'trying 
to persuade others in the family to speak a heritage language' (Spolsky, 2005: 
2153). Thus, language policy can refer to many different kinds of decision-
making as regards language use and at various levels of society. 
As mentioned above, the term language policy is frequently used 
interchangeably with the term language planning but generally there is no 
consistency in the use of terminology. Sue Wright (2004), for example, puts 
the two terms together in her book Language Policy and Language Planning: 
from Nationalism to Globalisation and uses the acronym LPLP throughout the 
text. The term language planning was originally coined by Vriel Weinreich in 
1957 but it was Einar Haugen who first wrote about it in his 1959 analysis of 
the process of language change in Norway. He described it as 'the activity of 
preparing a normative orthography, grammar and dictionary for the guidance 
of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community' (1959: 8), 
meaning a speech community in which more than one language is spoken. As 
can be seen, Haugen's original definition is a purely linguistic one focussed on 
the substance or corpus of a language, but over time other scholars in the field 
have devised different definitions to take account of other aspects of language 
planning. In Language Planning and Social Change, Cooper cites 12 of these 
which emphasise various aspects of the language planning process and 
analyses them from the perspective of 'who plans what for whom and how' 
(1989: 31). Cooper also advances his own definition of language planning as 
referring 'to deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect 
to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes' 
(1989: 45). Here, Cooper has moved away from seeing language planning 
solely in terms of the codification of a language. He does not restrict the 
planners to any particular societal group nor does he specify the kind of plan 
that should be implemented or the goal that should be achieved. However, by 
including in his description the idea of 'deliberate' action he is nevertheless 
implying that the activity is intentional and oriented towards a specific goal. 
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In this thesis, language policy is used as a more general, over-arching 
term, as suggested in Grin's definition cited above, especially as much of the 
discussion in this study involves language decisions which are not part of an 
explicit planning process. As Spolsky points out, 'Many countries, institutions 
and social groups do not have formal or written language policies, so that the 
nature of their language policy must be derived from a study of their language 
practice or beliefs' (2005: 2153). The term 'language planning' is used in this 
thesis more specifically to focus on activities which fit more recognisably into 
Cooper's definition of language planning. In this regard it is important to 
distinguish the two kinds of planning as put forward by Heinz Kloss: status 
planning and corpus planning. For him the focus of status planning was on a 
language's 'standing alongside other languages or vis-a-vis a national 
government' (1969), that is to say the social status of a language, while corpus 
planning was defined as actions aimed at standardising the actual language 
itself (in line with Haugen's original definition of language planning above). 
Both these concepts are germane to our discussion of the language planning 
activities of the three main ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina and they will 
be explored in more detail further on in this chapter in a consideration of these 
specific activities. But first it is necessary to consider the possible motivations 
for language policy and to do this it is instructive to look at the history of 
language planning and language planning scholarship. 
Overview of development of general language planning 
and policy study 
Language planning and policy falls within the discipline of the 
sociology of language which in turn is part of sociolinguistics (Eastman 1983: 
3). Joshua Fishman, who is considered to be the founding father of language 
planning, defmes the sociology of language as including 'behaviour toward 
language (language attitudes, language movements, language planning) and the 
language concomitants of social processes large and small (including societal 
formation and reformation, societal interaction and societal change and 
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dislocation), (1972: 269).15 In this definition language planning is clearly 
linked with social influences and circumstances. Joan Rubin explains this 
further when she says 'language is more than an instrument to impart 
referential meaning. Language is a social activity which serves to identify the 
speaker and to place him in a particular relationship with the addressee' (1984: 
9). In this sense language does more than just facilitate communication 
between speakers and therefore language planning and policy relates to not just 
this communicative function but also the symbolic meanings that are imparted 
when we use language. Carol Eastman underscores this when she highlights 
that language planning concerns 'center on sociologically based considerations 
of language (1) as a factor of ethnic identity, (2) as a marker of social class, and 
(3) as a reflection of status and mobility in a multilingual context' (1983: 116). 
In the context of this thesis, the first of these concerning ethnic identity is 
crucial for an understanding of the interaction between social and societal 
circumstances and language issues. 
Language problems and attempts to address language issues have 
occurred throughout history: Eastman sees contemporary language planning as 
owing much to the establishment of language academies from the sixteenth 
century onwards because modern-day language planners have similar concerns 
to those of their ancestors, for example, language standardisation, codification 
and elaboration. It was not, however, until the 1960s that the academic 
discipline of language planning began to emerge and Eastman pinpoints the 
activities of Joshua Fishman as crucial to this development. At the end of the 
1950s, Fishman suggested to the US Census Bureau that the language 
questions in the 1960 census questionnaire be revised. His interest was in 
collecting data on the use of non-English languages by the various ethnic and 
religious groups in the US which could then be used to research the language-
related problems that existed in the country at that time. This in tum led to the 
work Language Loyalty in the United States which Fishman published in 1960 
which Eastman says was 'one of the first works of scholarship to consider 
language planning as a scientific endeavour in a social context' (1983: 105). It 
also reflected growing interest in language issues generally as, in 1951, 
IS For him the tenn sociolinguistics was inadequate as it implied just a 'kind oflinguistics' and 
did not take account of attitudes to language. 
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UNESCO had published a report entitled The Use of Vernacular Languages in 
Education. It defmed ten language situations regarding language choices in 
multilingual societies and, according to Eastman, guided much of later 
language planning research in that area 
While language planning study began by considering the experiences of 
ethnic groups in the US, as represented by Fishman's work, as time went by 
there was a shift to research in the language problems of developing countries. 
According to Bjorn Jernudd, this was a 'reply to the mounting evidence of the 
need for immediate, practical solutions to the language problems of the 
developing countries' (1973:13). Language was seen as one element that 
needed to be and could be managed among all the issues involved in 
establishing an independent state and coincided with a 'general belief in the 
effectiveness' (Wright, 2004: 9) of language planning and the idea that 
language problems could be solved. At this stage of language planning focus 
was 'on the establishment and promotion of ''unifying'' majority (national) 
languages in postcolonial contexts' (May, 2003: 102) so that a language such 
as English would be promoted as a lingua franca in a country where there were 
competing minority languages and dialects. As a consequence, it was thought 
at this time that for a country to develop, especially economically, it was 
necessary for it to have as few official languages and dialects as possible 
(Phillipson, Rannut and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1995: 4). 
Sue Wright divides up the post-Second World War period into three 
phases of importance for the study of language planning. The first concerns the 
post-colonial experiences as mentioned above. The second phase was marked 
by a reaction against this 'optimistic belief in progress' (Wright, 2004: 9). 
According to Wright, progress in the modernisation and democratisation of the 
new states slowed and there was a rejection of Western neo-colonialist 
solutions to the problems of the developing countries. In the field of language 
planning, the focus shifted from the linguistic aspects to the social, economic 
and political effects of language contact, in particular, 'issues of 
advantage/disadvantage, status and access' (Wright, 2004: 9). In addition, the 
discipline had to respond to the massive migrations of the second half of the 
twentieth century which produced language behaviour that was different to 
what had occurred in the past so that there was a rejection of total linguistic 
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assimilation in favour of maintaining the language of the country of origin. 
This in turn led to certain countries developing policies to accommodate the 
cultural and linguistic traditions of the new immigrants, such as, Canada and 
Australia (Wright, 2004: to). 
The third phase, according to Wright, is a consequence of the end of the 
Cold War and the spread of American dominated globalisation in all spheres. 
As people have become increasingly associated on a global scale the need for a 
universal medium of communication has been met by English. Wright says that 
this 'hegemony of English in political, economic, cultural and technological 
spheres has remained unchallenged' (2004: 11). In tandem with globalisation 
there has also been increased regionalisation, according to Wright, where 
regional supranational groups have been established, such as the European 
Union (2004, 11). As member states concede some authority to the centre, 
groups that are dissatisfied with their status within these states look to this 
same centre for support for their increased autonomy or even independence. 
Wright cites the Catalans, Scots, Flemings, Slovaks and Estonians as examples 
of such groups which have acquired autonomy or an independent state as part 
of this process in the last two decades. Both these developments have meant 
that in both language policy and language policy scholarship there is increasing 
focus on minorities and their rights and, as part of this, emphasis is placed on 
linguistic human rights. In this regard, if the protection of minorities is 
essentially about ensuring that a particular minority continues to exist by 
protecting and securing minority rights for it, then its language as 'one of the 
most important cultural core values' (Phillipson, Rannut and Skutnabb-Kangas, 
1995: 7) must also be protected through the advocacy of linguistic human 
rights. This greater emphasis on linguistic human rights was reflected, at the 
end of the twentieth century, in the codification of international documents 
such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992 and the 
European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages of 1992. This concern 
with linguistic human rights therefore represents a shift away from the focus of 
early language planning which was on majority languages towards 
contemporary ideas connected with the need for and advantages to maintaining 
linguistic diversity. These developments are important for the present study 
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because with their emphasis on linguistic diversity they not only inform the 
approach of the international community to the language issue in Bosnia-
Herzegovina but also that of the domestic authorities and elites. 
Motivations for language planning 
As suggested by the variety of problems and concerns addressed in 
language planning and language planning scholarship since the 1960s, the 
motivations for language planning and policy are many and varied. Joan Rubin 
believes that there are three general areas of intended aims of language 
planning: linguistic, semi-linguistic and extra-linguistic (Rubin, 1984: 8). In the 
semi-linguistic category changes in language also serve social or political aims. 
According to Rubin, an example of this is bilingual education in the US which 
came after the civil rights movement and related to socio-political and 
economic rights as much as pedagogical improvements. Extra-linguistic aims 
are related to cases where there is no language problem and yet language 
planning is used to achieve these aims. Rubin cites the development of the 
Hausa language in this regard (1984: 9). In this case, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century when colonial rule was established in Northern Nigeria, the 
British High Commissioner imposed the Roman script for the written Hausa 
language as the language of administration. This was instead of the Arabic 
script that was already in use. His purely political objective was to facilitate 
colonial rule by creating a class of people who could read and write Romanised 
Hausa but were unable to speak English (Philips, 1996). 
Cooper says that 'language planning is typically carried out for the 
attainment of non-linguistic ends such as consumer protection, scientific 
exchange, national integration, political control, economic development, the 
creation of new elites or the maintenance of old ones, the pacification or 
cooption of minority groups, and mass mobilization of national or political 
movements' (1989: 35). He argues that extra-linguistic considerations 
(political, economic, scientific, social, cultural and/or religious) are the primary 
(my emphasis) motivation for language planning, and definitions of language 
planning as the solution of language or communication problems are 
'misleading' (1989: 35). This assertion is broadly true and there are numerous 
examples to support this such as the francization programme in Quebec in the 
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seventies which had the extra-linguistic aim of improving the economic and 
financial standing of the French population by putting more emphasis on the 
need for knowledge of French in the workplace but there are also some 
examples which seem to have been motivated by purely linguistic goals, for 
example the 1996 spelling reform in Germany which seems to have had the 
linguistic aim of simplifying the German orthography to make the language 
easier to learn. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, it is the extra-
linguistic considerations which are of overriding importance in the language 
planning activities of all three ethnic groups. As there is no communicative 
problem to resolve because the three main ethnic groups speak mutually 
intelligible languages, the motivation for language planning stems from the 
need to develop and maintain distinct ethnic identities for each of the ethnic 
groups; this is done partly through the promotion of separate language 
standards. While this has been easier for the Serbs and Croats who can make 
use of their historic, cultural and linguistic ties to Serbia and Croatia to claim 
ethnic difference, the Bosniaks have had to make greater effort in, for example, 
devising their own orthography, dictionaries, grammars and other instruments 
of codification in order to create a distinct linguistic identity which bolsters a 
separate Bosniak ethnic identity. In this they have undertaken activities that can 
be fitted into the categories of status planning and corpus planning which will 
be discussed in the next two sections. 
Status planning 
Over time the meaning of status planning has been extended in the 
scholarship to include 'deliberate efforts to influence the allocation of functions 
among a community's languages' (Cooper, 1989: 99). In his Sociolinguistic 
Typology of Multilingualism, Stewart elaborated ten categories of linguistic 
function: Official, Provincial, Wider communication, International, Capital, 
Group, Educational, School subject, Literary and Religious (1968: 540-541). 
According to Stewart, the same linguistic system could be used for more than 
one function. However, 'multilingual situations may be considered stable when 
the different linguistic systems are geographically, socially and functionally 
non-competitive' (Stewart, 1968: 541). For example, there may be two 
languages performing the same function but if they are the languages of 
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different local administrative units or of different social or ethnic groups there 
is no linguistic conflict because the use of one language does not impinge on 
the use of the other. A language conflict may arise if this complementary 
relationship is upset 'either by natural historical process or by direct 
administrative intervention' (Stewart, 1968: 541). 
Status planning among the Bosniaks is not related to ensuring that 
particular functions are allocated to Bosnian as against those allocated to 
Serbian and Croatian but rather harks back to Kloss's original definition of 
status planning, that is its 'standing alongside' Croatian and Serbian. This 
means raising the profile of the Bosnian language so that it is on an equal 
footing with Croatian and Serbian. One way to do this has been to stress the 
historicity of the language, and especially its position in the literary history of 
Bosnia. This is in line with Fishman's idea about language serving as an 
authenticating device for nationalism as discussed in the Introduction to this 
study. Thus, in Bosanski jezik. the Bosniak: language planner Senahid Halilovic 
(1998) cites 37 examples of the use of the tenn 'Bosnian language' since the 
fifteenth century. Interestingly, the Bosnian language that is referred to in each 
of Halilovic' s examples is not necessarily the Bosnian that is spoken today or 
indeed a Slavonic language. For example, Halilovic begins his list of 
references by stating that between the end of the fifteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century there were about 300 Bosniak: writers who 
wrote in Turkish, Arabic and Persian (1998: 22). Halilovic quotes a passage 
from Pregled knjiievnog stvaranja bosansko-hercegovackih Muslimana no 
turskom jeziku (Survey of the Literary Output of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Muslims in the Turkish Language) by F. Nametak which states that at the end 
of Turkish rule and the beginning of Hapsburg rule some Turkish-language 
publications were launched in Bosnia Halilovic then states: 'In these works 
and journals, the language of the population of Bosnia was consistently called 
Bosnian,16 (1998: 22). Moreover 'more than one hundred of these authors' 
(1998: 22) attach words such as BosnavilBosnaliIBomjaklBosanac to their 
names as a signifier of their allegiance to Bosnia 
16 U tim je djelima i aasopisima jezik fitelja Sosne dosljedno nazivan bosanskim. 
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Similarly, in line with the Herderian view of the importance of a 
language for a nation (as discussed in the Introduction to this study), Halilovic 
also links the Bosniak nation and its language when he writes, 'It is necessary 
to nurture and develop a love for one's own country, one's own nation and 
one's own language,I7 (1998: 60). Elsewhere he connects the Bosnian 
language with Bosnian statehood as they both have a tradition of several 
centuries (1998: 38). In this respect Halilovic is addressing the Bosniaks 
themselves and trying to raise the profile of the Bosnian language among them. 
In the second edition of Bosanski jezik published in 1998, he seems to be 
b e r ~ t i n g g the Bosniaks for neglecting their own language when he says: 'The 
Bosniaks have ignored themselves, they themselves have disregarded and 
neglected their own language,IS (1998: 8). He admits that the language 
situation of the Bosniaks is partly due to pressure from those more numerous 
and linguistically stronger 'but all this mirrors the lack of concern of the 
Bosniaks themselves for themselves, their past, present and future' 19 (1998: 8). 
Monnesland (2005) considers that Bosanski jezik, along with Jezik 
bosanskih Muslimana by Dievad Jahic (both published in 1991) and Rjecnik 
karakteristicne leksike u bosanskom jeziku by Alija Isakovic (published in 
1992), had a great influence on the later development of the Bosnian standard 
language partly because of the period in which they were written. Published 
before the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina they provided a linguistic status 
for a separate Bosnian standard which became crucial in the fonning of a 
separate Bosniak identity as the war unfolded. For Monnesland these three 
works 'laid the scientific foundation for political action regarding the 
proclamation of a Bosnian language,2o (2005: 484). This political action was 
manifested at the end of 1992, when the war had already started in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, with a letter from 105 Bosniak intellectuals addressed to the 
Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina demanding that Bosnian be made one of the 
three official languages in the then Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
political action was bolstered by a campaign by Bosniaks abroad to have 
17 Treba njegovati i razvijati ljubav prema svojoj zemlji. svome narodu i svome jeziku. 
18 Bomjaci su ignorirali sebe, sami su sebe, jezilc svoj, zaobilazili i zapostavljali. 
19 ali u svemu tome zrcala se i nebriga samih Bo!njaka 0 sebi, 0 svojoj pro§losti, sadUnjosti i 
~ p e k t i v i . .
udarile su strutni temelj polititkim postupcima oko proglaAavanja bosanskog jezika. 
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Bosnian recognised as a separate language (Monnesland, 2005: 485). The 
Bosnian language finally achieved political status at the end of August 1993 
when the Presidency issued a decree stipulating Bosnian as a designation for 
the official language in the republic: 'In the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the standard literary language with ijekavian pronunciation of its constituent 
peoples which is called by one of its three names, Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, 
shall be in official use,21 (Sluibeni list, 1.9.93). This was in stark contrast to the 
language provisions in the Constitution which had been passed six months 
earlier and which had continued the pre-war language policy and had as the 
official language of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 'Serbocroat and 
Croatoserbian with ijekavian pronunciation,22. Thus, we see that a 
combination of academic activity, emigre pressure and changing ethno-
political circumstances on the ground led to the linguistic designation of 
Bosnian achieving political status. This gave impetus to the Bosniak language 
planners to continue their efforts to standardise the language. 
The most influential language planners among the Bosniaks are 
scholars at the University of Sarajevo such as Senahid Halilovic and Dzevad 
Jahic who have been engaged in developing a grammar, orthography and 
comprehensive dictionary for the new Bosnian standard, as well as Josip Baotic 
and Ibrahim Cedic at the Institute for Language in Sarajevo. Whereas before 
1992 the Institute for Language researched issues to do with the use of Serbo-
Croat in various fields such as the media, the present-day institute deals with 
issues concerning the Bosnian language and Bosniak language planning only23. 
Thus, Cedic authored Osnovi gramatike bosanslcogjezika (Basic grammar of 
the Bosnian language) in 200 1 and most recently led the team that worked on 
the first comprehensive Bosnian dictionary that was published in September 
2007. 
At a governmental level, however, there is no one body or individual 
responsible for language planning. This is because the Bosniaks form a 
federation with the Croats so at the federal level it would be impossible to have 
21 U Republici Bosni i Hercegovini u slutbenoj upotrebi je standardni knjiUvni jezik 
ijekavskog izgovora njenih konstitutivnih naroda koji se imenuju jednim od tri naziva: 
bosanski, srpski, hrvatski. 
22 Srpskohrvatski odnosno hrvatskosrpski jezik ijekavskog izgovora. 
23 Interviewee QQ who used to work at the pre-war institute noted that before the war no one 
spoke about a separate Bosnian language. 
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a body or individual dealing with the language concerns of just one of the 
ethnic groups. A consequence of this is that despite the fact that there is general 
recognition in state structures of the importance of the language/ethnic identity 
link, the language planners do not have automatic governmental or practical 
support for their activities. Indicative of this is the way in which the Institute 
for Language, a state institution, was forced to finance the pUblication of the 
first Bosnian comprehensive dictionary. Cedic had to literally go from minister 
to minister asking for funds and finally received some support from three of 
them. Even then the institute was forced to sell copies of the latest dictionary in 
advance and depend on the good will of the printers who printed the dictionary 
for the amount that had been raised rather than the actual, higher, printing costs 
(Cedic, 2007). 
Corpus planning 
According to Cooper, 'corpus planning refers to activities such as 
coining new terms, reforming spelling and adopting a new script It refers, in 
short, to the creation of new forms, the modification of old ones, or the 
selection from alternative forms in a spoken or written code' (1989: 31). He 
says that corpus planning is traditionally split into three categories: 
graphisation, or the use of writing; standardisation (including codification), or 
the use of a supradialectal norm; and modernisation (including elaboration), or 
the development of vocabulary and forms of discourse. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, corpus planning activities among the Bosniaks have been 
focussed on standardisation and codification. An orthography by Senahid 
Halilovic was published in 1996 and a number of grammars have been 
published since the beginning of the 1990s. The first of these was Gramatika 
bosanskogjezika I-IV razred gimnazije (Grammar of the Bosnian Language for 
the I-IV Grades of Grammar School) authored by Hanka Vajzovic and Husein 
Zvrko and was published in 1994 while the war was still going on. 
Alongside the aforementioned three aspects of corpus planning, Cooper 
proposes a fourth, namely renovation which he describes as 'an effort to 
change an already developed code, whether in the name of efficiency, 
aesthetics, or national or political ideology' (1989: 154). He considers that the 
renovated language does not fulfil any new communicative functions but if it 
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does it also contributes to the non-linguistic goals that motivated the renovation 
in the first place. He cites possible goals as the legitimation of new elites, the 
discrediting of old ones, the mobilization of political support or the raising of 
consciousness (Cooper, 1989: 154). The difference between modernisation and 
renovation is that the fonner allows language codes to serve new 
communicative functions but the latter allows language codes to serve old 
functions in new ways. Cooper's examples of linguistic renovation include the 
switches from Arabic to Latin to Cyrillic script imposed by Soviet language 
planners on the Turkic languages of Soviet Central Asia after the revolution; 
the removal of Persian and Arabic loanwords from Turkish in the 1920s; and 
successive efforts to refonn Dutch spelling (1989: 154). To Cooper's examples 
of renovation we can add the corpus planning carried out by the Bosniaks. 
They have taken the pre-war language of Serbo-Croat and are attempting to 
create a separate standard by highlighting two characteristics which they 
consider to be specific to the speech of the Bosniaks: the phoneme Ix! and the 
use of loanwords from Turkish, Persian and Arabic known as turcizmi or 
Turkisms. As mentioned earlier, the new standard does not fulfil any new 
communicative functions so the primary aim of the renovation is to distinguish 
the Bosnian standard from the Croatian and Serbian standards. To sum up 
Bosniak language planning, we can follow Cooper and his analysis of 13 
definitions of language planning and provide a definition of language planning 
of our own based purely on the experience of the Bosniaks. The definition 
would be as follows: Language planning refers to deliberate efforts to influence 
the language behaviour of others through corpus and status planning activities 
directed at an existing language code for primarily extra-linguistic aims. 
Language planning models 
As the field of language policy and planning has developed, several 
language planning models have been advanced which approach the process 
from different aspects. In 1970, Neustupny put forward a model based on four 
kinds of problem that need to be addressed: code selection, stability, expansion 
and differentiation. For example, if the problem is code selection (choosing 
between competing language varieties) the planning would focus on official 
policy fonnation by the authorities in power. In 1971, Rabin advanced a 
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typology based on the types of aims of the language planning activities to be 
undertaken and the agents who would be responsible for the activities. But the 
model that is most frequently applied is that of Einar Haugen which he first put 
forward in 1969 and then elaborated on in 1983. The model (Haugen, 1983: 
275) is reproduced below: 
Form (policy planning) Function (cultivation) 
1. Selection 3. Implementation 
Society a Problem identification a. Correction 
(status planning) b. Allocation of norms procedures 
b. Evaluation 
2. Codification 4. Elaboration 
Language a. Graphization a. Terminological 
(corpus planning) b. Grammatication modernization 
c. Lexication b. Stylistic 
development 
In describing this model, Haugen makes the point that it is 'a framework for 
the starting points of language planners everywhere and they are starting points 
only because 'they say nothing about the end points, the goals to be reached or 
the ideals and motivations that guide planners' (1983: 269-270). 
Even though his model reflects Kloss's corpus/status planning 
distinction, Haugen makes the point: 'Selection and codification remain mere 
paper exercises unless they are followed by implementation and elaboration, 
the former involving social status and the latter the linguistic corpus. To stay 
alive a language must have users for whom it performs useful functions' (1983: 
272). The model illustrates that even though the corpus/status planning 
distinction is an important one for understanding language planning activities, 
it is equally important to bear in mind that language planning involves both 
interrelated types. This is certainly true of the language planning activities of 
the Bosniaks as the codification of the language through the publication of 
various grammars, orthographic manuals and so on raises the profile and 
therefore the status of the Bosnian language. 
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Haugen's model seems to be the preferred one among Bosniak 
language planners. At the 1998 Bihac symposium on the Bosnian language, 
Halilovic put forward a four-stage language planning model which was 
reminiscent of Haugen's and which Ford describes as follows: 'gathering 
information (pronalaienje bitnih cinjenica); selection of features needing 
attention, codification (planiranje, donosenje odluka); implementation 
(provodenje odluka); and elaboration (prikupljanje povratnih injormacija)' 
(2001: 94). 
Halilovic, as well as other speakers at the symposium, also cited the 10-
stage language planning model advanced by Milorad Radovanovic, professor 
of Serbian and General Linguistics at the University of Novi Sad. This model 
essentially elaborates on Haugen's by breaking down the stages as follows: 
selection, description, prescription, elaboration, acceptance, implementation, 
expansion, cultivation, evaluation and reconstruction (1992: 95). Radovanovic 
conceived the language planning process as cyclical and continuous so that the 
stages should not necessarily be seen as happening in a consecutive sequence 
but rather as overlapping (1992: 97). 
Curtis Ford (2001) applies Haugen's four-step scheme of language 
planning to the language planning activities undertaken by the Bosniaks. He 
says that selection has been 'straightforward' (2001: 128) because the Bosnian 
standard is based on the same neo§tokavian dialect as the joint Serbo-Croatian 
standard. He considers selection to have begun in the early 1990s 'with the first 
open discussions in print of the perceived need for linguistic recognition of the 
Bosnian Muslim identity' (Ford, 2001: 129). Codification, according to Ford, 
has focussed on a number of features seen to be characteristic of Bosnian 
Muslim usage (use of the phoneme Ix! and Turkisms) and there is widespread 
agreement on these features among the Bosniak language planners (2001: 129). 
Ford considers that the 'first steps' towards implementation have been 
taken with the pUblication of a number of orthographies, dictionaries and 
grammars (2001: 129). As for elaboration, Ford considered that this stage had 
not yet been reached as it presupposes a degree of acceptance which would 
lead to further activities by the language planners (2001: 130). This corresponds 
to stage 8 (cultivation) in RadovanoviC's scheme. According to him, a 
language is cultivated through the school system, mass media and so on. As yet 
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it may be too early still to go on to the next stage of evaluation as the standard 
language that has been generally accepted by the Bosniaks would need to be 
evaluated at all grammatical levels to see if any adjustments need to be made 
so that the last stage of reconstruction may be embarked upon and the circle 
closed. 
The next section of this literature review will look at evaluation in the 
language planning process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will highlight in 
particular the problems connected to it. 
Evaluating the results of language planning in Bosnia 
Evaluation is one of the stages of the planning process which receives 
the least attention in practice and in the scholarship. Rubin (1984) ascribes this 
to the fact that the goals of a specific language planning process are 'often 
multiple, hidden and not well ordered' (1984: 7) and outcomes are not always 
specified in advance. Moreover, as mentioned above, much language planning 
activity is not based on a deliberate formalised plan so it is more difficult to 
evaluate it particularly if, as Rubin says, evaluation includes 'analysis of trends 
and a general monitoring system, as well as evaluation of specific aspects of a 
particular programme' (1984: 7). In the case of language planning by the 
Bosniaks it can be said that while certain recognisable language planning 
activities have been undertaken, there is no written language policy as such and 
no official governmental institution exists specifically tasked with 
implementing and monitoring language change. It is therefore difficult to 
evaluate these language planning activities in the absence of any goals or 
objectives stated in advance and in the absence of any established mechanisms 
to monitor change. 
One thing that we can do, however, is look at the activities of the 
language planners and attempt to gauge their intentions behind their language 
planning activities. One important event for Bosniak language planners was the 
Bihac symposium on the Bosnian language which was held in September 1998 
and which Ford considers to be 'the first congress for a Bosnian standard 
language that would be separate from its Croatian and Serbian counterparts' 
(2001: 350). Fishman states in his book devoted entirely to first congresses that 
first congresses are at 'the very beginning of the long chain of decisions and 
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implementations yet to come' (1993: 7) but the Bihae symposIUm was 
nevertheless held some years after the first instruments of codification had 
started appearing. Even so, it was the first organised attempt by Bosniak 
language planners to look at language issues and is a good starting point for our 
evaluation of language planning activities by the Bosniaks. 
The symposium was organised by the Institute for Language in 
Sarajevo, the government of the Una-Sana Canton and the Federal Ministry of 
Education, Science, Culture and Sport. The participants represented a range of 
disciplines, not just linguistics, but also sociology, philosophy, history, religion 
and education, and each speaker was encouraged to approach the issues 
regarding the Bosnian language from their particular area of expertise. The aim 
of the symposium was 'to initially clarify the situation in which the Bosnian 
language fmds itself and highlight problem issues and possibly indicate ways 
to resolve them,24 (Cedie, 1999: 7). A range of views were expressed about the 
current state and future development of the Bosnian language. Ford 
distinguishes the prescriptivists from the descriptivists: the fonner were 
represented by speakers such as Senahid Halilovie and Dzevad Jahie, who 
enthusiastically advocated the development of a separate Bosnian standard. In 
Jahie's case, by drawing on historical and cultural factors to justify the 
existence of a separate standard. The descriptivists, as represented by Ibrahim 
Cedie and Josip Baotie, were much more in favour of a non-interventionist 
approach to the development of a separate standard; the latter calling for 
'increasing awareness about the language union in the past, the present and 
even about such prospects in the future of all three Bosnian nations,2S (1999: 
94). 
There were other speakers who did not fall into either of these two 
camps such as Mevlida KaradZa who elucidated three possible options for the 
future development of the three standards in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first was 
official status for the Bosnian language with recognition of the three variants of 
Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. This would imply a common grammar, 
orthography and dictionary based on a highly flexible nonn. The second option 
24 poUmo osvjetljavanje stanja u kojem se nalazi bosanski jezik i n ~ i t i i problemska pitanja 
i eventualno ukazati na puteve za njihovo rjdavanje. 
2S produbljivanje svijesti 0 jezitkom zajedniAtw u pro§losti, sadaAnjosti, pa i takvim 
perspektivima u buducnosti sva tri bosanska naroda. 
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would be official status for three standard languages (Bosnian. Croatian and 
Serbian) each of which would develop separately from each other. The third 
option was the recognition of Bosnian as the single official language 
throughout the state with an extremely flexible standard; this approach would 
mean deciding on a standard based on linguistic considerations rather than 
political ones (Ford, 2001: 99). The first and third options were reminiscent of 
the language policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
where the approach was to maintain a single language but with a degree of 
variation within the standard. It is significant that KaradZa talks about the 
possibility of options for the future language situation on this occasion since 
the symposium was held some time after certain corpus and status planning 
initiatives had already been taken. A number of normative works had already 
been published and the Dayton Peace Agreement had named Bosnian as an 
official language alongside Croatian and Serbian three years previously so the 
course of the development of the language had already been fixed at the second 
option of developing separate standards and yet KaradZa still obviously felt 
that the course of language development could be altered. 
The symposium' s conclusions cover both corpus and status planning 
issues. They begin with the unequivocal status planning declaration that 'The 
participants at the Symposium on the Bosnian language are unanimous in the 
view that the Bosnian language is a standard language which, in the family of 
Slavonic languages. stands alongside the Serbian and Croatian language·?6 
The conclusions then state seven future tasks to be carried out which include: 
the strengthening of the Institute for Language in Sarajevo and its renaming as 
the Institute for the Bosnian Language; the renaming of the Department for 
South Slavonic Languages at Sarajevo university as the Department for the 
Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian Language (in the singular); the provision of an 
intemationallanguage code for Bosnian and various short-term and long-term 
projects to compile grammars, orthographies for school and general use and a 
Bosnian dictionary. Reflecting the importance of the education system and the 
media for language planning, the conclusions also proposed the compilation of 
26 Ua:snici Simpozija 0 bosanskom jeziku nepodijeljenog su m i ~ l j e n j a a da je bosanski jezik 
standardni jezik koji u zajednici slavenskih jezika stoji naporedo sa srpskim i hrvatskim 
jezikom. 
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various Bosnian grammar books for primary and secondary schools and a 
manual for use by the media. The final conclusion related to better cooperation 
with education ministries to improve the teaching of the Bosnian language in 
schools. As Greenberg points out, these conclusions said nothing about the 
future standardisation of Bosnian, nor about any failings of the dictionaries and 
manuals already produced although some of these shortcomings had been 
mentioned at the symposium (2004: 154). Nor did they set any deadlines or 
specify the desired outcomes of the proposals. Many of the conclusions have 
nonetheless been acted upon: the Department for South Slavonic Languages 
was renamed; there is now an international language code for Bosnian, and 
several grammars, orthographies and dictionaries have been published. 
One year after the Bihae symposium, the weekly BH Dani published a 
series of articles about the state of the Bosnian language by a number of 
Bosnian language scholars. In one of these, Naila Hebib-Valjevac assessed that 
little had changed in the year since the Bihae symposium. She said that schools 
were still using Halilovie' s orthography from 1996 which she criticises, among 
many other things, for its 'inadvertent emotional approach to the task,27 (1999: 
paragraph 2) since it was begun in the war and completed soon after its end. 
Because of what she sees as its many shortcomings she blames the orthography 
for causing 'myriad almost irresolvable difficulties,28 (1999: paragraph 5) in 
the areas of schooling, journalism and publishing. She also has a pessimistic 
view of the future of the Institute for Language and its chances of survival 
although these fears have proven to be unfounded as the institute still exists 
albeit with its name unchanged. 
The differing views regarding the way forward for the standardisation 
of the Bosnian language expressed at Bihae have continued and are reflected in 
the various instruments of codification that have been published since then, as 
well as reaction to them. Indicative of this is that even though the first 
normative dictionary of Bosnian was published in September 2007 by the 
Institute for Language there are another two teams working on their own 
dictionaries. As can be expected from a dictionary compiled by a team led by 
Ibrahim Cedie, described by Curtis Ford as a descriptivist at the Bihae 
27 nehotifan emotivan pristup djelu. 
28 mno§tvo gotovo nerjdivih tdkoCa. 
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symposium, it has an open and non-puristic approach to the lexicon. For 
example, it allows for the Croatian names of months. In a newspaper interview 
at the time the dictionary was published Cedie conceded that when another 
dictionary is published there may be arguments about the standard but he sums 
up this first dictionary as follows: 'This dictionary of ours will be more suited 
to those who are more democratic, those who are more sober, those who are 
more reasonable,29 (Cedie, 2007: paragraph 21). 
The disagreements over the Bosnian standard are not to do with the 
specific features of Bosnian as there is broad agreement on these, but rather 
they revolve around the extent to which these features are and should be 
present in the standard. For example, Hebib-Valjevac criticised Halilovie's 
orthography as making the language too archaic and rural because of its 
emphasis on Turkisms (1999: paragraph 18). In a similar vein in another article 
in the aforementioned BH Dani series, Muhamed Filipovie thought that the 
emerging standard contained too many archaisms and orientalisms which he 
considered undermined mentally, psychologically and linguistically 'the whole 
process of the europeanisation of our world,30 (1999: paragraph 7). Similarly, 
RaSid Durie, another participant at the Bihae symposium, also heavily 
criticised the dictionary for schools (8kolski rjecnik bosanskogjezika) that was 
compiled by Dzevad lahie in 1999. According to Durie, the dictionary does not 
meet the three basic criteria in standardizing a lexicon, in that a lexeme must be 
generally comprehensible in a language community, up-to-date and widely 
used (2003: 68). In Durie's opinion the dictionary contains too many 
archaisms, orientalisms and regionalisms to be useful as a dictionary for the 
younger generation (2003: 68). These are harsh but valid criticisms because a 
standard that is perceived as being too far removed from the everyday 
contemporary speech of ordinary Bosniaks would not gain wide acceptance 
among them and would not achieve the desired status vis a vis Croatian and 
Serbian. This is also true of the other preoccupation of Bosnian language 
scholars which is the extent to which the standard is becoming too 
Croatianised. Okuka (1998) considers that between 1990 and 1993 there was a 
29 Ovaj lid tjetnik Ce we odgovarati ODom ko je malo demokratiroiji, ko je trezveniji, ko je 
razumniji. Ja mislim da je to tjetnik razuma i nauke. 
30 cijeli proces europeizacije DaAeg svijeta. 
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tendency to Croatianise the language because the Bosniaks and Croats were at 
that time allies in the war and cites the more frequent use of Croatian names for 
months of the year as an example of this. After 1993 and the outbreak of the 
Muslim-Croat conflict, this tendency inevitably diminished and more attention 
was paid to the features considered to be specific to Bosnian (Okuka, 1998: 
109). However, the perceived Croatianisation of Bosnian was an issue at the 
Bihae symposium; Muhamed Sator, in particular, criticised the increasing use 
in public of new Croatian words which are not original to Bosnian (Ford, 2001: 
98). Similarly, the Gramatika bosanskog jezika by Dzevad lahie, Senahid 
Halilovie and Ismail Palie that was published in 2000 was also criticised for its 
Croatian bias, most notably by Sarajevo University professor Midhat 
Ridanovie. 
In conclusion, then, although the Bihae symposium highlighted the 
most important issues for the Bosnian standardisation process and the future 
directions for language planning, the conclusions did not amount to an actual 
plan in the sense that Rubin describes. If we apply the flexible definition of 
language policy from Grin as cited above then the conclusions could still be 
seen as a language policy, although it falls short of the kind of language policy 
that Naila Hebib-V aljevac argued for at the symposium, i.e. one that was 
'scientific, long-term, directed and controlled,31 (1998: paragraph 7.0.1). As a 
consequence, disagreements over the standard have persisted since the Bihae 
symposium and are reflected in the normative works that have been authored 
by different scholars. 
The question then is how best to evaluate the progress of the language 
planning activities undertaken by the Bosniaks and this will be dealt with in the 
next section. 
How to evaluate the language planning activities of the 
Bosniaks? 
One way to evaluate progress is to look at the extent to which language 
usage has changed in the media and other areas dealing with the written word 
in Bosnia. There have been two unpublished attempts to evaluate the progress 
31 naufna, dugorOCna, usmjerena i kontrolisana. 
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of the language planning activities of the Bosniaks in quantitative terms: in a 
PhD thesis by Curtis Ford (2001) and an MA dissertation by Milena Marie 
Vogel (2007). Ford looked at data concerning the distribution of a number of 
lexical items considered to be specific to the Bosnian language and highlighted 
in the then most recently published normative works. The data came from the 
Oslo Corpus of Bosnian Texts and samples from four periodicals. The Oslo 
Corpus of Bosnian Texts is a joint project of the Department for East European 
and Oriental Studies and the Text Laboratory of the University of Oslo and 
contains 1.5 million words collected from a wide range of material including 
fiction, essays, children's literature, Islamic texts, legal texts and newspapers 
and journals. The material was produced between 1992 and 1997.32 
Ford assessed on the basis of his analysis of the Oslo Corpus of 
Bosnian Texts that characteristically Bosnian terms had won 'only marginal 
acceptance' (2001: 115). He concluded from his media analysis that the 
normative works for the new Bosnian standard had 'exerted no broad 
influence' (2001: 125) on the print media he examined. He attributed this to the 
fact that the works had only recently been published and not enough time had 
gone by for them to have taken root. He also thought that the absence of an 
official academy to enforce the new norm meant that journalists and editors in 
the print media relied on their own judgment when it came to using the newly 
recommended norms which meant that there was no consistency in the use of 
the Bosnian standard in the media. 
In another study, Milena Marie Vogel (2007) analysed the language of 
a limited number of newspapers printed in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 
and 2000 and her findings broadly agree with Ford's. She found increased use 
of words containing the phoneme Ixl such as lah1co (easy) instead of the 
Croatian and Serbian lako although there was low frequency of the use of 
Turkisms. Her findings also suggested a 'noticeable' shift in language towards 
use of Croatian which, given the criticisms regarding the 'Croatianisation' of 
the Bosnian standard mentioned above, may be attributable to the perceived 
Croatian bias of the hitherto published instruments of codification. 
32 The Oslo Corpus of Bosnian Texts is available at 
http://www.tekstlab.uio.nolBosnianlCorous.html[ Accessed on 1 September 2010] 
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Another way to evaluate progress is to look at the present language 
behaviour of Bosniaks and how it has changed, if at all, since the early 1990s. 
There have been no scientific evaluations of such behaviour in the scholarly 
literature along the lines ofFord's analysis although several writers take a more 
subjective approach. Writing in 2004, Sarajevo University professor Hanka 
Vajzovic observed that all Bosniaks now call their mother tongue 'Bosnian' 
(bosanski) as opposed to Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian as was the case before 
the war. However, she pointed out two phenomena in this regard: the majority 
of Bosniaks do not respect the recommended standard and a significant number 
of them do not speak Bosnian at all but some kind of in-between variant 
(meiJuvariant) or purely Croatian or even Serbian. She also made the point that 
language in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be differentiated 'according to 
established criteria (territory, social group, age, individual) rather than the 
criterion of the ethnic affiliation of the speaker,33 (Vajzovic, 2005: 537). 
Belgrade University language professor Ranko Bugarski reached a 
similar conclusion in Jezik ; leullura published in 2005. Talking about the 
speech of the people of Sarajevo he says that 'nothing dramatic34, (2005: 139) 
has happened and in fact the most important change has been what the 
language is called. He does however observe that there is a new habit that 
started to arise during the war whereby 'the new political and cultural elites of 
the three nations distinguish and stress specific ethnic markers, particularly in 
formal speech and writing' 35(2005: 139). He attributes this behaviour to a 
heightened etbno-national consciousness and the fact that 'social promotion 
requires or at least encourages the differentiation of the citizens of Sarajevo as 
Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats also as regards language,36 (2005: 139). 
Similarly, Monnesland says that in looking at the language used in the 
leading media, government administration and state education it is clear that 
there is no great difference between the Bosnian standard language and the 
former 'Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom' (2005: 510) which had 
33 po ustaljenim kriterijima (teritorijaino, socijaino, starosno, individualno) nego po kriteriju 
nacionalne pripadnosti govomika. 
34 nib dramatimo. 
3S nove p o l i t i ~ k e e i kultume elite triju naroda izdvajaju i naglabvaju s p e c i f i ~ n a a e t n i ~ k a a o b e l e ~ a , ,
lUU'()(!ito u formaInom govoru i pisanju. 
36 socijalna promocija zahteva iii bar p o d s t i ~ ~ razlutivanje gradana Sarajeva na Bomjake, Srbe 
i Hrvate i u j e z i ~ k o m m pogledu. 
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been the official designation of the variant of the language spoken in Bosnia-
Herzegovina after 1974. According to Monnesland the standard is more or less 
the same but it is now only used by the Bosniaks and anyone else who 'feels 
themselves to be Bosnians (along with another ethnic feeling)'37 (2005: 510). 
Vajzovic and Bugarski's observations suggest that the progress 
achieved by the Bosniak language planners should be viewed in the context of 
the extra-linguistic aims that have driven these activities rather than in purely 
linguistic terms. If the basic non-linguistic aim of these linguistic activities has 
been to bolster a Bosniak ethnic identity then it can surely be said that this has 
been achieved. Although the name of the language was officially recognised in 
domestic legislation, as well as the Dayton Peace Agreement, the planners have 
nevertheless managed to consolidate the status of this designation through their 
activities. No more so than in 2002 when the leading language planners were 
among 60 intellectuals who signed the Charter on the Bosnian Language.38 
This document was a response to ongoing debates about the name of the 
language and, specifically, to the refusal of the government of the Republika 
Srpska to accept the name bosanski in the context of constitutional changes. 
Neither the Croats nor the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina accept the name 
bosanski for the language of the Bosniaks, preferring the designation bosnjacki. 
The word bosanski is the neutral adjectival form for Bosnia while bosnjacki 
derives from the noun Bosnjak or Bosniak originally meaning a native of 
Bosnia. Bosnian language planners argue that bosanski is the name that has 
traditionally been used throughout the centuries to denote the language of the 
Bosniaks while the Serbs and the Croats consider bosanski to relate to the 
whole of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than just the Bosniaks 
and therefore suggests that the Bosniaks have unitaristic aspirations. 
The 2002 Charter on the Bosnian Language begins with the declaration 
that the Bosnian language is the language of the Bosnians and all those who 
consider it to be theirs with that name. It then stresses that the name has been in 
use since the Middle Ages. Point five states that by using the name bosanski 
the Bosniaks are not undermining anyone else's rights and do not aspire to the 
unification and unitarisation of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
37 koji se osjetaju Bosancima (uz drugo nacionalno osjeeanje). 
38 Text of charter or Povelja 0 bosanskom jeziku available at http://www.bosnjaci.rsI 
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charter also says that any imposition of the name bosnjacki amounts to 
politization born of continued Serbian and Croatian paternalism and the denial 
of Bosniak national distinctiveness. Point seven sounds a conciliatory note, 
however, welcoming any linguistic or cultural research undertaken by the other 
ethnic groups which would 'facilitate our greater knowledge and mutual 
respect' 39 • 
Despite such efforts by Bosniak language planners, debates about the 
name of the Bosnian language persist. For example, in 2005, in a statement on 
the position of the Croatian language issued by the Croatian Academy of Arts 
and Sciences in Croatia the Bosnian language is denoted as follows 'bosanski 
(bosnjacki)' (/zjava, 2005). The linguist Dalibor Brozovie, a Croat from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, expressed the view that, 'Every nation has the right to 
call its own language whatever it wants. Therefore the Bosniaks have the right 
to call their language Bosnian if that suits them for whatever reason. But we 
have the right in our social and scientific practice not to accept a name for a 
thing that we otherwise recognise,40 (1999: 14). The Serb linguist Branislav 
Brborie was even more scathing, saying, 'A language called Bosnian does not 
exist, nor can it nor must it be assigned an international code unless it is 
transformed into the Bosniak language, deprived of the aspiration to endanger 
Serbian and Croatian and undermine the constitutional order of Bosnia-
Herzegovina,41 (2001: 239). 
In evaluating the language planning activities of the Bosniaks it can be 
concluded from the scholarly literature that the Bosniak language planners 
have made a certain amount of progress in their endeavours. They have 
compiled and published several normative works including a comprehensive 
dictionary of the Bosnian language. The problem has been the disagreements 
among the language planners as to the exact contours of the norm and the way 
forward in language planning activities. The question is, should these activities 
39 omoguciti ode bolje upomavanje i medusobno uvdavanje. 
40 Svaki narod ima ujedno pravo da svoj jezik naziva kako bote. Prema tome Bomjaci imaju 
pravo nazivati svoj jezik bosanskim ako im to iz kakva razloga odgovara. Ali mi imamo pravo 
da mi sami u svojoj dru!tvenoj i znanstvenoj praksi ne prihvatamo naziv za objekt koji inaee 
~ r i z n a j e m o . .
1 Jezika s atributom bosomki nema, niti ga mof.e biti, a ne bi smeo ulaziti ni u medunarodne 
kodove ako se ne preoblikuje u boanjacki jezilc, likn pretenzije da ugrof.ava srpski i hrvatski a 
narulava ustavni poredak BiH. 
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be more prescriptivist or descriptivist, and should the norm look to the past for 
its specifically Bosniak features or should it be more open and modem in 
accepting the influence not just of Serbian and Croatian but also of other 
languages such as English and German. For some planners and commentators, 
such as Muhamed Filipovic quoted above, this is a question that goes beyond 
language and encompasses ideas about the kind of state and, ultimately, the 
kind of future that the Bosniaks want. 
It can also be seen from the scholarly literature that there has so far 
been little change in the language behaviour of ordinary Bosniaks although it 
may still be too early to judge. A survey of the language use of the first 
generation of school children to complete their schooling in the post-war 
education system would be a better indicator of the extent of language shift. 
The most important change and possibly the greatest language planning 
success has been in the naming of the language. The designation of bosanski or 
Bosnian is now generally accepted and used by the Bosniaks although the 
Croats and Serbs still challenge the validity of this nomination. This is also the 
most significant aspect of the language planning of the Bosniaks for this thesis 
because it means that despite debates about the content of the standard the 
Bosniak ethnic group nevertheless has a distinct linguistic identity at least in 
name and this has been recognised by the international community in its 
approach to language issues in the post-Dayton period. 
The next two sections will deal with the language planning activities of 
the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is immediately obvious that 
these sections are much shorter than the previous one on language planning by 
the Bosniaks. This is for the simple reason that the Serbs and Croats have not 
had to establish their own linguistic standards and therefore have engaged in 
far less activity in this regard. Correspondingly, there is much less in the 
scholarly literature about these language activities. It is indicative, for example, 
that in his Language and Identity in the Ballcans: Serbo-Croatian and its 
Disintegration, Greenberg does not devote any section specifically to the 
language of the Bosnian Croats; Svein Monnesland (2005) is really the only 
scholar who deals in any detail with the language policy of the Croats in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Language planning by the Bosnian Serbs 
In describing the language planning that is carried out in certain 
developing countries 'with their one-party states and military dictatorships,' 
Bamgbose uses the term 'planning by decree' (1989: 27). He cites as an 
example the decision by the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia in 
1972 to impose the Latin script for Somali and the steps taken to enforce the 
decisions. This term could be used to describe certain language planning 
activities undertaken by the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in autumn 1993, the 
Bosnian Serb authorities imposed ekavian as the official pronunciation in Serb-
held territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than the native ijekavian 
pronunciation. The motivation for this decree was purely political as it was 
intended 'to maximally distinguish the speech of the Bosnian Serbs from that 
of the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks' (Greenberg, 2004: 78), thereby 
demonstrating that the Bosnian Serbs were politically affiliated more with the 
Serbs in Serbia proper than with any other ethnic group in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
Greenberg (2004), Okuka (1998) and Monnesland (2005) all deal in 
detail with the polemics that immediately arose concerning this decree 
predominantly among linguists in Serbia. This issue went to the heart of the 
debate in Serbia itself on the future development of the Serbian standard, 
something that had been at issue since the time of the language reformer Vuk 
KaradZic in the nineteenth century. The decree split Serbian intellectual circles 
into two camps, and Okuka sums up the differences of opinion thus: 'Some 
saw in it [the decision] a unique opportunity to finally achieve some old 
national goals and tried to justify it with sophisticated arguments. Others 
decisively rejected it and called it nonsense,42 (1998: 122). The first group, 
which Greenberg calls the status quo linguists, included well-known members 
of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the historian Milorad Ekmecic 
and the linguist Pavle lvic. They were in favour of allowing modem Serbian to 
continue its development towards ekavianisation. The opposing camp included 
the majority of Serbian linguists and writers, which Greenberg calls the neo-
42 Die einen sahen in ibm [dem BeschluB] die einzigartige Gelegenheit, endlich einige alte 
nationale Ziele zu erreichen. and sie versuchten. ibn mit sopbistischer Argumentation zu 
rechtfertigen. Die anderen lebnten ibn entscbieden ab und nannten ibn unsinnig. 
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Vukovites, and defended ijekavian as part of the Serbian standard. Typical 
among these was Ranko Bugarski who called the Bosnian Serb decree 'ethnic 
cleansing of the language,43 (Monnesland, 2005: 491) as ijekavian had been 
recognised as part of the Serbian norm since the nineteenth century. 
The provisions of the decree proved unworkable and opposition to it 
was so great that it was rescinded in November 1994 by the Bosnian Serb 
Assembly. This was not however the end of official efforts to favour ekavian 
over ijekavian and on 25th June 1996 the Law on the Official Use of Language 
and Script was passed in the Republika Srpska This law specified the use of 
ekavian throughout all sections of society including the media and education 
system and it stipulates fines for failure to adhere to the provisions. As 
Monnesland notes: 'This is one of the rare cases in the world of punishment for 
the ''wrong'' use of language' 44 (2005: 491) but it also harks back to the fascist 
Independent State of Croatia, of which Bosnia-Herzegovina was a part during 
World War II, which also imposed fines for failure to adhere to the imposed 
Croatian standard language. The 1996 law was also heavily criticised and in 
1998 the Constitutional Court of the Republika Srpska declared its provisions 
to be unconstitutional. 
It is clear from the literature that there is no established language policy 
among the Bosnian Serbs in the sense that Rubin describes, nor are there any 
scholars working on language planning in the Republika Srpska. The 
development of the Serbian language in Bosnia-Herzegovina is essentially 
dependent on language developments in Serbia. Greenberg (2004) considers 
important in this regard the establishment of the Committee for the 
Standardisation of the Serbian Language in 1997 which was initiated by the 
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Montenegrin Academy of Arts and 
Sciences and the Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Republika Srpska. It 
consists of 19 members, 14 of whom are from Serbia, three from the Republika 
Srpska and two from Montenegro. Its main purpose is 'systematic 
standardisation of the Serbian language with the ekavian and ijekavian 
pronunciations, both comprehensively and in particulars, and the formulation 
of appropriate documents and manuals, as well as the issuance of measures 
43 etnitko i!i§eenje jezika. 
44 To je jedan ad rijetkih slutajeva u svijetu da se kamjava zbog 'pogrdne' upotrebe jezika. 
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which would ensure the implementation of recent innovations in nonnative and 
linguistic practice,45 (Greenberg, 2004: 84). It is thus a body with corpus 
planning responsibility for the Serbian standard and the potential to be highly 
influential in directing the future of the Serbian language. The more than 50 
decisions that it has issued to date deal with a wide range of issues, from the 
creation and use of the feminine fonn of certain nouns to the name of the 
language in the newly independent Montenegro. It has issued two decisions 
(decisions 1 and 27) on the name of the language of the Bosniaks which 
challenge the use of the name Bosnian for their language and supports the 
name Bosniak instead.46 
Language planning by the Bosnian Croats 
Just as among the Bosnian Serbs, there are no official language 
planners among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor any official language 
planning or policy. Monnesland points out that the language policy that does 
exist originates from the beginning of the conflict of the 1990s and the 
advocacy of the ruling party in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union, of the 
creation of the Croat-dominated Herceg-Bosna. According to Monnesland, the 
principle behind the language decisions of the Bosnian Croats was 'complete 
identity of the standard linguistic idiom of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and the Croats in Croatia,47 (2005: 493) because this unity with the kin state of 
Croatia meant the preservation of a Croatian identity in a 'pure' Croatian 
language. Monnesland says that some linguists in Croatia (Stjepan Babic, 
Dalibor Brozovic) supported this policy but generally Croatian linguists have 
not paid much attention to this language issue. That notwithstanding, in 
February 2005, the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences issued a statement 
on the position of the Croatian language in which it calls for more focus to be 
put on encouraging the teaching of Croatian at domestic and foreign 
45 sistematsko nonniranje srpskogjezika, s ekavskim i ijekavskim izgovorom, sveobuhvatno i u 
pojedinostima, i izrada odgovarajutih dokumenata i p r i r u ~ n i k a , , kao i dono§enje akata koji bi 
obezbedivali probodnost nedavnib inovacija u nonnativistici i jezic!koj praksi. 
46 Details of the committee's decisions are to be found at 
http://www.rastko.rsltilologijalodbor/index_c.html. 
47 potpuna istovjetnost standardnojezitkog idioma Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini i Hrvata u 
Hrvatskoj. 
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universities as a separate standard language. In the introduction it has this to 
say about a single Croatian standard: 
Even though the Croats, like other nations, speak different dialects and 
vernaculars, the Croatian literary and/or standard language is one single 
language. The Croats in Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not 
have another language. Moreover, the Croats in Croatia would not have this 
kind of standard language were it not for the fact that it is based to a 
substantial extent on the speech of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina48 (Jezik, 
2005: 41). 
There has however been disagreement among Croatian scholars and 
commentators in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ivan Lovrenovic, Zeljko Ivankovic, 
Zdenko Lesic, Mile Stojic, Josip Baotic) about the unity of the Croatian 
language as they consider that the language of the Bosnian Croats does 
nevertheless differ from the 'Zagreb' norm and the present policy of 'one 
uniform' language could lead to the destruction of the Bosnian Croat identity. 
Monnesland quotes in this regard the Bosnian Croat Zdenko Lesic who said 
that he would never use the word kazaliste (the Croatian word for theatre) as 
this word is never used in Bosnia-Herzegovina By the same token, however, 
he also said that he did not speak Bosnian as this meant 'Muslim' (2005: 494). 
Furthermore, there has been some concern among the Bosnian Croats that the 
Croatian language is being undermined generally in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At a 
2003 conference in Mostar on threats to the Croatian language, which was 
organised by the local branch of the Malica hrvalska cultural society, the 
president Igor Zidic said that the right of the Croats to the Croatian language 
was being destroyed because of 'Bosniak-Bosnian unitarism' .49 Another 
speaker, Musa Simun felt that the Croatian language was being undermined in 
the education system, particularly in the cantons with a Bosniak majority 
(Monnesland, 2005: 495). 
While there is no institution or individual guiding language planning by 
the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina it can still nevertheless be said that a 
language policy does exist among the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is 
concerned with ensuring that the status of Croatian in the country is equal to 
that of Serbian and Bosnian. Thus, certain efforts have been made to deal 
41 Iako Hrvati govore r a z l i ~ i t i m m ruujetjima i govorima, kao i drugi narodi, hrvatski je kojilevni 
ilili standardni jezik jedan i jedinstven. Hrvati u Hrvatskoj i Hrvati u Bosni i Hercegovini 
n e ~ u u drugoga jezika. ~ t o v i A e , , Hrvati u Hrvatskoj De bi imali ovakav standardni jezik da mu 
nisu bitnim dijelom osDovice bili govori Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini. 
49 b o ! D j ~ k o - b o S 8 D S k i i unitarizam. 
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scientifically with the language situation of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(various conferences on the Croatian language in Bosnia and the Mostarski 
dani hrvatskogjezika (Mostar days of the Croatian language) conference that is 
held every year at the pedagogical faculty at Mostar university) and there are 
on-going calls for the establishment of a television station specifically catering 
to the Croatian population which is seen as an important way of preserving the 
Croatian language. 
Literature on the language policy of the International 
Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
As stated earlier on in this review, there is little in the scholarly 
literature addressing directly the issue of the language policy of the 
international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are two major 
published works on the language situation in the country but each of these 
deals with the international community's intervention in the language situation 
in a general way and in total their writing on this specific topic amounts to just 
a few paragraphs. The first work is Jezik u Bosni i Hercegovini (Language in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) edited by Svein Monnesland and published in 2005. This 
is one outcome from the Language and National Identity project run jointly by 
the Institute for Language in Sarajevo and the Institute for East European and 
Oriental Studies in Oslo. It takes a historical approach and looks at all the 
literary traditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than focusing on that of just 
one ethnic group. It has, for example, chapters on the speech of the Sephardic 
Jewish community and the Roma. The vast majority of contributors to the 
volume come from Bosnia-Herzegovina and include the language planners 
mentioned elsewhere in this chapter such as Senahid Halilovic, Josip Baotic 
and Ibrahim Cedic. 
Svein Monnesland himself contributes a chapter on contemporary 
language policy in which he looks at the language planning activities (both as 
regards status and corpus planning) of the three main ethnic groups in shaping 
their separate standard languages. In this he also recognises the contribution of 
the international community which he says had 'a significant influence'so 
so matajan uticaj. 
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(Monnesland, 2005: 488) on language policy. After a brief description of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement he discusses the approach the international 
community 'headed by the OHR,Sl (2005: 488) has taken to the language 
situation; this is based on the strict equality of the three languages. In this 
regard he mentions the role of High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in 
imposing constitutional amendments in 2002 to ensure this linguistic equality. 
Later on in the chapter he criticises what he calls 'Daytonski jezik' or 'Dayton 
language' which has developed as a result of the policy of the international 
community to produce all official documents in three language versions. 
Because of the way this is done, with the translation into one language serving 
as the basis for the other two and the 'more or less mechanical replacement of 
individual words which are known to be ethnically hued,52 (2005: 512), an 
artificial language is developing which 'is not real Bosnian, nor Serbian nor 
Croatian but an expression of the "equality" of the international community in 
the area oflanguage,S3 (2005: 512). 
Monnesland also deals briefly with the role of the international 
community in education refonn and its efforts to do away with the segregation 
in schools which emerged during and after the war. He touches on the 
opposition of Croatian politicians to international efforts to stop segregation on 
the basis of language and briefly mentions the issue of returnee children who 
find themselves in a minority position in their communities. Monnesland 
concludes though that 'The international community is still in a dilemma about 
how to solve this problem - to ensure linguistic freedom, prevent majority rule, 
stop segregation,54 (2005: 517). It is unclear from what Monnesland has 
written as to why the international community is in a dilemma other than the 
fact that its efforts at ending segregation in education have generally failed 
although Monnesland does not mention this explicitly. 
Monnesland's chapter is a good introduction to the issues that need to 
be looked at in considering the international community's language policy. As 
Sl Sa OUR-om na ~ e l u . . The OUR or Office of the High Representative was established in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee the civilian aspects of the peace. 
S2 manje We m e b a n i ~ k a a imljena pojedinib r i j ~ i i za koje se ma da su nacionalno obojene. 
S3 nije ni pravi bosanski, ni srpski, ni h r v a t s k ~ ~ vee izraz 'ravnopravnosti' medunarodne 
zajednice n a j e z i ~ k o m m planu. 
S4 Medunarodna zajednica jo§ uvijek je u nedoumici kako rijditi ovaj problem-osigurati 
jezi&ll slobodu, s p r i j ~ i t i i majorizaciju, uldnuti segregaciju. 
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he suggests, its intervention in language matters must be seen in terms of its 
effect on domestic legislation and policy areas such as education reform, as 
well as on the development of each language's corpus. In this regard 
Monnesland enlivens the topic by reproducing three translations of a document 
from the website of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
on higher education which demonstrate the 'mechanical' way in which the 
translations are produced and use of slight differences to distinguish the 
versions. 55 As can be expected, the Serbian version is distinguished because it 
is written in Cyrillic and the main difference between the versions is in lexical 
items. For instance, the word for century is stoljece in the Bosnian and 
Croatian versions but vijek in the Serbian version and the word for prompt is 
pravovremeno in the Bosnian and Serbian versions but pravodobno in the 
Croatian version. The other distinguishing feature of the Croatian version is the 
strict positioning of enclitics (in this case je) after the first word in a sentence 
even at the expense of breaking up a phrase. Thus, the first sentence of the text 
begins in the Bosnian version, Reforma visokog obrazovanja usmjerena je Ira ... 
(higher education reform is aimed at...) while in the Croatian text it is, Reforma 
je visokoga obrazovanja usmjerena Ira... Despite these differences all three 
versions can be understood by the speakers of all three languages. 
The other scholarly work which refers to the actions of the international 
community as regards the language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is Robert 
D. Greenberg's monograph Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-
Croatian and its Disintegration published in 2004. As the title suggests, 
Greenberg does not look solely at language developments in Bosnia-
Herzegovina but also in the rest of the former Yugoslavia where Serbo,:" 
Croatian was spoken. After the introduction, the first chapter deals with the 
history of the language of Serbo-Croatian and each subsequent chapter focuses 
on the four 'successor' languages: Serbian, Montenegrin, Croatian and 
Bosnian. In the chapter on Bosnian, Greenberg concentrates on the language 
planning efforts of the Bosniaks, including the 1998 BihaC conference and the 
2002 Charter on the Bosnian language, and looks in detail at the distinctive 
features of the Bosnian standard. 
" oseE website available at http://www.osce.org/ 
65 
As for the intervention of the international community, Greenberg 
states that the Dayton Peace Agreement gave legitimacy to the Bosnian 
language, and he, like Monnesland above, describes the intervention of the 
High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in imposing constitutional changes in 
order to guarantee the equality of the three languages. Only in the chapter's 
Conclusions does Greenberg address wider implications of the recognition of 
the three standards and the role of the international community in this. He 
assesses that 'the emergence of the new standards has proven to be a barrier to 
reintegrating the country's ethnic groups into a viable and cohesive nation that 
would function independent of the United Nations, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR)' (Greenberg, 2004: 156). He points out further that the 
constitutional formulation imposed by Petritsch 'obliterates any aspirations of 
the non-nationalist linguists, who had proposed the adoption of the Bosnian 
language by all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the 1998 Bihac 
Symposium' (Greenberg, 2004: 157). 
Greenberg also highlights that the Dayton Peace Agreement commits 
Bosnia-Herzegovina to abiding by the 1992 European Charter for Regional and 
Minority Languages and stresses the essential problem in its practical 
application to the three languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As official 
languages they cannot be regarded, according to the charter, as minority 
languages, however, speakers of these languages are nonetheless in the 
minority in certain parts of the country. For example, Bosniaks and Croats in 
the Republika Srpska or Bosniaks and Serbs in Croat majority areas of the 
Federation. Greenberg suggests that these minority populations do require the 
protection of the charter but he concludes: 'It will be difficult to enforce a 
realignment of majority/minority relationships on populations still reluctant to 
live in an ethnically diverse society' (2004: 157). He then goes on to say that 
this difficulty has been especially evident in the field of education, citing 
education expert Aida PaSalic-Kre§o (1999) who blames nationalist policies for 
creating 'national schools' in which the majority population tries to assimilate 
the minorities Greenberg, 2004: 157). He concludes this paragraph by citing 
the OHR's education policy which calls for the linguisticlliterary heritage of 
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the three ethnic groups to be taught 'in a balanced and meaningful way' (2004: 
158). 
Although neither of these works deals with the international 
community's language policy in any great detail they do nonetheless indicate 
the areas in which the international community's approach to language is 
important and needs to be investigated further. These are post-Dayton policy 
on equality and ethnic rights, education reform and institutional translation and 
interpretation policy. I have therefore taken these areas and analysed them 
further in this study. By looking at them in much closer detail we can gain a 
better understanding not only of the way in which the international 
community's language policy is formulated and implemented but also its 
implications for the post-I995 peace-building project. By building on the little 
scholarship that already exists in this field, this study makes a significant 
contribution to it. 
Conclusion 
The basic aim of this literature review has been to consider the 
language planning activities being conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
context of the scholarship on language planning literature in general and 
specifically as regards language planning in the country itself. From a 
consideration of the language planning and policy scholarship we can say that 
the language planning activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not been a 
rational, theory-driven process but rather what Cooper would call 'a messy 
affair - ad hoc, haphazard, and emotionally driven' (1989: 41). In this respect 
the activities of language planners in Bosnia-Herzegovina are no different to 
those of the language planners in many other settings. Of the three ethnic 
groups, language planning models can be applied only to the language planning 
of the Bosniaks who have engaged in recognisable corpus and status planning 
activities. However, they have been hampered in their endeavours by lack of 
agreement in linguistic circles over the exact form and future development of 
the Bosnian standard, the absence of an officially established policy and plan, 
the lack of a single body with primary responsibility for language policy and 
planning and the absence of tangible (including financial) support from the 
authorities for the creation of such a body. 
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Evidence in the literature suggests that the new Bosnian nonn is not 
being widely used by the Bosniaks. However, the name of the language, 
bosanski, has met with wide-spread acceptance and may be the most successful 
outcome of the language planning activities undertaken by the Bosniaks. It is, 
after all, a crucial element that provides 'contrastive self-identification via 
language' which Fishman considers so important in nationalist language 
planning. The nomination of the language therefore has primary importance 
over its substance. Language planners may argue over the exact fonn of the 
nonn and ordinary Bosniaks may not have changed their language behaviour to 
any great extent, but a distinct linguistic identity, as indicated by the ethnic 
designation of the language, consolidates a separate ethnic identity which is so 
crucial in the ethnic power relations of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Aside from the failed attempt by the Bosnian Serbs at 'planning by 
decree' in 1993, the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not 
undertaken any specific language planning activities. They have not, for 
example, felt it necessary to compile any nonnative works such as an 
orthography or grammar specifically on the speech of their respective 
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina as they are able to look to Serbia and 
Croatia respectively for their standards. The language issue is, however, guided 
by extra-linguistic considerations. As with the Bosniaks, it is important for 
both the Serbs and the Croats to have distinct linguistic identities that allow 
them not only to claim difference from the other two ethnic groups but also to 
align themselves ethnically and politically with their kin states of Serbia and 
Croatia respectively. The extra-linguistic, political dimension to language is 
therefore the most important one for all three main ethnic groups in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. From the available scholarship we have seen that the 
international community has played a crucial role in the language issue in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by advocating the existence and equality of three separate 
language standards, thereby bolstering the claims to difference of all three 
ethnic groups. By officially recognising Bosnian in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement it gave legitimacy to the Bosniak ethnic group and supported 
Bosniak claims to an ethnic identity separate from that of the Serbs and Croats. 
It thereby fed into the status planning goals of the Bosniaks. Likewise, having 
an officially and internationally recognised language also aids the Serbs and 
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Croats in their claims to ethnic distinctiveness. Once ethnic distinctiveness has 
been established it becomes easier to keep the three ethnic groups separate 
using language as a tool in this. 
The language policies discussed in this literature review are only the 
latest to deal with the issues raised by the language-ethnic identity link. These 
policies are conditioned by contemporary concerns and circumstances; they 
have been influenced not only by the conditions prevailing in a post ethnic-war 
environment but also by a wider international concern for respect for human 
rights and particularly linguistic human rights. But the approaches taken in 
these contemporary language policies are not the only options in using 
language to regulate inter-ethnic relations. Since the nineteenth century 
different authorities governing Bosnia-Herzegovina have recognised that the 
language issue can be manipulated for extra-linguistic aims and have therefore 
fonnulated different language policies in order to achieve these aims. Although 
this thesis takes 1995 as its starting point for considering the international 
community's language policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country was not at 
that point a tabula rasa as regards the language situation and it is therefore 
crucial to examine the language policies conducted in the past for an 
understanding of the interplay between ethnic identity and language and 
language attitudes in the present. The next chapter will therefore investigate 
three periods of Bosnia-Herzegovina history during which the conduct of a 
distinct language policy can be identified. 
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Chapter 2 
Language and Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a 
Historical Context 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to put the language issues affecting 
present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina into a historical context. The aim is to 
demonstrate that the issues that are germane to the contemporary language 
situation are not new and that comparisons can be made between concerns 
governing modern-day language politics and those that were salient at different 
periods in the past. Examining the various language policy responses that have 
been made in the past to issues related to the relationship between language 
and ethnic affiliation also casts light on current attitudes to language issues. 
The link between language and ethnicity was not made until the 
eighteenth century with the awakening of Romantic nationalism in the region 
but since then this relationship has been recognised by different ruling 
authorities as key to identity formation and as such these authorities have taken 
various approaches to utilise it for wider political ends. The chapter therefore 
focuses on three periods in history when a specific language policy related to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was instituted in an attempt to manipulate linguistic 
identity to achieve specific political goals. 
The first of these is the period of Hapsburg rule over Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1878-1918) during which Administrator Benjamin Kallay 
attempted to create an all-embracing Bosnian identity as a counterweight to 
growing Serbian and Croatian nationalism in other parts of the empire which 
had started to seep into Bosnia-Herzegovina and threatened to undermine the 
empire as a whole. The project to nurture a Bosnian identity, known as 
bosnjaJlvo or Bosnianism, required a language policy aimed at creating a 
common language called Bosnian (bosansld). The second period to be 
discussed is the period of the wartime Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 
(1941-1945) during which language policy was also part of the authorities' 
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wider efforts at identity fonnation but in this case the aim was to create a pure 
Croatian identity incorporating a pure Croatian linguistic identity to include not 
only the Croats but also the Muslims living in the NDH. The third and longest 
period under consideration is the post-Second World War period between 1945 
and 1991. Tito recognised early on that a solution would need to be found to 
the national question and language policy became an essential part of the post-
war Communist regime's national policy to regulate inter-ethnic relations. 
Rather than taking an exclusivist approach language policy was marked by a 
move towards a flexible standard language which would encompass the speech 
of all the Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian speakers in the country. 
Before looking in more detail at these three periods, there will be a brief 
account of the ethno-linguistic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the 
beginning of Hapsburg rule. During Ottoman times the key marker of identity 
was religious affiliation and it was not until the end of Ottoman rule that the 
Catholic and Orthodox communities began to think of themselves as Croats 
and Serbs and aligned with fellow Croats and Serbs outside Bosnia-
Herzegovina. As we shall see, as ideas about identity and ethnic affiliation 
gradually began to change, ideas about language and linguistic difference also 
came to the fore. 
Background to Hapsburg occupation 
There were three main motivations for the Hapsburgs to occupy 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Friedman 1994: 58). The first was economic: the 
monarchy wanted to obtain captive markets for the disposal of its industrial 
produce and to procure raw materials cheaply. Bosnia-Herzegovina was also 
rich in natural resources such as gold, silver, lead, iron ore and coal. Second, 
there was a need to stop their great rival Russia exerting influence in the 
region. Third, the Hapsburgs feared the possible creation of a large south Slav 
state instigated by a newly-independent Serbia. Such a state would then attract 
the Slav populations which were part of the empire and lead ultimately to its 
destabilisation. 
The declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by Serbia and 
Montenegro in 1876 brought the prospect of a large south Slav state closer 
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especially as the former had agreed to annex Bosnia and the latter Herzegovina 
(Malcolm, 1994: 133). In the even, Serbia and Montenegro had to be rescued 
from Ottoman re-conquest by Russia who declared war on the Ottoman Empire 
in 1877. According to Noel Malcolm there had earlier been secret negotiations 
between the Russians and Austrians on sharing out the Balkan lands 
(1994:133) and as Russian troops approached Istanbul, Russia was able to 
dictate terms to Austria that were favourable to itself by offering Austria 
occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in return for Austrian neutrality. Russian 
gains in the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878 (notably the 
creation of a large Bulgarian state) were rolled back at the Congress of Berlin 
in July 1878 which confIrmed Hapsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
while it still remained a sovereign part of an ever-weakening Ottoman Empire. 
Francine Friedman characterises Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning 
of the occupation as an 'administrative nightmare' (1994: 59). There had been 
massive social conflict prior to the occupation because of bad agrarian 
conditions in the agriculture sector and there was a total breakdown of order. 
Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina was 'one of the most backward areas in 
Europe' (Donia and Fine, 1994: 75) and was not well placed to develop and 
prosper. It was a predominantly agrarian society with 88% of the generally 
impoverished and illiterate population engaged in agricultural activities (Donia 
and Fine, 1994: 76). 
As elsewhere in the empire, the Ottoman rulers had organised the non-
Muslim population into millets, or religious communities, which meant that 
their subjects were mostly governed by local religious leaders. Barbara 
Jelavich contends that this practice of using local religious officials for 
government duties arose because as the Ottomans took over ever more territory 
they found that once they had conquered an area the civil authorities would 
have been killed or driven out but the local religious communities would 
remain (1983: 48). The Ottomans were also particularly tolerant of 'people of 
the Book,' such as the Jews and Christians, which were given millet status. The 
status of the Catholics (the Bosnian Franciscans) was legalised by charter 
because the head of the church was located outside the Ottoman Empire and 
although they were not a millet they nonetheless had the privileges of one on a 
local level (Fine, 2002: 7). The millets were allowed to govern themselves with 
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little interference from the Ottomans 'as long as they paid taxes and did not 
cause disorder' (Donia and Fine, 1994: 65) but they were nonetheless second-
class citizens in comparison to the local Muslims. There were certain 
restrictions placed on them regarding occupation and dress and, for example, 
they were required to bow down to Muslims and to dismount a horse when in 
view of a Muslim (Bieber, 2000: 23). The non-Muslims were required to pay a 
head tax, unlike the Muslims, and they were also subject to the devshirme or 
child levy whereby male children were taken away from Christian families and 
educated as Muslims. Furthermore, non-Muslims could not bring lawsuits 
against Muslims and they could not give testimony in Muslim courts. 
The Muslims, on the other hand, were favoured by the Ottoman 
authorities and, according to William Lockwood, they were considered to be 
and 'thought of themselves, as the establishment, and an integral part of the 
Empire' (2009: 4). The advantages to being a Muslim in better economic and 
social status were one reason for the conversions of a vast number of Christians 
that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the fifteenth and the 
seventeenth centuries. Lockwood makes the point that aside from the 
devshirme the conversions were not forced by the Ottomans (2009: 2) and 
people chose to convert on an individual basis given their individual 
circumstances and the benefits they would expect to win. Aside from the 
benefits, the conversions can be seen in the context of an environment in which 
changes in religion were common, and Lockwood considers that 'the lack of a 
strong church organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, either Catholic or 
Orthodox, made widespread conversion possible' (2009: 2). The nature of 
religious observance is also important here because as Noel Malcolm puts it, 
In country areas poorly served by priests, Christianity (in whatever fonn) had 
probably become little more than a set of folk practices and ceremonies, some 
of them concerned with birth, marriage and death, and others aimed at warding 
off evil fortune, curing illnesses, securing good harvests, and so on. The shift 
from folk Christianity to folk Islam was not very great (1994: 58). 
An additional reason for conversion given by Lockwood is the prestige 
attached to identifying with the new authorities because 'the Empire 
represented the epitome of civilization, a major center of not only political and 
economic power, but also cultural and intellectual life' (2009: 2). Conversions 
were more common in towns than in the countryside because this was where 
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the social and economic benefits to conversion were to be had. For instance, 
after the early sixteenth century it was necessary to be a Muslim to have a 
career in the Ottoman governing structure (Malcolm, 1994:65). 
The issue of conversion in Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina is important in 
this discussion because it significantly altered the composition of the 
population and laid the foundations for the later emergence of the Muslims as a 
separate ethnic group. More importantly though, from the point of view of 
relations between the groups, it impacted on the way in which the Croats and 
Serbs subsequently viewed the Muslims. A persistent element of the attitude of 
Croats and Serbs to the Muslims is that they are really Croats and Serbs 
because this is, supposedly, what they were before conversion to Islam.56 As 
such they can be co-opted onto the side of either of the groups for political 
purposes. Furthermore, there is also the view among Croats and Serbs that the 
Muslims (and now Bosniaks) are not a 'proper' ethnic group because they do 
not have their own distinct culture and history since they are really Croats and 
Serbs. These views became important after the national awakenings of the 
nineteenth century and, as we shall see, have informed Croat and Serb attitudes 
towards the Muslims until the present day. 57 In research based on interviews 
with politicians in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, Roland 
Kostic cites this view voiced by a Bosnian Serb politician: 'Listen, the 
Bosniaks were recognised as a nation in 1993. They don't have to worry about 
the problem of history. Their history starts [in] 1993. Until 1971, their history 
was either Croat or Serb history. They have no history, save for this latest war' 
(2007, 100). 
56 This view does not take into consideration that during Ottoman times the communities of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were based on differences in religious affiliation and the modem national 
categories of 'Croat' and 'Serb' did not arise until the nineteenth century. Moreover, this is a 
simplistic interpretation of the development of the ethnic groups as it fails to take account of 
the fact that at the time of the Ottoman conquest there were three Christian denominations in 
Bosnia: the Catholics, the Orthodox and the autochthonous Bosnian Church which was based 
on the Catholic monastic system that existed in Bosnia at that time. Moreover, members of all 
three converted to Islam over the course of the centuries. The Bosnian Church is also the basis 
of the popular myth among the Bosniaks that the Muslims descended from a Bogomil Christian 
heresy connected with this church which converted as a group to Islam. This myth suggests 
that the Muslims were a distinct group before conversion (Hoare, 2007: 42). 
S7 The cultural anthropologist Fran Markowitz also suggests that this idea about conversion 
means that Croats and Serbs associate certain negative character traits with Bosniaks as they 
'tend to view them as the descendents of opportunistic and treacherous individuals who 
changed religion to gain social and economic advantage' (2010: 63). 
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In the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims were not a socially homogeneous 
group and there were stark differences between the Muslim landowners and the 
peasantry which was both Muslim and Christian. In 1878, there were 6-7,000 
Muslim landowners in control of 85,000 serfs, of whom 2,000 were Muslim 
and the rest Orthodox (60,000) and Catholic (23,000). In addition there were 
77,000 free peasants, the vast majority of whom were Muslims. There was no 
social mobility between the peasantry and the landed aristocracy so the Muslim 
peasant had much more in common with a Christian peasant than a Muslim 
landowner. These economic and class differences were one of the factors that 
meant that no group consciousness based on religion developed among all the 
Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina during Ottoman times. 
The Muslim population gradually grew after Ottoman conquest until by 
the late sixteenth century or early seventeenth century they made up an 
absolute majority of the population (Malcolm, 1994: 53). By the end of 
Ottoman rule, however, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was 43% 
Orthodox, 38% Muslim and 18% Catholic (Okey, 2008: 8). The fall in the 
proportion of Muslims can be attributed, among other things, to the many 
Muslims who died fighting in the Ottoman Anny in the empire's numerous 
military campaigns and the many victims of the plague which swept Bosnia in 
the early eighteenth century. Noel Malcolm also suggests that the Orthodox 
population grew naturally after the seventeenth century because a certain social 
stability was established as a result of a functioning local economy (1994: 96). 
The differentiation of the groups according to religious community 
meant, as Malcolm claims, that they referred to themselves mostly in religious 
terms; thus the Catholics self-identified as lalinci (Latins) or krisCjani 
(Christians) and the Orthodox called themselves Vlasi (Vlachs) or hriscjani 
(Christians) (1994: 148). The Muslims, however, called themselves Bosnjaci or 
Bosniaks in order to stress their regional origins (Friedman, 1996: 43) rather 
than religious affiliation with the Ottoman rulers. 58 They were also called and 
referred to themselves as Turci (Turks) which was another way of 
sa Df.evad Jahie says that the word BoSnjak dates from the Middle Ages and replaced the word 
BoSnjan;" which was used to denote members of the Bogomil church (cf. 050), as well as later 
religions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He also says that during the Ottoman Empire BoSnjalc was 
used to denote all the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not just one part of the population 
(1999:46). 
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distinguishing themselves from the Anatolian Turks who were known as 
Turkusi (Banae, 1996: 133). 
Linguistically there seems not to have been any barrier to 
communication between the different groups nor, indeed, any consciousness of 
linguistic difference between them. Socially, Donia and Fine maintain that 
there was 'frequent intermingling in everyday life. Catholics, Orthodox, 
Muslims, Jews and others shared the same marketplaces and, particularly in 
urban areas, were often acquainted with one another and prone to render 
mutual assistance and cooperation in times of need' (1994: 84). At the village 
level members of different faiths would attend each other's festivals. Bosnian 
Croat commentator Ivan Lovrenovic also considers that because of the turmoil 
of war, violence and economic stagnation in the seventeenth century there 
developed between the different groups 'a cult of good neighbourliness, with 
its own traditional terms such as komSiluk [neighbourhood, neighbours] and 
dosluk [friendship] of which there are many examples in folk memory, in 
poetry, in written chronicles and in records of bequests: a ground-roots 
negation of division and particularization' (1998: 100). 
The most obvious linguistic differences were in the written language 
which was heavily influenced by the practices of the different religious 
communities which were at the centre of literary activity. The Muslims, for 
example, developed their own script based on Arabic (arebica) which they 
used to write their mother tongue. This script was used by writers in the 
Alhamijado literary tradition which developed among the Bosnian Muslims 
between the seventeenth century and the early twentieth century. These writers 
also wrote in Turkish, Persian and Arabic.59 The written language of the 
Orthodox population was likewise influenced by Serbo-Slavonic 
(srpskoslovenski) which was Old Church Slavonic of the Serbian redaction and 
ruskoslovenski which was Old Church Slavonic of the Russian redaction, both 
of which were used in the Orthodox church until the end of the eighteenth 
century (Okuka, 2005: 274). 
S9 As the language of the rulers, Turkish would also have been spoken although not to a great 
extent as the administration of the province was left to members of the local community. 
Turkish was necessary though for communication between Constantinople and the local 
authorities and all official documents were written in Turkish. Bosnians who were part of the 
ruling and educated elites in Constantinople would also have spoken Turkish. 
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The literary activity of the Catholics was focused on the Franciscans 
who were generally well-educated with experience of schooling abroad in 
Italy, Hungary and Croatia. Initially their literary activity was confined to 
religious works such as various prayer books, catechisms, liturgical writings, 
translations of the Bible and collections of sermons and they wrote both in the 
vernacular and Latin. Over time, the literary output of the Franciscans 
broadened to include monastic records, chronicles, historical works and poetry. 
They used mainly bosancica (a form of Cyrillic particular to Bosnia which was 
used by all three groups during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule) but 
from the beginning of the seventeenth century there was increasing use of the 
Latin script. This was despite the fact that various forms of this script were in 
use and it was not standardised until the nineteenth century. According to Ivo 
Pranjkovic, the Bosnian 'Franciscans obviously did not worry too much,60 over 
what they called the vernacular language - whether this was slovinski 
(Slavonic), bosanski (Bosnian), naiki (ours), iliricki (Illyrian), slavobosanski 
(Slaveno-Bosnian), dumanski (a local term the exact meaning of which is 
unclear) and hrvatski (Croatian) - but the important thing was that all its 
speakers considered it to be their mother tongue (2005: 229). This also 
suggests that among the Catholic community there was no consciousness of the 
need to settle on one linguistic designation that would be specific to that 
community so even though a group identity developed based on religious 
affiliation there was no perceived need to link this identity to a particular 
language. 
Attitudes among the three main groups began to change in the 
nineteenth century under the influence of developments in neighbouring areas. 
The Orthodox and Catholic populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina had always 
maintained ties with neighbouring Serbs and Croats and they were not only 
very much aware of developments in these communities but also came to be 
directly affected by them. For the Orthodox community the Serbian uprisings 
of 1804 and 1815 demonstrated growing Serbian political self-confidence as 
the Ottoman Empire weakened and Serbian nationalism began to spread. From 
the 1840s, Serbian leaders, led by Ilija GarUanin, Serbia's minister of the 
60 Franjevci se ocito nisu previAe brinuli. 
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interior, worked on plans to expand the Serbian state. GaraSanin laid out his 
idea of a greater Serbia in a secret docwnent of 1844 entitled Nacertanije or 
Outline. For GaraSanin the borders of a greater Serbia would encompass all the 
Serbs who spoke Serbian. This linguistic definition of a Serb was inspired by 
the work of the language reformer and folklorist Vuk Stefanovic KaradZic 
(1787-1864) who considered anyone who spoke a stokavian dialect to be a 
Serb. This linguistic concept of Serbdom meant that religious affiliation no 
longer had to be the primary marker of ethnicity. As Ivo Banac puts it, 
KaradZic 'brought forth a modem Serb national ideology, the purpose of which 
was to assimilate the vast majority of Catholic Croats and all Bosnian Muslims, 
whose dialects were akin to the stokavian subdialects spoken by Serbs' (1984: 
80). 
These developments in Serbia had a direct effect on the Orthodox 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Politically, the leaders of Serbia were 
interested in winning the support of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(including Muslims) for their Serbian national project and sent agents into the 
province to set up networks to support the Serbian cause (Jelavich, 1983: 350). 
There was even a successful attempt to set up an organisation in Bosnia to fight 
against the Ottomans (Hoare, 2007: 54). Linguistically, Vuk's work in two 
areas - collecting the folk songs of the Serbs in Serbia and Bosnia and 
reforming the language of the Serbs - had a powerful resonance among the 
Orthodox population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He developed the first 
orthography for the Serbian language which was more suited to the vernacular 
language than the liturgy-based Slaveno-Serbian and which was based on the 
principle of 'write the way you speak'. The dialect he used as the basis for his 
new linguistic norm was the eastern Herzegovina dialect and much of the oral 
literature he collected came from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This meant, as Milos 
Okuka puts it, that 'Vuk's language and work with the Serbs of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was in fact their own language and their own cultural treasure,61 
(2005: 278). 
The awakening of Serbian national consciousness in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was also greatly aided by the introduction of progressive reforms 
61 Vukov jezik i djelo kod Srba Bosne i Hercegovine bio je ustvari njihov vlastiti jezik i 
njihova vlastito kultumo blago 
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from 1839 onwards which led to some economic development. This meant that 
the second half of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a wealthy 
mercantile class among the Serbs especially in urban areas. One consequence 
of this was an increasing number of books and written materials were brought 
into the province from Serbia from which the local mainly urban population 
could imbibe romantic ideas of national awakening. In 1866, the first 
newspaper to be printed in Bosnia appeared, Bosanski vjestnik (Bosnian 
Herald), which 'had a decidedly Serb orientation' (Hoare, 2007: 71). Hoare 
considers that this 'marked the start of the process by which newspapers would 
be launched aimed at specific ethno-religious communities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, so that the Bosnian reading public was increasingly divided into 
readers of Serb, Croat or Muslim newspapers' (2007: 71). 
For the Catholic community, the early part of the century saw the 
emergence and rise of the Illyrian movement in Croatia. It came to the fore in 
the 1830s and 1840s in its opposition to the authorities' endeavours to replace 
Latin as the official language of Croatia with Hungarian since at that time 
Croatia came under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Crown. The Illyrians 
were initially a small group of members of the lower nobility, clergy, the 
professions and the army led by Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72). Because of the lack of 
a university in Croatia, they had studied in such places as Graz and Vienna 
where they had come into contact with the new ideologies and ideas popular in 
the rest of Europe such as German Romanticism. In order to oppose attempts at 
assimilation by the Hungarians the Illyrians strove to demonstrate that Croatia 
belonged to a much larger territory, one that included all the south Slavs and as 
part of this south Slav national unity it was then necessary to demonstrate that 
it had its own language. There were three competing dialects in Croatia -
kajkavian, cakavian and ~ t o k a v i a n n - from which the Illyrians chose one as the 
basis for standardized Croatian. Although Gaj and his followers were kajkavian 
speakers they nevertheless chose ~ t o k a v i a n n as the basis for the standard 
Croatian language because it was not only the most widespread dialect among 
the Croats but also the dialect used by the Serbs. With this wide linguistic 
base, the Illyrians hoped that their idea of the unity of all the South Slavs 
wo\lld have appeal beyond the Croats in Croatia 
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As we have seen above, language thus played a decisive role in the 
construction of both Serbian and Croatian identities. Consciousness about a 
shared language within each of the communities meant that different socio-
economic groups could coalesce around one national identity. Similarly, 
awareness of linguistic commonality between the Croats and Serbs led to a 
promotion of South Slav unity based to a great extent on language. Thus, the 
activities of language reformers such as Vuk KaradZic, Ljudevit Gaj and Dura 
Danicic at this time were crucial in the awakening of national consciousness 
within these communities. 
Because of these political and linguistic developments the Orthodox 
and Catholic communities had begun to think of themselves in ethnic terms by 
the end of Ottoman rule and this process was well advanced, especially in 
urban areas, by the time the Hapsburgs took over (Donia and Fine, 1994: 81). 
The Muslims were left out of this process, however, principally because of 
their status within the Ottoman Empire. Whereas millet status had allowed the 
religious communities to develop their own group identity, the Muslims were 
identified and self-identified with the Ottoman authorities. As Lockwood puts 
it, 'Because of the international makeup of the ruling Ottoman apparatus 
(including prominent Serbo-Croatian speakers), there was no official 
differentiation-no formalization of a Bosnian Moslem ethnic group' (2009: 4). 
It was only later, once Bosnia-Herzegovina was under Hapsburg occupation 
and circumstances had changed for the Muslims that they began to think of 
themselves as distinct not only from the Christian populations but also from the 
other Muslims in the Ottoman Empire (Lockwood, 2009: 5). 
The Nature of Hapsburg Rule 
According to Robin Okey, the Hapsburg authorities saw their mission 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina as one aimed at developing the province both 
economically and culturally. The framework for this was to be a European one 
which matched the buoyant pro-European ideas and attitudes prevalent in the 
Hapsburg Empire at the time. As Okey puts it, 
The later nineteenth century saw European confidence and prestige at its 
zenith. A century of unparalleled economic, scientific and educational progress 
was associated with the espousal of rationalist, increasingly secular norms and 
notions of constitutional government rooted in respect for civic society. In the 
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dawning age of imperialism the sense of European superiority was fostered by 
the decline of the Ottoman empire, long a feared rival (2007: 1). 
The most important figure in this Europeanising project for Bosnia-
Herzegovina was Benjamin von Kallay who was the Common Imperial 
Finance Minister and as such the administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 
1882 until his death in 1903.62 His was an authoritarian approach to ruling 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and he controlled every aspect of policy. His first priority 
was the economic development of the province and he established a road and 
rail infrastructure that allowed for coal and iron mining to be opened up. He 
also developed numerous branches of industry, including forestry, paper and 
spirits manufacture, distilling, food-processing, carpet-making and cigarette 
production (Okey, 2007: 59). 
In tandem with economic development, the administration worked to 
develop the cultural field. There was a reform of the education system that 
concentrated on secondary schools and was meant to bring contemporary 
European educational ideas and standards to the province (the illiteracy rate in 
1878 was about 95% of the population). Printing presses were established and 
new journals and other publications were launched. Theatrical and musical 
performances and exhibitions were organised and libraries and reading rooms 
were opened (Sator, 2005: 321). A provincial museum was set up to preserve 
cultural artefacts from the province's past and, according to Okey (2007:70), to 
enhance the international cultural prestige of the province. To this end also 
links were established with 60 institutions in Austria and elsewhere and in 
1894 a five-day conference of leading European archaeologists was held in 
Sarajevo. 
Aside from the Europeanising project, the other major strand of 
Hapsburg policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina centred around fear of Serbia and the 
potential dangers represented by growing nationalism in neighbouring Croatia 
and Serbia. The Hapsburg authorities thought that the province could be drawn 
into a larger south Slav community and become mobilised politically on the 
basis of ethnic affiliation. In an effort to pre-empt these possible outcomes 
62 This arrangement ensured that the administration would have allegiance only to the crown, 
thereby avoiding a constitutional struggle between Vienna and Budapest, the two competing 
centres of power in the Hapsburg Empire, over territory and influence in the province. 
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Kallay came up with his policy of bosnjaStvo or Bosnianism.63 The idea behind 
this policy was to create an all-Bosnian, inter-confessional identity that would 
be attractive to all the different groups in the province as a way of identifying 
themselves. It was not meant to privilege one group over the others but it was 
hoped that the creation of this Bosnian identity would isolate the population of 
the province from the growing nationalisms among its neighbours. Part of the 
exploration of the past in the cultural sphere as detailed above was also to 
bolster this idea of a separate identity (Okey, 2007: 70). 
The important thing about this policy is that it was fIrst and foremost 
intended to protect the empire itself. Promoting a feeling of loyalty to and self-
identifIcation with the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina was intended to embed 
the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the wider empire and draw it away 
from ideas of affiliating with Croatia and Serbia on the basis of common ethnic 
ties. As Okey puts it, 'the bottom line is that [Kallay] advocated Bosnianism -
a policy he latterly relaxed - as a means to smooth Bosnia's accommodation to 
the Habsburg state, not as endorsement of the continuity of Bosnian statehood 
in a modem Bosniak sense' (2007: 254). This is clear from the fact that as soon 
as the Hapsburgs adopted a more conciliatory approach, especially towards the 
Serbs, in the run-up to Hapsburg annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, 
they dropped their bosnjaStvo policy altogether. 
Kallay's Language Policy 
As an exercise in identity fonnation Kallay's policy of bosnjaStvo 
necessarily had to incorporate a language policy.64 The drive for educational 
and cultural development threw up the issue of what to call the language 
spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina Textbooks from Croatia were being used in 
schools but were deemed unsatisfactory by the Hapsburg authorities because of 
many elements that were insulting to the Muslim and Jewish populations 
(Sator, 2005: 322). The provincial government then embarked on creating 
63 Most writers on this period of Bosnia-Herzegovina history call this policy bo§njaftvo and 
only Muhamed Sator (2005) calls it bosanstvo. The fonner term is the most appropriate one as 
it comes from the word bo§njak which at that time was an ethnically-neutral term for an 
inhabitant of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
64 Another element to the policy of boinjaftvo was the introduction of a new flag and coat-of-
arms in 1889 which were designed on the basis of historical Bosnian symbols which would 
distinguish them from Croatian and Serbian symbols (Hoare, 2007: 74). 
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textbooks specifically for Bosnia-Herzegovina which raised the question of 
what to call the language in the province. Sator sums up the dilemma over the 
designation of the language well when he states, 
In a country in which there were different cultural and traditional 
achievements, at a time of the awakening of national consciousness, with 
serious conservative attitudes and ever present national-romantic views of the 
past, with an education system divided by religion, a compromise solution 
needed to be found65 (2005: 322). 
Initially (in 1879) the Hapsburg administration had called the language 
Croatian but then soon changed this to the more descriptive zemaljski 
(provincial) and then zemaljski bosanski (provincial Bosnian). Also in 
circulation were the terms srpski (Serbian), srpsko-hrvatski (Serbo-Croatian) 
and bosanski (Bosnian) (Sator, 2005: 322). It was Kallay though who insisted 
on the language being officially called bosanski or Bosnian to reflect his 
bosnjaStvo policy. 
To deal with the issue of which form of the language should be used in 
newly created school textbooks the provincial government set up a 
Commission for Language in 1883. The Ottoman authorities had already 
accepted the phonetic spelling and Vuk's reformed alphabet in 1866 and the 
Commission endorsed this. The phonetic spelling was favoured as it was used 
by the largest part of the population. This was also commensurate with what 
was happening in neighbouring areas. In 1850, representatives of the Serbs and 
Croats (including Vuk KaradZic) had signed a Literary Agreement in Vienna 
on unifying the language of the Croats and the Serbs on the basis of the eastern 
Herzegovina dialect on which Vuk had based his reformed Serbian language.66 
The choice of this dialect meant that the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
took easily to Vuk's reforms and the new joint language. 
After two sessions of the initial commission, the authorities set up 
another Commission for Language to adopt orthographic provisions that would 
guide the official use of language in the administration and particularly in 
schools. It was made up of representatives from all three ethnic groups and met 
about 80 times. Little is known about the proceedings of these meetings (there 
6S U zemlji u kojoj su postojale razlii!ite kultume i tradicijske tekovine, u vrijeme buctenja 
nacionalne svijesti, sa teAkim konzervativnim shvatanjima i joA uvijek prisutnim nacional-
romantimim pogledima na proAlost, sa koofesionalno podijeljenim Akolstvom, 1rebalo je Dati 
kompromisno reAenje. 
66 The text of the agreement, as well as a translation of it are to be found in (Greenberg, 2004). 
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are no minutes in the Archives of Bosnia-Herzegovina) but it nonetheless 
issued systematic provisions which established a standardised orthography in 
the province (Sator, 2005: 324). The existence of the commission and its work 
towards developing the norm indicate the importance that the provincial 
government and Kallay attached to language issues and particularly the 
standardisation process. It also demonstrates the very deliberate way in which 
they approached the language planning process. 
Another important element of the standardisation process was the 
publication of the first grammar for the Bosnian language in 1890 which was 
controversial from the start. The author, a Croatian school teacher called Franjo 
Vuletic, did not want it to be called a grammar of the Bosnian language 
(bosanslci) preferring instead for the language to be called Serbo-Croatian, 
Croato-Serbian, Croatian or Serbian or Serbian or Croatian (Ford, 2001: 64). In 
the event the authorities published it as a grammar of the Bosnian language 
without stating the author's name. The grammar provoked outrage from the 
Serbs and Croats especially in the media where the government and the 
Muslims defending the designation Bosnian were ranged against the Serbs and 
Croats who defended their own national designations for the language (Okuka, 
1998: 55). There was also reaction in the Austrian parliament with one delegate 
ironically asking why Kallay had sought to create a new language (Okuka, 
1998: 56).67 
Yet Sator considers that this polarisation of opinion shows that the 
grammar had been misinterpreted. According to him the grammar was 
important because it led to stabilisation of the linguistic norms and brought 
together the languages that were in use in Croatia and Serbia without seeking 
to create a separate standard language for Bosnia-Herzegovina (Sator, 2005: 
328). After all, the grammar was based on the principles put forward by Vuk 
KaradZic and the Serb Dura Danicic which were the same ones that formed the 
basis of the Croatian Orthography (Hrvatslci pravopis) by Ivan Broz (published 
67 Kallay brought in the Slavonic specialist and Vienna university professor Vatroslav Jagic (a 
Croat) who made what Okuka bas caUed a 'chaotic speech' (1998: 56) in the Austrian 
parliament defending Kallay's grammar which served to enrage Croatian and Serbian 
newspapers and led to protests outside his apartment in Vienna. According to Okuka, Jagic 
explained in his memoirs years later that be bad been misrepresented by Kallay as he bad 
wanted to say in his speech that the language used in Bosnia was the same as Croatian and 
Serbian. 
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in 1892) and the Grammar of the Serbian or Croatian Language (Gramatika 
srpslcog iii hrvatslcog jezika) by Tomislav Maretic (published in 1899). 
Moreover, Sator argues that the grammar served a political purpose as Kallay 
wanted to distance the Serbs from the Russian Empire and bring them closer to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Making use ofVuk's principles which were of a unifying 
character was one way of doing this linguistically. As Sator says, 'This was 
essentially a way of diverting literary linguistic processes towards one centre, a 
common course, at a time when close but also different norms coexisted,68 
(2005: 328). Sator even puts the pUblication of the grammar in the context of 
the Hapsburgs' wider Europeanization concerns. According to him, the 
authorities wanted to organise Bosnia-Herzegovina 'in line with the practices 
of a modem European state with a unified area of communication,69 (2005: 
325). In this sense, the Hapsburgs favoured one, unifying standard language. 
Another important element of Kallay's overall cultural policy was his 
encouragement of the print media and establishment of new journals and other 
publications. Government-owned pUblications could be expected to use the 
official name for the language but, according to Sreto Tanasic, there were 
different approaches to the naming of the language. Some did use the new 
official designation but others also used more descriptive terms such as 
nastavni jezik (language of instruction), maternji jezik (mother tongue), or 
hrvatski iii srpski jezik (Croatian or Serbian). The ethnically-based publications 
did not use the designation Bosnian but stuck to Croatian or Serbian. T anasic 
says that the Serbian paper Bosanska vila which was the most important 
publication in Bosnia at the time always called the language srpski or Serbian 
and criticised those who tried to avoid using the designation by using more 
neutral terms (2005: 353). The Muslim or Bosniak papers used the name 
Bosnian and often continued to use it after the designation was officially 
scrapped in 1907. 
Despite this lack of consistency in the designation of the language in 
the print media Tanasic does stress, however, that throughout the Hapsburg 
period the actual language used in all these publications developed towards the 
68 R i j ~ ~ je, u su!tini 0 skretanju literarno-jeziadb procesa u jednu maticu, u zajedni&i tolc, u 
vremenu kada su koegzistirale bliske ali i r a z l i ~ i t e e nonne. 
(I) U skIadu sa uzusima modeme evropske drfave u okviru jedinstvenog komunikacijskog 
prostora. 
85 
standardised norm based on Vuk.'s linguistic model (2005:362). Tanasic credits 
these publications with improving literacy in the country and increasing the use 
of the norm. As evidence for this he cites the language survey that was carried 
out by the Hapsburg authorities in 1897. It was intended as a prelude to holding 
a major philological-ethnographic congress which in the event did not take 
place.7o The survey was carried out by the provincial museum using brochures 
printed in both Latin and Cyrillic and containing 150 questions. Its aim was to 
form a picture of the speech of ordinary people throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina both on a territorial and confessional basis. 
Although the results of the survey were never fully analysed, according 
to Tanasic, they do show that all of the 215 respondents had mastered the 
orthographic provisions of the 1890 Grammar and they all displayed common 
linguistic traits. As he puts it, 'It is clear from the survey that local speech 
could not be differentiated solely according to confession because, for 
example, the completed survey papers from Stolac show that a Catholic priest 
and a Muslim judge have almost identical answers' 71 (Tanasic, 2005: 332). 
This indicates therefore that the religious divisions in the population did not 
produce corresponding divisions in language use or in perspectives on 
language. 
The language that was used in schools, various publications, 
newspapers and magazines, and generally in the public domain continued to 
move towards a standard language based on Vuk.'s principles. Sator says that at 
the beginning of the twentieth century it was possible to discern a higher level 
of literacy and more consistent use of the accepted norm in the print media 
(2005:333). School reforms also began to bear fruit with an increasing number 
of educated young people, some of whom went on to university education in 
other parts of Europe. Here they carne into contact with ideas about 
nationalism which they then brought back to the province, thereby 
undermining Kallay's intention of isolating the population from such ideas. 
This was the weakness in Kallay's Europeanisation policy. He wanted the 
70 Okuka claims that the results of the survey were so 'shattering' for Kallay that he could not 
go ahead with the congress (1998:58) although be does not explain why they were shattering. 
Gerd-Dieter Nehring says that it is not known at all why the congress was Dot held (2005: 310). 
71 U anketi je vidljivo da se mjesni govor ne mof.e diferencirati iskljlWivo prema konfesiji, jer, 
naprimjer, ispunjeni anlcetni listovi iz Stoca pokazuju da katoli&i svetenik i stolKki kadija 
imaju gotovo istovjetne odgovore. 
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population of the province to have access to modern European ideas but he 
failed to appreciate that ideas connected with Romantic nationalism and 
linguistic identity would not necessarily lead to a greater feeling for a Bosniak 
identity, as he had hoped, but would in fact engender a stronger and competing 
feeling of loyalty to the ethnic group and its members outside the province. 
Language developments continued in the same way - with an increase 
in the use of the norm but with continued opposition to the designation of 
Bosnian - until 1903 and the death of Benjamin Kallay. After his death there 
was no longer a strong defender of the term Bosnian and in 1907, the official 
name of the language was changed from Bosnian to Serbo-Croat. Vuletic's 
grammar was reprinted without amendment and again anonymously in 1908 
and 1911 as the Grammar of the Serbo-Croatian Language (Gramatika srpsko-
hrvatskog jezika). 
Under Kallay's successor, Istvan Burian de Rajeczi, language policy 
became more liberal as the policy of bosnjaStvo was gradually abandoned. In 
1907 the designation of Bosnian for the language was scrapped and the official 
language of the province became srpsko-hrvatski (Serbo-Croat) although the 
Muslims were allowed to use the former designation for official 
correspondence and school certificates (Sator, 2005: 334). Until the beginning 
of World War I the Serbs were also allowed to use the designation of srpslci 
and the Croats hrvatslci to describe the language they spoke. Burian's more 
tolerant approach generally was dictated by the preparations that the Hapsburg 
authorities were making to fully annex the province. In this context Burian 
sought fit not to antagonize the Serbs and Croats in the hope that they would 
not oppose eventual annexation of Bosnia-Herz.egovina. 
Nevertheless, the Hapsburg authorities continued with their established 
language policy of consolidating the standardised language according to Vuk's 
and Dura D a n i ~ i c ' 's principles. Thus, in 1911 they issued an order for the 
revision of textbooks, grammars and readers for schools, in 1912 the 
orthography was revised and in 1913 a conference was held on the subject of 
technical expressions in teaching Serbo-Croat grammar with the purpose of 
standardising the linguistic terminology in use in schools. Hapsburg policy 
changed again during World War I as the authorities clamped down on the 
Serbs in an attempt to prevent nationalist Serbs from joining forces with 
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Serbia. This meant that in 1914 all Serbian publications except one ceased 
publication and in 1915 the Cyrillic alphabet was banned. 
Assessment 
The language policy moves made by Kallay as part of his bosnjastvo 
policy can be fitted into Einar Haugen's language planning model outlined in 
the Literature Review. Following his stages: Selection of the norm was logical 
because it built on the norm already chosen by the Ottomans and was based on 
the phonetic spelling and the principles of Vuk KaradZic and Dura Danicic 
which had in turn been based on the speech of eastern Herzegovina. The 
naming of the language as Bosnian was also logical for Kallay as it echoed the 
designation of the wider policy of bosnjaStvo and related to the entire 
population of the province. 
Codification was embarked upon first with decisions on the 
orthography made by the Commission for Language in 1883 and then the 
publication of Vuletic's Grammar in 1890. There was also Implementation 
with the Hapsburgs' concentrating on the use of the norm in schools and the 
media Evaluation was only partially achieved because even though the survey 
on language use was carried out its results were not fully analysed and acted 
upon. There was also some Elaboration with later moves by the authorities 
prior to World War I to revise textbooks, grammars and readers in schools. 
This demonstrates that the Hapsburg authorities certainly approached 
their language planning project in a way familiar from modern-day scholarship 
so that their language policy was deliberate and considered. The results, 
however, were mixed. Hapsburg language policy is inextricably linked with the 
broader policy of bosnjastvo and as an integral part of that policy it patently 
failed. Overall, the bosnjaItvo project failed to create an identity that would 
appeal to all three main ethnic groups in the province principally because self-
identification on the basis of ethnicity was already too far advanced when 
Kallay started implementing his policy. It was therefore too late for a language 
called Bosnian to have any appeal and there was opposition to this designation 
from the beginning, not only from the Croats and Serbs but also from the bulk 
of the Muslim population. Thus the language policy failed to achieve its status 
planning goal but where it could claim success was in corpus planning and the 
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standardisation of the nonn. The Hapsburgs were not interested in creating a 
kind of linguistic third way in order to differentiate the Bosnians from the 
neighbouring Serbs and Croats. They instead consolidated the trend that had 
begun with the Ottomans' adoption in 1866 of a phonological orthography and 
Vuk's refonned alphabet. Their corpus planning was therefore centred on the 
standardisation of the language as used by all three main ethnic groups and 
following Vuk's linguistic principles which had been adopted as part of the 
Vienna Agreement of 1850. Decisions by the Commission for Language and 
the publication of the Bosnian Grammar consolidated this nonn. It is important 
here that when Vuletic's Grammar was reprinted as a Grammar of Serbo-Croat 
rather than Bosnian its content was not amended in any way, thus ensuring 
continuity in the language's codification. Looked at more broadly as part of 
cultural and educational policy, the Hapsburg language policy also achieved a 
modicum of success in helping to increase literacy rates in the province. 
According to Okey, by 1910 illiteracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 88 per cent, 
down from 95 per cent at the start of Hapsburg occupation (2007: 184).72 This 
figure though conceals variations according to location so in Sarajevo, for 
example, the literacy rate was 57 per cent while in the much more rural Cazin 
area it stood at just 2 per cent (Okey, 2007: 220). From this we see that it was 
the urban population that benefited most from the drive to increase literacy. 
After all, Bosnia-Herzegovina remained an agrarian province under Hapsburg 
rule on the periphery of the Empire and, according to government statistics 
from 1910, 87.91 per cent of the population of the province were occupied in 
agricultural activities as their primary or secondary occupations (Babuna, 1996: 
4). 
Ironically Kallay's policy of improving the education system and 
encouraging the printing of books and the establishment of new journals, 
newspapers and various publications ultimately contributed to the failure of the 
bosnjaitvo policy as a whole. Improved education meant that increasing 
numbers of students were able to study outside the province and come into 
contact with new ideas about national self-determination. Through the new 
media the educated urban elites of the Croatian and Serbian populations were 
72 To compare the illiteracy rate in Bosnia-Herzegovina with smrounding areas. in 1900 the 
rate of illiteracy in Croatia-Slavonia was 56% and in Serbia 77% (Okey, 2007). 
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able to access ideas from the neighbouring Croats and Serbs and were thereby 
able to conceive themselves as being part of ethnically-based communities 
which included other Croats and Serbs outside the province. As time went on 
these communities broadened to encompass a wider unified south Slav 
community that would provide a much broader identity than a solely Bosnian 
identity, as conceived by Kallay, ever could. 
Francine Friedman considers that the experience of the Bosnian 
Muslims during Hapsburg occupation represented the 'political awakening' 
(1996: 57) of the Muslims as a distinct ethnic group although still on a 
religious basis. Kallay had courted the Muslim landowners in his efforts to 
establish his policy of bosnjaStvo by doing nothing to refonn the agrarian 
sector. This section of the population, as well as the educated Muslim elite in 
Sarajevo, who had a privileged position in Kallay's Sarajevo-based system of 
government (Hoare, 2007: 74), benefited the most from the bosnjastvo policy 
and as a consequence were its main supporters. The Muslim peasant 
population, on the other hand, were not attracted to the bosnjaStvo policy 
precisely because it favoured the Muslim landowners and they therefore 
continued to identify themselves in religious tenns. It was, however, religious 
issues around which the conflicting concerns of the Muslim peasantry and the 
urban and landowning elites began to coalesce at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Thus, Aydun Babuna (1996) dates the start of organised Muslim 
opposition to Hapsburg rule to 1899 and controversy surrounding the 
conversion of a particular Muslim girl from Mostar. The two rival Muslim 
groups from Mostar that came together to protest at this incident, which they 
blamed on inadequate religious education, represented the beginnings of 
organised Muslim opposition to the Hapsburg authorities. Thus the first 
Muslim political party, the Muslim National Organisation, was established in 
1906. Marko AttHa Hoare points out that the religious nature of this Muslim 
political activity is demonstrated in the 'adoption of the tenn "Muslim" by the 
leading political and cultural figures of this people to describe themselves, and 
by all reading r o o ~ ~ professional societies, youth groups and other 
organisations that represented the Muslims under Austria-Hungary' (2007: 76). 
The bosnjaStvo policy also alienated the Orthodox population which 
opposed the government's restrictions on the activities of religious foundations 
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and educational bodies. The Orthodox community considered these 
restrictions, as well as the ban on the use of the name Serbian for the language 
and restrictions on the use of Cyrillic to be violations of the rights they had 
enjoyed under Ottoman rule (Hoare, 2007: 77). Their opposition was therefore 
founded on demands to restore these rights and establish autonomy over school 
and religious matters. As with the Muslims, the political mobilisation of the 
Orthodox community culminated in the establishment of the first Serbian 
political party, the Serb National Organisation, in 1907. 
It could be argued, then, that even if Kallay had lived on after 1903 his 
policy of bosnjastvo, which held no appeal for the vast majority of the 
province's population, would have eventually sunk under opposition from a 
population that was becoming increasingly politicised on an ethnic basis. The 
changing political situation in the region as a whole also required different 
policy responses which tolerated the expression of ethnic difference rather than 
sought to suppress it. To this end, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Kallay allowed the establishment of the educational-cultural societies, the 
Muslim Gajret society, the Serbian Prosvjeta society and the Croatian 
Napredak society (Hoare, 2007: 81) but with the rise of nationalism and 
political mobilisation around ethnic identity (actually facilitated by the 
aforementioned ethnically-based educational-cultural societies) there would 
have been no hope for the survival of an identity that was based on 
membership of a state rather than membership of an ethnic group. 
Finally, though, perhaps the most enduring legacy of Kallay's 
bosnjaitvo policy and especially his language policy is that it has allowed 
present-day Bosniak language planners to claim historical continuity for the 
Bosnian language, especially as regards its name. It provides justification for 
their claims that the Bosnian language is not a new and artificial construct but a 
language that has a history that goes back at least until 1883. For example, 
Dt.evad Jahic, in discussing the importance of Kallay's language policy in his 
book Bosanski jezik u 100 pitanja i 100 odgovora (The Bosnian Language in 
100 Questions and Answers) says as regards the language, 
That language was created by ethnic and national history and not by any kind 
of temporary policy which was after all what even Kallay's political mission in 
Bosnia was. Kallay's Bosnian language policy in fact represents more a proper 
historical reflex on the part of Bosnian culture to its past. It is an indicator of 
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how much that language is an unavoidable factor in the Bosnian tradition 73 
(1999: I 00). 
The next historical period to be considered will be World War II when 
language policy was used once again by the governing authorities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a way of creating a specific identity. As background to that 
section of the chapter there will be a brief discussion of the political and 
language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1918 and 1941. 
The inter-war period was politically and economically tumultuous for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the end of World War I Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
incorporated into the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes and for the first few years after the war it was able to maintain its 
autonomy. In 1921, however, it was split into six provinces and in 1929, when 
King Alexander suspended the constitution, made the country a dictatorship, 
and renamed it the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it was divided between four 
banovine or banates which cut across the already existing borders of the 
constituent parts of the kingdom. To all intents and purposes therefore Bosnia-
Herzegovina ceased to exist as a territorial-administrative whole. 
From the beginning there was fundamental disagreement over the 
nature of the kingdom: whether it should be a unitary state (the option favoured 
by the Serbs) or a federation (the Croats' preferred option). It came to be 
dominated by the Serbs and run from Belgrade which caused huge resentment 
among the non-Serbs, especially the Croats. This meant, according to 
Friedman, that 'Yugoslav political parties coalesced along ethnic lines even 
more rigidly than before and provoked constant turmoil during the interwar 
period' (1996: 95). Politically, the defining relationship in the interwar state 
was the bitter rivalry between the Serbs and Croats. Within this rivalry each 
side sought to win over the support of the main Muslim party, the Yugoslav 
Muslim Organisation, for their positions. The Yugoslav Muslim Organisation 
was, however, able to negotiate through the Serb-Croat relationship by, as 
Donia and Fine put it, playing out 'the historic role of the Bosnian Muslims as 
73 Taj jezik je stvorila etniBca i nacionalna historija, a ne nikalcve privremene politike, kakva je 
uostalom bila i Kallayeva p o l i t i ~ k a a misija u Bosni. Kallayeva politika bosanskogjezika u stvari 
vik predstavlja zakonomjeran historijsld retIeks bosanske kulture na svoju proAlost. Ona je 
pokazatelj koliko je taj jezik nezaobilazan faktor bosanske tradicije. 
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a swing group in coalition politics, typically supporting the center against 
centrifugal tendencies' (1994: 125). 
Bosnia-Herzegovina also had to cope with social unrest because of the 
poor economic state of the province and problems to do with agrarian reform 
and the position of agricultural workers (Sipka, 2005: 411). In the thirties the 
whole kingdom, which was still an overwhelmingly agrarian state, suffered 
greatly as a consequence of the Depression (Donia and Fine, 1994: 133). 
Loss of autonomy and the social, economic and political problems 
meant that no language policy was conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
interwar years which Sipka has described as a 'gluvo doha' or silent period for 
linguistic activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2005: 413). As a centralised state, 
decisions about language matters were made in the capital Belgrade and there 
were no linguistic experts or expert bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself who 
could influence linguistic decisions made elsewhere. The only decision about 
language made in Bosnia-Herzegovina in this period was the Law on the 
Official Language and Script (Zakon 0 zvanicnom jezilcu i pismu) that was 
passed by the Main Committee of the National Council of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes for Bosnia-Herzegovina just before the kingdom was established. 
This law proclaimed the official language of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be Serbian 
or Croatian (srpski iii hrvatski) and gave equal status to the Cyrillic and Latin 
alphabets (Sipka, 2005: 410). This designation was, however, changed in 1921 
with the promulgation of the first constitution of the kingdom when the official 
name of the language was changed to Serbo-Croato-Slovenian (srpsko-
hrvatsko-slovenacki). This designation was the result of a political compromise 
'in the spirit of the unitary idea of a "three-name nation",74 (Sipka, 2005: 412). 
The idea was that the single state should have a single language even though 
Slovene, despite being a Slavonic language, is not sufficiently close to Croatian 
or Serbian to be easily comprehensible to the Croats and Serbs.7s 
Sipka maintains that despite the name change the old names for the 
language endured throughout the kingdom so that in Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
language was still called Croatian or Serbian. Two orthographies were written 
74 U duhu unitame ideje 0 'troimenom narodu'. 
7S ~ i p k a a says that various options for the name were put forward by different political parties 
and members of the Constituent Assembly such as srpskohrvatski, srpsko-brvatski and brvatski 
iii srpski. Slovenian would be separate but would have equal status (§ipka, 2005: 412). 
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- the Orthography of the Croatian or Serbian Language (Pravopis hrvatskoga 
iii srpskoga jezika), published in Zagreb in 1921 and the Orthography of the 
Serbocroatian Literary Language (Pravopis srpskohrvatskog knjizevnog 
jezika), published in Cyrillic in Belgrade in 1923 - and they were both used in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina along with the revised orthography that had been adopted 
back in 1912 during the Hapsburg era. Another name change came in 1929 
with the issuance of a special orthographic instruction for schools (Pravopisno 
uputstvo za sve osnovne, srednje ; strucne skole u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata ; 
Slovenaca) by the minister of education in Belgrade. This document used the 
designation Serbocroatian (literary) language (srpskohrvatski [knjiZevni] jezik) 
throughout and Sipka says that this was applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina until 
the beginning of World War II. Once the Kingdom of Yugoslavia became 
embroiled in the war and Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into the 
Independent State of Croatia, language once again became the subject of 
official policy as the wartime authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina endeavoured 
to use language to manipulate the ethnic loyalties of the population. 
Language policy in the Independent State of Croatia 
1941-1945 
Even before the inter-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia fell to Axis forces on 
the 17th April 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) had been set up on 
10th April 1941 incorporating not just Croatia but the whole of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It was divided between a German and an Italian military zone 
and was governed as a fascist quisling regime by Ante Pavelic, the leader of 
the Ustasha movement which was an extremist organisation that had spent the 
interwar years underground in Italy and supported by Mussolini. After the 
Serb-Croat political conflicts of the interwar years the Croats saw the 
establishment of the NDH as an opportunity to set up their own purely Croatian 
state. Pavelic had compiled 17 Principles of the Ustasha movement in 1929 
which guided the regime. The principles equate the Croatian nation with the 
Croatian state and Principle 8 makes this clear: 
The Croatian nation has the right to revive its sovereign authority in its own 
Croatian State in its entire national and historical area, that is to say to 
reconstitute a complete, sovereign and independent Croatia. This 
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reconstitution may be accomplished by any means, including force of arms 
(Pavelic papers). 
There was no room in this state for any other ethnic groups such as the Serbs, 
Jews and Roma and the authorities set about removing them from their territory 
through deportation, extermination or conversion. 
This policy did not, however, extend to the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina who were now citizens of the NDH. Pavelic declared the Muslims 
to be 'the blood of our blood, they are the flower of our Croatian nation' 76 
(Kisic Kolanovic 2007: 67). Nor was the Muslim faith a bar to the Muslims 
being seen as Croats as the Ustashas considered the Muslims to be Croats who 
had converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. In a speech to the Croatian 
parliament in February 1942, Pavelic said: 'The Muslim blood of our Muslims 
is Croatian blood. It is the Croatian faith because on our territory its members 
are Croatian sons'77 (Kisic Kolanovic 2007: 68). Nada Kisic Kolanovic calls 
this approach an 'Islamic variant of Croatian culture' which was a consequence 
of the Ustashas' desire to create a homogeneous greater Croatian state (2007: 
68). After all, in Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats made up only 23 per cent of the 
population while the Muslims represented 37 per cent so by incorporating the 
Muslims into the NDH the Ustashas could claim the bulk of the population to 
be Croatian. Moreover, the Ustashas realised that they needed Muslim support 
in dealing with the Serbs and other groups and so demonstrated toleration of 
them by, among other things, allowing Muslims in the government and state 
apparatus, subsidising their schools and allowing mosques to be built. This 
approach meant that the Muslims were not treated as a separate group in 
society (Kisic Kolanovic, 2007: 94) and therefore not singled out for 
eradication as the Serbs, Jews and Roma were. 
The NDH's language policy should be seen as part and parcel of the 
process of creating a pure Croatian nation and the authorities gave language 
policy a high priority, passing legislation on language use only days after the 
NDH was established. The second of these pieces of legislation was a decree 
banning the use of Cyrillic whereby any violation of the decree was punishable 
76 krv oak krvi, oni su cviet ode hrvatske narodnosti. 
77 Muslimanska krv odih Muslimana je hrvatska krv. Dna je hrvatska vjera, jer su na ndoj 
zemlji njezini pripadnici hrvatski sinovi. 
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with a fme of 10,000 dinars and one month's imprisonment.78 Other pieces of 
legislation dealt with individual lexical items so, for example, the Order on the 
Name of the Seat of the Vrhbosna County changed the spelling of Sarajevo to 
Sarajvo and another government order banned the use of the word lice meaning 
person where the more 'Croatian' word osoba was to be used instead (Sipka, 
2005: 418 and 419). 
Creating a pure Croatian language meant breaking with the 
phonological principles that had prevailed in language use in Croatia since 
1892 and especially since the Vienna Agreement of 1850. Thus, in August 
1941 the Decree on the Croatian Language, its Purity and its Orthography 
(Zalconska odredba 0 hrvatslcom jeziku, 0 njegovoj cistoc; i 0 pravopisu) was 
issued which stipulated that the phonological orthography would be replaced 
by the etymological 'lcorijenski' orthography. According to Robert Greenberg, 
'This switch away from the phonological system revealed a bias among Croat 
extremists. These individuals believed that only through an etymological 
writing system would Croatia regain its purity and authenticity, cleansing itself 
of the unwanted Serbian elements' (2004: 46). 
Indeed, the decree also outlawed the use of words 'which do not reflect 
the spirit of the Croatian language, as a rule foreign words, borrowed from 
other, even similar languages,79 (Okuka, 1998: 73). The foreign words 
mentioned here included words which could be considered to have their origin 
in Serbian. Ridding the language of Serbianisms mirrored the U stashas' 
attitude to the Serbs generally because as the main enemy of a pure Croatian 
state the NDH authorities wanted not only to eliminate all Serbs from its 
territory but also to eradicate all Serbian influence from the language. In 
contrast, although the speech of the Muslims could equally have been 
considered foreign in a similar way to that of the Serbs, the authorities' 
approach was much more tolerant because having declared them to be Croats 
and therefore part of the homogeneous Croatian nation their speech could not 
be considered as foreign and impure. Consequently no special provision was 
71 Even though the official currency of the NDH was the kuna it was not introduced untillu1y 
1941. As the legislation imposing a tine for using Cyrillic was passed in April 1941 the dinar 
would still have been the currency in circulation. 
'79 Desbalb ist es verboten, in Wort und Schrift W&ter zu benutzen, die nieht den Geist der 
kroatischen Sprache widerspiegeln; das sind in der Regel Fremdw&1er, die BUS andenm, wenn 
80ch Ihnlichen Sprachen entlehnt sind. 
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made concerning the speech of the Muslims although they were expected to 
adhere to decrees on language usage. 
Indicative of the Ustasha authorities' attitude to the language of the 
Muslims is the way in which they dealt with the language issue in the 
Handschar Division which operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the period 1943-
1945. The establishment of this division was instigated by SS Chief Heinrich 
Himmler who envisaged it as a purely Muslim division which would operate in 
the area of northeastern Bosnia and protect Srem where German settlers were 
to be found. In the agreement between the SS and the Ustasha authorities on 
the division's formation it is stated that the language of command would be 
German while Croatian could be used 'colloquially and for training' (Lepre, 
1997: 24). The division's newspaper was also published in Croatian and 
German. Although the bilingual solution was logical because the commanding 
officers in the division were Gennan it was nevertheless a compromise on the 
part of the Ustasha authorities which had wanted the language of command to 
be Croatian too. The Ustasha authorities were wary about creating a military 
unit around which the Muslims could rally and they therefore endeavoured to 
ensure that the division had a clearly Croatian character (Lepre, 1997). 
Okuka says that the new writing system caused 'chaos, insecurity, fear 
and horror,3o (1998: 74) but the authorities did their utmost in all areas of 
social life to impose their linguistic norm ( ~ i p k a , , 2005: 419). They set up a 
State Office for Language to deal with language policy in an organised way. It 
had responsibility for, among other things, the publication of school books 
such as an orthography, grammar and dictionary; giving advice to authors and 
publishers on works of literature and school books; the monitoring of all print 
material from the point of view of language; the control of language used in 
theatres, cinemas and radio stations and language promotion (Okuka, 1998: 
72). In 1945 it published a brochure titled 'For the Correctness and Purity of 
the Croatian Language' which contained lists of words to be avoided and the 
Croatian words to be used instead (Okuka, 1998: 76). The authorities also 
encouraged the publishing sphere and Kisic Kolanovic ~ t e s s that about 
2,000 different titles covering books, brochures, magazines and so on were 
80 Chaos, Unsicherbeit, Angst und Scbrecken. 
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published in the NDH (2007: In). This was an achievement in itself given the 
shortages and general chaos caused by the war. Muhidin PeleSie though says 
that the new etymological orthography was not systematically used and could 
be found mainly in those publications with an explicitly Ustasha orientation 
(2003: 237). 
The NDH lasted until the end of the war in April 1945 when the 
Partisans had taken control of the whole territory of what was to become a 
Communist-led Yugoslavia. The regime continued to concern itself with 
purifying the language throughout the war (Greble Balie, 2009: 129) but its 
language policy left very little trace in the subsequent language situation. This 
is partly because the authorities had barely four years in which to change 
people's language habits and also because the NDH did not really gain 
purchase ideologically throughout its territory. As Emily Greble Balie puts it: 
Unlike other radical right regimes in wartime Europe, the ustasha agenda 
failed to transcend the political realm and to unite society. It dominated public 
culture and rhetoric but never became ingrained in local mentalities. Born in 
the midst of a multisided war that worsened by the year, the Croatian nation-
state was disorganized, decentralized and doomed (2009: 137). 
Despite the short-lived nature of NDH language planning, Einar Haugen's 
model can still, partially, be applied to its efforts. There was Selection of a 
specific norm with a specific name for the language - in this case Croatian with 
an etymological korijenski orthography. Codification was attempted with the 
issuance of legal decrees on the orthography and, in 1942, with the publication 
of a new etymological orthographic manual. The NDH also endeavoured to 
implement the chosen language through the media and with its use throughout 
the school system. 
The significance of the Ustashas' language policy for the present 
discussion though is in the way in which it attempted to use language to create 
a specific identity. This is exactly what Kallay had tried to do but for different 
reasons. Whereas Kallay wanted to create an all-embracing identity for all the 
ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Ustashas were interested only in 
manipulating language in order to create a singular ethnic (Croatian) identity 
which was superior to all others. By creating this superior identity they could 
then justify the expulsion or extermination of the £lesser' groups, especially the 
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Serbs. Thus, exhortations to 'cleanse' the language of Serbianisms echoed 
exhortations to 'cleanse' the state of the Serbs themselves. 
At the end of World War II and with Croatia's incorporation into 
Communist-ruled Yugoslavia Ustasha ideas about language exclusivity and 
purity lost their prominence. They did, however, resurface at the beginning of 
the 1990s when Croatian language planners undertook to mould the western 
variant of the then supposedly common language into a 'purer' Croatian 
language. Among other things, this entailed introducing or reintroducing native 
Croatian forms and eliminating foreign borrowings. According to Greenberg, 
in doing the latter, they removed 'both Orthodox Slavic and orientallIslamic 
elements from their language' and thereby 'differentiate their language from 
both Serbian, with its "Orthodox" influences, and Bosnian, with its strong 
Turkish/Arabic lexical components' (2004: 124). The language planners also 
looked to the NDH period for historic lexical items by introducing words 
which were emblematic of this time, such as lama for the currency (Greenberg, 
2004: 124) and domovnica meaning a document confinning Croatian 
citizenship. There was also an echo of Ustasha language policy in the failed 
attempt by the ruling HDZ to introduce a law which would levy fines for 
incorrect use of the language (Greenberg, 2004: 131). 
The language policy of the post-World War II period saw a return to a 
single standard for all the Serbo-Croat speaking peoples throughout Yugoslavia 
with a phonological orthography as it became part of the Communists' efforts 
at dealing with the national question. The next section therefore looks at the 
impact of these efforts and how language issues played out in the new state and 
as it moved towards dissolution culminating with the conflicts of the 199Os. 
Language Policy in Communist Yugoslavia (1945-1990) 
There are two factors that are important in considering the post-World 
War II language policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First of all it must be seen in 
the context of the overall policy of the Communist government to deal with the 
national question in the federal state. Secondly, as before, language politics 
was dominated for much of this period by the relations between the two largest 
ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Croats. As part of the wider state of 
Yugoslavia and as a republic where not one single ethnic group was in the 
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majority, Bosnia-Herzegovina was perhaps most exposed when it came to 
developments in the area of inter-ethnic relations and, particularly in the 
linguistic field, in Croatia and Serbia. 
Tito had recognised early on the importance of resolving the national 
question for the viability of the future federal state. His solution was to 
recognise the different national identities and allow for a certain amount of 
self-determination but within an authoritarian (and initially totalitarian) federal 
political framework under the complete control of the Communist party. As 
part of his national policy a hierarchy of groups was developed with six 
constituent, or founding, peoples (narod) - Croats, Muslims (after 1963), 
Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes - at the top of this hierarchy. 
Each of these constituent peoples had a home base in one of the republics.81 
Five of the six republics were named after the majority people in them 
(Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) although the territorial 
boundaries of the republics were not coincident with the locations of the 
constituent peoples. Thus, members of a constituent people would be living 
outside the borders of their home people's repUblic. Despite being a numerical 
minority in another republic the members of a particular people would 
nevertheless retain the rights afforded to a constituent people and the crucial 
thing here was that they did not consider themselves to be a minority. Bosnia-
Herzegovina was different because it had three constituent peoples none of 
which formed a majority of the population. Two of the constituent peoples (the 
Croats and the Serbs) lived outside the borders of their home republic (Croatia 
and Serbia, respectively) which meant that the republic was affected by any 
developments in relations between Croatia and Serbia. 
Being at the top of this hierarchy of groups, the constituent peoples 
were afforded the most rights, having in this regard the right to self-
determination. Important here is the distinction made between the constituent 
peoples and the other categories of nationality (narodnost), minority (manjina) 
and others (ostalJ) which had fewer rights. Nationality status, for example, was 
afforded to citizens who identified ethnically with a people which had a 
national homeland outside the SFRY. This category included Albanians, 
"There were also two Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and ofVojvodina. 
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Hungarians, Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Ruthenians, Bulgarians, Turks and 
Italians who 'had guaranteed cultural rights to preserve their sense of 
community and its inheritance' (Woodward, 1995: 31) but not the right to 
national self-determination. 
This national policy and the policy of creating a viable federal state both 
concerned the ways in which the different groups related to the state and its 
resources and to each other. As Francine Friedman puts it: 
This socialist vision assumed that an equitable distribution of economic 
resources with an emphasis on economic equality would erase the worst 
excesses of ethnonationalism and, indeed, eventually of national self-
identification. Memories of World War D's nationalistically inspired atrocities 
would fade as all Yugoslav peoples dwelled in economic and political security 
(Friedman, 1996: 146). 
This emphasis on equality meant that the federal state structure 'helped satisfy 
important psychological needs of the Yugoslav peoples for recognition of their 
national individuality, and perhaps more important, it gave each nationality the 
assurance, for the first time, of enjoying a truly equal status with the other 
national groups' (Shoup, 1968: 119). The Communists hoped 'to incorporate 
the emotional attachments of nationalism into the revolutionary ideology of 
Communism by identifying Communism with the abolition of all forms of 
national exploitation' (Shoup, 1968: 120). The attractions of nationalism would 
then be subsumed by those of an equitable and economically successful 
Communist state and the Communists would have thereby solved the 
ethnically-based conflicts that had dogged the region since the nineteenth 
century. 
As regards the language situation, according to Milan Sipka, there was 
no 'elaborated and defined,82 (2005: 422) language policy immediately after 
the war. This is clear from a 1944 decision of the Anti-fascist Council for the 
People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (A VNOJ) which stated that all the Council's 
decisions would be published in 'the Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and 
Macedonian languages,83 (Sipka, 2005: 421). This decision marked the end of 
the linguistic separatism that had prevailed in the NDH but shows that the 
Communists had not yet formulated a language policy that would 
accommodate more than just the four main ethnic groups. Similarly the first 
12 razradena i definisana. 
83 na srpskom. hrvatskom. slovena&om i makedonskom jeziku. 
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republican constitutions passed after the war in 1946 gave different 
designations to the language depending on the dominant ethnic group in a 
particular republic: in Serbia and Montenegro it was Serbian (srps/ci), in 
Croatia Croatian (hrvatsla) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbian or Croatian 
(srpski iii hrvatsla) (Sipka, 2005: 422). The choice of Serbian or Croatian in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina reflects the view of the Communists at the time that the 
Muslims would eventually identify themselves as either Croats or Serbs 
(Malcolm, 1994: 197). However, as Noel Malcolm points out, the results of the 
1948 census show how deeply embedded a separate Muslim identity already 
was. In the census there were three categories for the Muslims to choose: 
Muslim Serb, Muslim Croat or Muslim nationally undeclared. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 72,000 declared themselves as Serbs, 25,000 as Croats but the 
overwhelming majority, 778,000, registered as 'undeclared' (Malcolm, 1994: 
197). It was therefore clear that these Muslims were not interested in 
identifying themselves as either Croatian or Serbian. 
After the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the Communists felt compelled to 
find new policies to replace the Stalinist model which would move away from 
a centralised model of government. Thus, the regime came up with the idea of 
promoting a Yugoslav identity based on class rather than ethnic affiliation and 
the unity of the Yugoslav state but there was still the hope that the social and 
economic changes would still be effective in settling national issues within a 
federal system and that socialist ideals would become more important than 
national ones. As Shoup puts it, the idea was 'to elevate the Yugoslav idea to a 
level of respectability which would make it an effective contender for the 
national loyalties of the Yugoslav peoples' (1968: 190). One way of doing this 
was to bring nationalities together in the cultural field and such things as inter-
republican cultural exchanges were encouraged. 
This policy change provides the context for the first important 
milestone in language developments after the Second World War. The ideas 
about a Yugoslav culture led the Matica srpska cultural foundation to carry out 
a survey regarding a joint language and orthography. Encouraged by the results 
of the survey which favoured 'a consolidation of the standard language 
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community of the three nations recognised at that time,84 (Sipka, 2005: 423) 
(the Croats, Montenegrins and Serbs), the editorial board of the Letopis Malice 
srpske journal organised a three-day conference in December 1954 to discuss 
language issues which was attended by linguists, writers and cultural workers. 
The conference concluded with the adoption of the Conclusions of the Novi 
Sad Agreement which recognised the language of the Croats, Montenegrins 
and Serbs as one language. 
The first four points of the Agreement which deal with the substance of 
the common language state the following:8s 
1) The popular language of the Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins is one 
language. Therefore, the literary language, which has developed on its basis 
around two main centers, Belgrade and Zagreb, is also a single language, with 
two pronunciations - ijekavian and ekavian. 
2) In naming the language, it is necessary in official use always to state both of 
its constituent parts. 
3) Both scripts, Latin and Cyrillic, are equally legitimate; therefore, it is 
necessmy to ensure that both Serbs and Croats learn in the same manner the 
two scripts, a goal to be reached especially by means of school instruction. 
4) Both pronunciations, ekavian and ijekavian, are also equally legitimate in 
all respects86 (translation from Greenberg, 2004: 172). 
The provisions of the agreement and their emphasis on the language of the 
Serbs and Croats reflect the major concern of the time which was 'to bring 
together and unite those two most developed and in terms of language issues 
most far apart centres,87 (Sipka, 2005: 424). This explains why the agreement 
allows for a standard language flexible enough to accommodate two 
pronunciations and two scripts. It also partly explains why very little specific 
mention is made of any other ethnic group apart from that of the Montenegrins 
in the first sentence.88 Sipka attributes the omission of Sarajevo as a centre of 
linguistic development also to the lack of qualified language scholars who 
could have represented Bosnia-Herzegovina at the conference (2005: 424) 
B4 ~ v r i C e n j e e standardnojezi&og zajedniftva tada priznatih triju nacija. 
B.5 Four of the remaining six points concern the compilation of a joint dictioll8l)', orthography 
and tenninology. 
16 1) Narodni jczik Srba, Hrvata i Cmogoraca jedan jc jczik. Stoga je i lmjit.cvni jczik koji se 
razvio na njegovoj osnovi ako elva glavna srediJta, Bcograda i Zagrcba, jcdinstvcn, s dva 
izgovora, ijckavskim i ekavskim. 2) U naziw jezika numo je uvek u sluf.benoj upotrebi istaCi 
oba njegova sastavna dela. 3) Oba pisma, latinica i cirilica, ravnopravna su; zato treba nastojati 
da i Srbi i Hrvati podjednako DIlUU oba pisma, Ito Ce sc postici u prvom redu §kolskom 
nastavom. 4) Oba i7govora, ekavski i ijekavski, takode su u svemu ravnopravna. 
17 Priblititi i ujcdiniti ta elva ~ r a z v i j e n i j a a i u jcziacim pitanjima najudaljenija centra. 
II Sarajevo university is mentioned only in the point covering the membership of the 
commission for compiling an orthographic manual and terminology. 
103 
(among the many signatories to the agreement only three were from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and all of those were Serbs: writers Marko Markovic and Ilija 
Kecmanovic and university professor Jovan Vukovic).89 This view is borne out 
in an article published in the Slavic and East European Journal in 1957 giving 
an overview of Slavonic linguistic study throughout the then Yugoslavia. It 
stresses Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana universities as the most important 
centres for this kind of study and mentions just one publication from the 
University of Sarajevo (Schenker, 1957: 272-279). 
Despite this apparent disregard for the language situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina manifested at the Novi Sad conference, the agreement was 
welcomed in the republic as its provisions actually most suited it as a 
multiethnic republic. The flexible norm could be applied to both constituent 
peoples (norodi) - the Serbs and the Croats. It must not be forgotten here that 
constitutionally there were only two constituent peoples in the republic at the 
time, as the Muslims were still considered to be a religious community only. 
Moreover, it was only once the Muslims had acquired the status of a norod that 
they could think in terms of promoting the idea of a separate linguistic identity. 
The provisions of the agreement were implemented in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as were the later common norms in the orthography ( ~ i p k a , ,
2005: 424). In the 1963 republican constitution, for example, the language is 
called srpslwhrvatski but this was corrected in the later constitution of 1974 
which stipulated: 'Serbocroat and Croatoserbian with the ijekavian 
pronunciation are in official use in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina,90 (as quoted in ~ i p k a , , 2005: 424). ~ i p k a a says that to judge by the 
terminology used in schoolbooks the name of the language changed with the 
political climate so that from 1945 until the Novi Sad Agreement the main 
national subject in schools was called srpski iii hrvatski (Serbian or Croatian) 
in line with the 1946 Constitution. After the Agreement and until the 
publication of the joint orthography in 1960 the designation was srpslw-
hrvatski while after this it was srpslwhrvatski (written as one word). Finally at 
89 Nor did the 1ater work that was done OIl a joint orthography and dictionary include more than 
one linguistic expert from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
90 da je u S o c i j a l i s t i ~ k o j j Republici Bosni i Hercegovini u slufbenoj upotrebi. .. srpslcobrvatski 
odnosno brvatskosrpski ijekavskog izgovora. 
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the end of the 1960s the designation of the language was established as 
srpslcohrvatski-hrvatslcosrpski jezik (Sipka, 2005: 425). 
The common language started to unravel, however, in the mid 1960s. 
The political reforms of the fifties and sixties meant not only that more power 
was devolved to the republics but also there was increasing desire in the 
republics for more autonomy and greater readiness to express alternative 
viewpoints. Thus, at the Fifth Congress of Yugoslavists held in Sarajevo in 
1965 there was sharp debate about the nature of the common language: was it 
truly a single language or were there distinct Croatian (centred around Zagreb) 
and Serbian (centred around Belgrade) variants? The Novi Sad Agreement was 
thus being challenged as it had made no mention of variants. This presaged the 
publication in March 1967 of the Declaration on the Name and Position of the 
Croatian Literary Language which was signed by 19 (almost all) of the most 
important Croatian scientific and cultural institutions. This declaration 
advocated doing away with the official designation of the language in favour of 
establishing four literary languages: Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian and 
Slovenian which would have 'clear and unambiguous parity and equality,91 (as 
quoted m Sipka, 2005: 425). 
It also stated: 
In line with the above demands and explanations it is necessary to 
ensure the consistent application of the Croatian literary language in 
schools, print journalism, public and political life, on the radio and 
television whenever the Croatian population is in question, and that 
officials, teachers and public workers officially use the language of the 
environment in which they work regardless of where they hail from92 
(as quoted in Sipka, 2005: 425). 
A group of Serbian writers countered the following month with their own 
Proposition for Consideration (Predlog za razmiSljanje). Having in mind not 
only the interests of the Serbs in Serbia but also the protection of the rights of 
the Serbs in Croatia, they endorsed the Croats' declaration, thereby 
undermining its potency. The Serbian response called for the constitutions of 
the republics of Croatia and Serbia to ensure all Croats and Serbs had the right 
91 Jasnu i nedvojbenu jednakost i ravnopravnost. 
92 U skladu s gornjim lahtjevima i objdnjenjima potrebno je osigurati dosJjednu primjenu 
brvatskoga knjif.evnog jczika u §kolama, novinstw, javnom i poJitiekom fivotu, na radiju i 
tclcviziji lead sc god radi 0 hrvatskom stanovniltvu, tc cia sbdbenici, nastavnici i javni radnici, 
bez obzira otkuda potjec:ali, shdbeno upotrebljavaju jezik sredine u kojoj djeluju. 
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to schooling in their own language and alphabet and according to their own 
national programmes. The document declared the Vienna and the Novi Sad 
agreements to no longer be valid and also advocated the right of Croats and 
Serbs to nurture all forms of their national culture freely and without 
hindrance. 
The two documents were significant in several ways. Seen in the 
broader context of developments in the country as a whole they reflected 
increasing discontent in the republics with the federal system and with the 
deteriorating economic situation at that time. The authorities recognised the 
non-linguistic implications of a dispute over language unity because if the joint 
language split then this could easily lead to a split in the country on other 
bases. Both documents called for separate recognised language standards, as 
well as the right to use these standards in such spheres as education, which 
would mean nations living alongside each other rather than in one unified 
community. This would therefore undermine the post-war policy of 
Brotherhood and Unity which the communist authorities had relied on to solve 
the national question and keep the country together.93 
Linguistically, the two documents represented the logical outcome of 
the historical Croat-Serb debates over whether there was one or more than one 
language. They shifted emphasis away from language seen in territorial terms, 
i.e. as the western or eastern variant or centred around Zagreb or Belgrade, to 
an ethnic designation of language in the sense that Croatian, for example, 
would be linked with the whole of the Croatian nation whether its members 
lived in Croatia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia. This obviously had major 
implications for relations in ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Furthermore, by advocating a binary division of the language, the signatories 
failed to take into account the linguistic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 
Montenegro. Although at that time recognised only as a religious group the 
Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina had become the largest of the three ethnic 
groups in the republic. A two-way language split would mean that individual 
Muslims would have to decide if they wanted to be affiliated linguistically and 
93 The scenario suggested by the two documents bas arguably come about in parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina today where children of different ethnic groups are taught according to different 
cmricula and in some cases in the same school but segregated from one another. 
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therefore ethnically with either the Croats or the Serbs. This would in turn 
disturb the ethnic balance in ethnically-mixed communities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and lead to the domination of one ethnic group over the other(s).94 
The two documents therefore necessarily put Bosnia-Herzegovina in a 
difficult position. The fIrst official reaction came from the Executive 
Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-
Herzegovina at the end of March 1967 with the publication of a statement that 
stressed their political implications for the country as a whole, saying 'that the 
Declaration and the Proposition are not only an expression of the nationalistic 
and chauvinistic views and attitudes of their signatories but also an attempt at a 
blatant political act of terrorism against the brotherhood and unity, equality and 
socialist patriotism of the peoples of Yugoslavia,9s (as quoted in Sipka, 2005: 
429). More specifIcally though, for the first time the statement called for 
linguistic tolerance and freedom of use of language. In this sense it supported 
'the inalienable right of all citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina to make use of the 
richness of the language, freely and in a completely tolerant way,96 (Sipka, 
2005: 429). This was possibly the only way the republican Communists could 
have reacted to the two documents. They could not come down in support of 
one side or the other because in a multiethnic republic such an approach would 
risk not only splitting the language but also the population as a whole. 
Tolerance was also the main message from the Sarajevo Symposium on 
Linguistic Tolerance in Education held in April 1970. This was a gathering that 
brought together language and education experts to consider solutions to a 
language situation that looked increasingly as if it was moving towards 
polarisation. The symposium's conclusions echoed the provisions of the Novi 
Sad Agreement and reiterated that the name of the language in the republic was 
either srpskohrvatslci or hrvatskosrpski and that the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets 
94 This language split would also be problematic for those members of the population who 
declared themselves to be Yugoslavs. In the 1961 census these made up 8.4 per cent of the 
~ o n o f B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a ( W o o d w a r d , , 1995: 33). 
Da su Deklaracija i Predlog De samo i2'l8Z nacionalisti&ih i Iovinisti&ih g1edanja i 
opredjeljenja njihovih potpisnika, nego i pokuAaj otvorene politi&e diverzije protiv bratstva i 
-Ledinstva, ravnopravnosti i socijalisti&og patriotimJa naroda Jugoslavije. 
Neotudivo pravo svih gradana u Bosni i Hercegovini cia se koriste bogatstvom jezika, 
slobodno i do kraja toleran1no. 
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had equal status. The participants in the symposium also made it clear that they 
were not in favour of linguistic p o l a r i s a t i o ~ ~ stating the following: 
It is unsuited to the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their culture for the 
literary language to be directed towards a two-variant (or two-language) 
polarisation or for a third, Bosnia-Herzegovina variant, to be fonned because 
that would be contrary to our linguistic reality, hinder the free and independent 
development of the literary language and limit the possibility of enriching our 
literary linguistic expression97 (Zalcjueci, 1969170: 54). 
Bosniak language scholar Josip Baotic considers that this symposium marked 
the beginning of efforts to create a language policy specifically for Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2005: 444). The need for such a policy had after all become clear 
during the debates about the Declaration and Proposition. The concept for this 
language policy was formulate<L however, in February 1971 by a number of 
party bodies98 working in conjunction with linguistic experts in a document 
titled 'The Literary Language and Literary Language Policy in Bosnia-
Herzegovina' (Knjizevni jezik i knjiievno-jezic/ca politi/ca u Bosni ; 
Hercegovini). They came up with four basic principles which would form the 
foundation of a language policy. These were: 
1. Acceptance of the Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croat literary language as one 
language with all its diversity and differences in variants; 
2. Openness towards positive cultural and linguistic influences from all 
republics and all cultural environments of our language area; 
3. Nurturing autochtonous literary linguistic and cultural values which are the 
common wealth of all the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and fonn a bridge 
between their cultures, that is, insistence on what connects us and brings us 
together; 
4. Full freedom of individual choice of linguistic means of expression 
regardless of whether they would be distinguished as variants in other 
environments (Mostmslco savjetovanje, 1974: 209)99. 
97 Narodima Bosne i Hercegovioe i njihovoj kulturi ne odgovara usmjeravanje knjif.evnog 
jezika u pravcu dvovarijantske (iii dvojezi&e) polarizacije Diti formiranje treCe, 
bosanskobercegovatke varijante, jer bi to bilo protivno ndoj j e z i ~ k o j j stvamosti, ODeDlogucilo 
slobodan i samostalan razvitak knji!evnog jezika i o g r a n i ~ i l o o mogucDost bogatenja naJeg 
k n j i f . e v n o j e z i ~ k o g g imlza. 
91 These bodies were the Commission of the Central Committee (CC) of the League of 
Communists (LC) of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Work of the LC on Further Strengthening 
and Developing Inter-edmic Relations and Inter-republican. Cooperation, the Commission of 
the LC CC BiH for the Ideological and Political Activities of the LC in the field ofCuhure and 
Media, the Commission of the LC CC BiH for the Ideological and Political Activities of the 
LC in the field of Education and Science, the Secretariat of the CC of the LC Bill and the 
Executive Committee of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Working 
People (SA WP) of BiH, as well as other bodies of the SA WP ofBiH. 
99 I. Prihvatanje hrvatskosrpskog, odnosno srpskobrvatskog lmji!evnog jezika kao jednog 
jezika sa svim raznolikostima i varijantnim razlikama; 2. otvorenost prema pozitivnim 
kulturnim i j e z i ~ l d m m uticajima iz svih rcpublika i svih kultumih srcdina naJeg j e z i ~ k o g g
podtueja; 3. Djegovanje autobtonih knji!evnojezi&ih i kultumih vrijednosti, koje su zajedni&o 
blago svih naroda BiH i fine most mectu njihovim kulturama tj. insistiraju D8 ODOme Ito DIS 
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These principles reflect well the concerns in the republic at the time. There is 
continued insistence on Croato-Serbian or Serbo-Croat as one language which 
was at variance with the support expressed elsewhere in Yugoslavia for 
dissolution of the joint language. The joint language is portrayed in these 
principles as a positive thing that encompasses the broad cultural and linguistic 
experience of all the groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the call for freedom of 
choice in language use reflects an inclination towards tolerance of difference 
rather than the opposite as implied by the Declaration and the Proposition. 
The participants in the meeting also stressed the political implications 
of a polarisation according to variants as this would mean that the Muslims 
would be forced to choose one or the other variant and 'that is again a form of 
national assimilation (on the linguistic and cultural plane). The acceptance of 
the thesis that each of our nations MUST have their own separate literary 
language is a direct negation of Muslim national specificity,)oo(Mostarsko 
savjetovanje, 1974: 210). Ultimately, the participants recognised the far-
reaching consequences of this linguistic polarisation in the political field, 
fearing that this 'would lead us to the disintegration and denial of the 
sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina')O) (Mostarsko 
savjetovanje, 1974: 211). 
The document that was adopted at the end of the meeting nevertheless 
introduced a new element into language policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina which 
was the concept of a bosanskohercegovae1ci standardnojezic1ci izraz (Bosnia-
Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom or expression). Thus, while rejecting a 
polarisation according to variant or language, the document introduced a new 
category that essentially disrupted the binary split with the creation of a third 
linguistic option. Significant here is the use of the word idiom or expression 
because, in describing the speech of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it puts stress on the 
spoken rather than the written word (Greenberg, 2004: 39) but still keeps it 
within the category of the standard literary language. By using this term it 
could be claimed that the standard linguistic unity would not actually be 
povezuje i zblitava i 4. puna sloboda individualnog izbora jezi&ib izrafajnih sredstava bez 
ohzira DB njihow varijantsku markiranost u drugim sredinama. 
100 A to je opel jedan vid nacionalne asimilacijc (na lingvisti&om i kultumom pJanu). 
Prihvatanje teze da svaki narod u DIS MORA imati svoj poscban knjif.cvni jczik direktno je 
negiranje muslimanske nacionalne posebnosti. 
101 Takva politika vodila hi DIS dezintegraciji i negiranju suvereniteta SR Bosne i Hercegovine. 
109 
affected. Most importantly it restored the idea of a linguistic designation tied to 
territory rather than to an ethnic group. The Bosnia-Herzegovina standard 
linguistic idiom therefore referred to the language spoken by all the inhabitants 
of the republic and not just one section of the population. This added nuance to 
the provisions of the Novi Sad Agreement which had essentially oversimplified 
the dialectal picture in Yugoslavia by associating the separate pronunciations 
of ekavian and ijekavian with Belgrade and Zagreb. 1OO It was therefore 
specified that for official purposes the new idiom would be based on 'the 
ijekavian literary pronunciation and other autochtonous linguistic 
characteristics,103 (Mostarslco savjetovanje, 1974: 214). 
Seen from a historical perspective, the introduction of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom was reminiscent of Benjamin Kallay's 
policy. As the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities now did he had described the 
language in terms of territory rather than ethnic group affiliation and had tried 
to impose one designation of the language on all the inhabitants of the province 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Kallay's case though he had failed to appreciate the 
growing strength of ethnic feeling among the population. In contrast, the 
introduction of the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom offered a 
nuanced approach which did take account of ethnic linguistic differences whilst 
retaining a common language. 
Baotic also points out that the introduction of the new designation was 
not intended to 'denationalise' the Muslims, Croats or Serbs, or to allow one 
group to demonstrate their superiority over another or to assimilate anyone 
(2005: 459). The intention was to ensure that every person's linguistic capacity 
would be the same throughout the territory so that everyone would be equal in 
their use of language. Moreover, Baotic considers that there was a subtle 
political motivation behind this novelty: 
Nor, indeed, can the linguistic ambition be discounted of showing that a 
standard language, even in an ethnically non-homogeneous community and 
without unity of physiognomy, can function effectively nor the political 
102 Ekavian is associated mainly with Belgrade and Serbia but ijekavian is spoken not just by 
Croats but also by the populations of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina and some parts of 
Serbia. 
103 Ijekavski knjit.evni izgovor i druge autobtone jezii!ke osobine. 
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ambition that a high degree of democracy can be attained even without 
splitting into ethnic variantslO4 (2005: 459). 
To a certain extent then, the introduction of a linguistic idiom for Bosnia-
Herzegovina could be seen as an attempt not to weaken the common language 
but to strengthen it by allowing it to function throughout the territory of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia In this context Baotic says that all 
language projects undertaken by the Institute for Language, which had been set 
up in 1972 to research language issues and to work on the new idiom, were 
directed at maintaining the integrity of the common language rather than 
creating a basis for separate rules that would differentiate the Bosnia-
Herzegovina idiom from other idioms or variants. 
Developments in the language field cannot, however, be divorced from 
other political developments inside Bosnia-Herzegovina to do with the rise of 
Muslim national consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s that was spurred on by 
changes to the structure of the state of Yugoslavia with authority increasingly 
being put into the hands of the republics. Policy was thus moving away from 
the idea of an integral Yugoslavism and towards a decentralised state structure. 
This liberalisation was partly a result of the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic, the 
hard-line Serbian vice president and Minister of Interior of Yugoslavia, in 
1966. His departure from the political scene also meant that Bosnia-
Herzegovina political life gradually became less dominated by Serbian 
politicians which allowed for the rise of a small elite of Muslim Communist 
officials who were interested in encouraging a distinct Muslim national 
consciousness (Malcolm, 1994: 198). 
The rise of Muslim national consciousness also coincided with Tito's 
foreign policy aims. Tito courted the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they 
enhanced his standing in the Non-aligned Movement which included many 
Muslim countries. While visiting Muslim dignitaries from non-aligned states 
would have visits arranged to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was useful for Tito to be 
able to have a diplomatic corps containing Muslims who could be sent to serve 
in Muslim countries. In tum the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 'were given 
104 Ne mole se iskIjutiti, istina, ni lingvisti&a ambicija cia se pokaf.e cia standardni jezik i u 
nacionalno nehomogenoj zajednici i sa neostvarenim jedinstvom fizionomije mole efikasno 
fimkcionirati, kao ni p o l i t i ~ k a - d a a se visok stupanj demolcratimosti mole ostvariti i bez 
raslojavanja na nacionalne varijante. 
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privileges within Yugoslavia that in many ways were equal to those of the 
Serbs, Croats, and other nations to show that Muslims were not only tolerated 
but were valued. Their prestige and power within Yugoslavia grew 
accordingly' (Friedman, 1994: 167). 
Language was important at this time in the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Communist officials' endeavours to promote a separate Muslim identity. In 
her analysis of debates surrounding census policy in 1970-71, Iva L u ~ i e e makes 
the point that the Communist supporters of the idea of establishing the Muslims 
as a separate nation strove to de-emphasize the religious content of Muslim 
identity and instead highlighted other identity markers such as language. She 
quotes Admir Catie, a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina League of 
Communists Central Committee, speaking at a Central Committee session in 
February 1970, 
The ethnic substance of the Muslims, as is the case with the Serbs, Croats or 
Montenegrins, has historically developed within the borders of our country and 
under specific historical-cultura1 circumstances, in which the Serbo-Croatian 
language served as its main basis. The crucial determinant of the Muslim 
national identity is the language on which their whole culture is based and 
which connects them with the Montenegrins, Croats and Serbs and their 
cultures ( L u ~ i e , , 2009: 21). 
This quote neatly encapsulates the dilemma in pushing for Muslim nationhood 
at that time. For ideological reasons the Bosnia-Herzegovina Communists 
could not use religion to differentiate the Muslims from the other ethnic groups 
so they concentrated on linguistic differences. At the same time, however, they 
were at pains to highlight the Muslims' linguistic connection to the other 
Serbo-Croat speakers in Yugoslavia. This echoes the idea inherent in the 
introduction of a Bosnia-Herzegovina standard linguistic idiom - the 
importance of being different and yet the same - which was needed to allow 
for self-identification on an ethnic basis but within a broader identity that 
included other ethnic groups. 
The strength of Muslim self-identification can be seen in the figures for 
successive censuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1961 the census allowed for the 
self-designation of 'Muslim in the ethnic sense' for the first time and 842,248 
Bosnians registered themselves as such (Donia and Fine, 1994: 87). This is 
close to the figure in the previous census of 1953 for those who declared 
themselves as Yugoslavs (891,800) (in 1961, 275, 883 people declared 
112 
themselves to be Yugoslavs). This suggests that in the past rather than declare 
themselves as Croats or Serbs the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were much 
more inclined to register themselves as Yugoslavs but once the designation of 
'Muslim in the ethnic sense' was allowed they abandoned this designation. By 
the time of the 1971 census, 1,482,430 people were prepared to declare 
themselves as 'Muslim in the sense of a nation' (as against 43,796 declared 
Yugoslavs). The Muslims were not recognised officially as a nation until the 
1974 federal Constitution. Prior to this the 1963 republican Constitution had 
referred to the Muslims but did not give them the status of a nation on an equal 
footing with the Serbs and Croats although they were recognised as a separate 
nation in 1969 by the republican League of Communists Central Committee 
(Malcolm, 1994: 199). 
The 1974 Constitution also marked the endpoint in the decentralisation 
of the state of Yugoslavia as it essentially turned it into a confederation with 
virtually all power vested in the republics and autonomous provinces. It also 
signalled the beginning of the end of the joint language as conceived in the 
Novi Sad Agreement. Where the Novi Sad Agreement had allowed for two 
variants based around two centres the new constitution created two more 
options within the Serbo-Croatian literary language: the Montenegrin standard 
idiom and the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard idiom. While this arrangement can 
be seen as accommodating the particular speech of the populations of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (as discussed above) and Montenegro and strengthening the 
common standard it also meant, as Greenberg concludes, that with these new 
provisions 'the link: between ethnicity, identity, and language was strengthened' and 
implied that each norod 'had the right to a home republic, a separate socio-cultural 
identity, and their own version of the Central South Slavic language. Thus, four 
embryonic successor languages were created as a result of the new constitution' 
(2004:57). Thus, when the state of Yugoslavia finally fell apart under the weight 
of competing violent nationalisms in 1991, the two variants and idioms fonned 
the basis for the separate standards of Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian and 
Montenegrin. Once the Republic of Croatia had declared its official language 
to be Croatian and embarked on a language planning project to make it as 
distinct a language as possible and disassociate it from the other variants of 
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Serbo-Croat, there was thus less and less reason for the other nations to 
maintain the common standard language. 
After 1991, the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard idiom began to develop 
into the new Bosnian language which became the language of the Bosniaks 
only. This is resonant of the experience of the Hapsburgs as bosnjaitvo and the 
Bosnian language really only appealed to a small section of the Muslim 
community. Both these cases demonstrate the difficulty of creating a new 
linguistic identity when there are competing linguistic loyalties. Neither the 
Croats nor the Serbs have need of a language or idiom that would identify them 
with the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they can identify linguistically 
with their kin states of Croatia and Serbia. It is only the Bosniaks, who have no 
kin state, who are in need of a distinct linguistic identity that ties them to the 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the language-ethnic 
identity link that has been crucial in identity politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
since the beginning of the nineteenth century. It has looked at the way in which 
language policy has been used by various previous authorities to regulate inter-
ethnic relations and assessed the outcomes of their endeavours. In all three 
periods under review there was the recognition among ruling elites that 
language issues could be manipulated for wider political ends. This therefore 
gives credence to the idea prevalent in language planning scholarship, as 
outlined in the Literature Review, that decisions about language are always 
dictated by extra-linguistic concerns and aims. In these three episodes the 
extra-linguistic aims were essentially to do with security issues. For Kallay, as 
part of the bosnjaitvo project, language policy was intended to embed the 
ethnic groups into the Hapsburg empire so that they would not be drawn 
towards uniting with members of their ethnic communities outside the province 
and thereby threaten the integrity of the empire as a whole. The Ustashas' 
language policy was also a security issue as they sought to control the non-
Croatian ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They recognised that they 
could not eradicate the entire non-Croatian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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in their desire to create a pure Croatian state. lOS They dealt with the Serbs by 
embarking on a plan to extenninate them but to 'neutralise' the Muslims they 
tried to create an identity that would encompass them, as well as the Croats. 
The Ustashas would thus have had the bulk of the population under their 
control. The Communists too sought to use a unifying language policy as part 
of their national policy to prevent disunity among the various nations and their 
secession from the federal state. 
Given this link between language policy and security issues we also 
see, again commensurate with language policy scholarship, that language 
policy does not operate in a socio-political vacuum and that its success or 
failure depends on circumstances in the wider environment which mayor may 
not be linked directly with language issues. This is clear from the experience of 
the Hapsburgs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The policy of Benjamin von Kallay 
failed because it was part of a wider identity formation policy that did not 
appeal to all the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. General opposition to 
the Hapsburg regime among all the main groups in the province meant that 
there was no significant commitment among the population to the imposed idea 
of an all-inclusive Bosnian identity. Despite the fact that Kallay made all the 
right moves in the sense of having a specific and well-planned language policy, 
he could not prevent the influence of other ideas coming from outside the 
province to do with affiliation to an ethnically-based community which went 
wider than the province's borders. 
The language policy of the Communist authorities in the SFRY also fell 
victim to developments and events in the wider society. Decentralising efforts 
by the authorities to meet the demands in some republics for greater autonomy 
and political liberalisation failed in the sense that they led to greater 
nationalism in the republics so that ethnic identity became much more 
important than any identification based on affiliation to a given republic or 
even to the federal state. An all-inclusive language policy based on a joint 
standard rather than separate standards held no appeal for advocates of 
increased separation along ethnic lines. 
lOS In 1941, there were 1.7 million Serbs out ofa total population oftbe NDH of 6.3 million 
(Hoare, 2007: 176). 
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In essence, the language policies implemented during the three periods 
under consideration were all about trying to create a specific identity and in 
two cases it was focussed on affiliation to a territory rather than to a particular 
ethnic group. In Kallay's case it was a question of creating an all-inclusive 
Bosnian identity based on attachment to the province of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and therefore the Habsburg Empire rather than to one of the nascent ethnic 
groups. Similarly, the authorities in Communist Yugoslavia strove initially to 
use language policy to help create an over-arching Yugoslav identity for all the 
peoples of the federal state who spoke Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian, and after 
the devolution of power to the republics the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
moved to develop a linguistic identity predicated on identification with the 
republic rather than with one ethnic group. As we saw in this chapter, in both 
cases the broader identity lost out to the allure of the narrower ethnically-
defined ones. 
What then can past experience in the conduct of language policy tell us 
about the concerns of present-day approaches to the language issue in Bosnia-
Herzegovina? The experiences detailed above have resonance in post-Dayton 
Bosnia-Herzegovina because the new state structure has made ethnic affiliation 
the dominant political identity. Political power is gained through appeals to the 
ethnically-based loyalty of the population and rights are vested not in the 
individual but in the ethnic group. There is therefore no incentive for any of the 
elites to nurture a broader identity based on membership of the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina rather than of the ethnic group. As we saw in the Literature 
Review, this is reflected in the area of language policy where the trend has 
been towards defining a distinct language for each of the ethnic groups rather 
than developing an inclusive linguistic identity that would encompass all of 
them. Given this linguistic separation, the fate of Kallay's language policy and 
that of the Communist regime prior to 1990 would suggest that any attempt 
now to create an inclusive linguistic identity in conditions of ethnic division 
would fail. 
To a certain extent, the present approach to the language issue on the 
part of domestic language planners is to be expected in an environment where 
wartime ethnic differences have become entrenched in the peacetime political 
system. It can be viewed as having moved on from the pre-conflict inclusive 
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approach of the Communists towards exclusivity: the creation of separate 
standard languages is intended to establish linguistic difference between the 
ethnic groups and create a barrier between 'Us' and 'Them'. This is the essence 
of nationalist language planning, but it also chimes with contemporary thinking 
about linguistic human rights which advocates pluralism and the defence of the 
linguistic rights of a language and its speakers. This exclusivity is what guides 
the actions of the domestic language planners. 
The international community has not followed the example of previous 
regimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and viewed language as a security issue. It has 
therefore not seen language policy as a tool to achieve extra-linguistic aims, for 
, example, aims that would be connected with the goals of the contemporary 
peace-building process. International organisations led by the Office of the 
High Representative have thus not fonnulated a deliberate and planned 
language policy. They could have followed the examples of Kallay and the 
Ustashas and attempted to use language policy to impose a specific linguistic 
identity but they have not. This is in contrast to the High Representative's 
actions regarding other symbolic markers of identity. For example, in a move 
reminiscent of similar action taken by Kallay, in February 1998 the then High 
Representative Carlos Westendorp, imposed a new Bosnian flag, one which 
avoided offending any of the ethnic groups and intended to emphasise the 
country's all-Bosnian identity. He thereby showed an appreciation for the 
importance of certain symbols in identity fonnation which did not extend to the 
symbolic significance of language in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The international community's approach to the language issue has been 
conditioned on two things: the exclusivist approach of the ruling elites to 
language and contemporary thinking on linguistic human rights. International 
organisations therefore support the existence of three distinct languages and 
advocate their equality. This approach is different to that of Kallay and the 
Ustashas but is reminiscent of the post-1974 language policy of the 
Communists although it has moved on from this policy in recognising the equal 
status of different languages rather than of just variants or idioms. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, the language policies that have been 
conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past have depended on the wider 
socia-political situation for their success or failure. In our consideration of 
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present-day language policy it is therefore necessary to look more closely at the 
political and constitutional environment that was created in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement and investigate the interplay between language issues and extra-
linguistic concerns. Where we have seen that in the past, language policy was 
considered a way of ensuring security the next chapter will focus on what the 
international community's approach to language issues means for the peace-
building process and the ultimate security and stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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Chapter 3 
The Dayton Peace Agreement, Language and 
Societal Security 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I examined the interaction between the language 
issue and socio-political circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina from a 
historical perspective. The periods considered were those where the ruling 
authorities conducted identifiable language policies for the purpose of 
achieving essentially extra-linguistic aims which, I contend, were in large part 
focussed on the security and stability of the state. As I state at the end of the 
chapter, these policies generally did not achieve their intended aims and 
although this was for various reasons, the policies fell victim to developments 
in the wider socio-political arena. Although it cannot be said, for example, that 
in the period from the end of World War II to 1990 language debates were the 
direct cause of violent conflict, they did nonetheless both reflect wider 
developments that moved Bosnia-Herzegovina towards conflict and at the 
same time contribute to the disagreements leading to conflict. As discussed in 
the last chapter, from the 1960s onwards, for example, the language debates in 
Croatia and Serbia reflected greater tolerance for the expression of alternative 
viewpoints and respect for difference between the peoples of Yugoslavia while 
at the same time these linguistic debates bolstered claims to ethnic difference 
which undermined Yugoslavia as a stable multi-ethnic state and ultimately led 
to its destruction. 
Given the salience that language issues bad historically in inter-ethnic 
relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina it could have been expected that language 
would play an important role in the post-1995 multi-ethnic state. In the 
Literature Review I discussed the language planning activities of the three 
former warring sides in establishing separate linguistic identities for 
themselves as a way of bolstering their distinctive ethnic identities. In this 
chapter the focus will shift to the approach of the international community to 
language issues and the way it has fed into broader peace-building aims since 
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1995. Of interest in this chapter is the general constitutional and political 
environment in which language issues play out and which was created to a 
large extent by the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
The chapter will begin with a consideration of what is meant by peace-
building (which includes elements of both state and nation building) and detail 
the kind of state structure put in place by the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the 
first step in the peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is 
necessary for an understanding of a political process that is dominated by 
ethnic identity and ethnic affiliation. It will then go on to look at what the 
Dayton Peace Agreement says specifically about language as this informs the 
international community's subsequent approach to the language issue. One 
consequence of this approach was the decision of the Constitutional Court 
passed in 2000, but not imposed by the High Representative until 2002, which 
consolidated the equality of all three languages throughout the country; the 
implications of this decision for the international peace-building project will 
therefore be discussed. 106 Having seen in the previous chapter that, historically, 
the language issue has been seen as a security issue, the final section of this 
chapter will apply the concept of societal security to explain how in a political 
environment dominated by ethnic rivalries the language issue can be 
manipulated at a rhetorical level by political elites to keep their constituencies 
in a continuous societal security dilemma. This in turn undermines the stability 
of the state and throws into doubt the achievement of the peace-building aims 
of the international community. 
What Is Peace-Building? 
In June 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then Secretary General of the 
United Nations, issued an Agenda for Peace outlining the ways in which the 
UN could be more effective in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
106 The Constitutional Court was established in the Constitution (at Annex 4 of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement) and bas the task ofupbolding the Constitution. According to Art. VI, 3.a. it 
'shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute that .-ises under this Constitution 
between the Entities or between Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities, or between 
institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina'. The comt is made up ofoine members, four ofwbich are 
selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, two by the Assembly of the 
Republika Srpska and three by the President of the European Comt of Human Rights. 
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keeping. 107 This was a response to the changing role of the UN's peace-
keeping operations since the end of the Cold War. The end of super-power 
rivalry over spheres of influence meant that the US and the erstwhile Soviet 
Union were no longer willing to devote military and economic resources to 
aiding their allies and continuing to insulate them from outside interference 
(Paris, 2004: 16). This meant that the UN and international organisations 
became increasingly involved in resolving conflicts, as well as post-conflict 
situations, and the Agenda for Peace was an attempt to define the UN's mission 
in this changing environment In it Boutros-Ghali defines the concept of post-
conflict peace-building which he sees as being related to preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping. For him, post-conflict peace-building is 
action to identifY and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidifY peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy 
seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-
keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If 
successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, 
which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 21). 
He also outlines what peace-building efforts may entail and says they 
may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of 
order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, 
advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, 
advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening 
governmental institutions and promoting fonnal and informal processes of 
political participation (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 55). 
He stresses though that post-conflict peace-building is intended to prevent a 
recurrence of conflict and states, 'only sustained, cooperative work to deal with 
underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an 
achieved peace on a durable foundation' (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 57). 
The Agenda for Peace and the subsequent Supplement to the Agenda 
for Peace published in 1995 were not intended to provide a template for peace-
building operations but rather guidelines as to how to proceed (Stedman, 2002: 
107 Preventive diplomacy is defined as 'action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, 
to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter 
when they occur' (Boutros-Gbali, 1992: para. 20). Peacemaking is defined as 'action to bring 
hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in 
Chapter VI of the charter of the United Nations' (Boutros-OhaIi, 1992: para. 20). Peace-
keeping is defined as 'the deployment of a United Nations presem:e in the field, hitherto with 
the consent of all the parties concerned. normally involving United Nations military and/or 
police personnel and frequently civilians as well Peace-keepiDg is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of contlict and the making of peace' (Boutros-GbaIi, 1992: 
para. 20). 
121 
19) as Stephen John Stedman has pointed out, 'policies and mandates need not 
be guidelines for a c t i o ~ ~ so much as expressions of faith, acknowledgement of 
virtue, and instruments of education' (2002: 19). Even so, the ideas contained 
in the documents have tended to inform the international peace-building 
operations undertaken since the end of the Cold War. An added element to 
these operations is that they have also tended to be predicated on the idea that 
the adoption of the Western liberal democratic model is the best way to 
reconstruct war-tom societies (paris, 2004). Peace-building is therefore not just 
about stopping war and reaching a durable cease-fire agreement but also about 
creating a liberal democracy and establishing a Western-style market 
economy.108 The drawback to this approach though is it introduces an added 
element of competition in a situation where former warring sides are already 
jockeying for position and influence and therefore risks de-stabilizing further 
the post-war state (paris, 2004).109 
As the tasks listed above suggest, peace-building contains elements of 
both state-building and nation-building. According to Roland Kostic, state-
building refers to 'the creation of viable political and administrative institutions 
enabling a political entity, the state, to function efficiently as an independent 
unit with a capacity to provide public goods for its population' (2007: 40). 
Two key elements to state-building are control of the police and military forces 
and the creation of an effective fiscal system as the basis for a functioning legal 
and administrative system. In contrast, nation-building 'is one of the most 
widespread processes of collective identity creation with an intention to 
legitimize a constructed state authority within a given tenitory' (Kostic, 2007: 
40). The two key elements to this are a unifying ideology and an integration of 
society which entails 'the incorporation of different groups into a common 
society' (Kostic, 2007: 40). Key pillars of the integration process include the 
101 Roland Paris dates these principles back to the end of World War I and the then US 
president Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy. Ac:c:ording to Paris, Wilson believed that the 
spread of the American market democracy model would promote peace in domestic and world 
affairs (2004: 40). 
109 The peace-building approach taken in this study focuses on the actions of outside actors 
which are considered to take the lead in the pe.:e-building process. Another peace-building 
approach is peace-building from below in which 'solutions are derived and built ftom local 
resources' (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005: 222) so that the focus in this 
perspective is on the actions of local actors such as non-gowmmental organisations and other 
community-based organisations. 
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development of national communication, media and education 'in order to 
establish a national political and cultural dialogue' (Kostic, 2007: 40). 
The nation-building process can be seen as an exercise in creating a 
common identity tied to the new state in order to facilitate the integration of 
different groups into it. Because nation-building seeks to create an integrative 
identity, language, as a marker of identity, is an important element in this 
process. If there is more than one language spoken in the new state there is a 
need to decide how the languages will be treated: what will the official 
language or languages be? Will there be a lingua franca to facilitate 
communication between the different groups throughout the state? For 
example, modem Hebrew was adopted as the language of the state of Israel in 
1948 as a way of unifying different groups speaking a variety of languages into 
one nation and over time became a 'legitimate, daily and all-encompassing 
language of the Israeli nation' (Ben-Rafael, 1994: 54). The learning of modem 
Hebrew by new immigrants to the state can be seen as one means of 
constructing a new identity tied to belonging to the Israeli nation. Similarly, if 
one language is chosen as the official language of the new state over others the 
way in which these other languages are treated also impacts on the nation-
building process. If the speakers of the less dominant languages feel that they 
have not been afforded language rights and are not able freely to use their 
mother tongue then their commitment to the new state and self-identification 
with it may be diminished. 
Peace-building is taken as the framework for this study precisely 
because it is an over-arching concept that contains elements of both state-
building and nation-building. The Dayton Peace Agreement itself was first and 
foremost a peace agreement that was intended to solidify the cease-fire that had 
come into effect three weeks before the start of negotiations at the Wright 
Patterson Airforce Base. The bulk of the agreement therefore concerns military 
aspects of the peace such as the separation and disarmament of forces and the 
cantonment of weapons (Annexes 1 and 1 a) while a large part of the 
negotiations at Dayton revolved around the allocation of territory between the 
three warring sides (Holbrooke, 1999). As Paddy Ashdown, former High 
Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2002-2006), bas stated 'The Dayton 
Peace Agreement had only one purpose - to end a war. Almost no attention 
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was paid to creating a functioning state' (2007: 99-100). That notwithstanding, 
the Dayton Peace Agreement does contain state-building elements such as a 
constitution and a blue-print for the establishment of state structures. 
There is however no explicit nation-building element to the Dayton 
Peace Agreement and no concern with how to tie the three former warring 
sides into the new integral state. In the post-war period, though, the 
international community has been involved in nation-building efforts with the 
ORR deciding on a coat-of-arms, flag, national anthem, and the design of 
passports and currency for the new state. Moreover, it could be argued that the 
Dayton Peace Agreement's focus on human rights protections may contribute 
to engendering a sense of loyalty to the state among the different groups in the 
sense that if a minority group feels that its rights are respected and being 
protected by the state it will have a sense of loyalty to that state and therefore 
self-identify with it. This therefore engenders a sense of attachment to the state. 
Nation-building though is important for this study because of its focus on 
identity formation of which language is a part. 
This chapter is concerned with the mismatch between the two main 
elements of peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it will show that the 
way the state has been developed since 1995 with its emphasis on ethnic 
identity as the over-riding identity in the political process is at variance with 
the nation-building aspects if we understand those aspects as having the aim of 
creating an integrative identity that is tied to the new state rather than the ethnic 
group. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement as a basis for peace-
building 
The Dayton Peace Agreement reflects the concerns in the Agenda for 
Peace. Aside from annexes on the military aspects of the peace and regional 
stabilisation, the agreement contains, inter alia, provisions related to the 
holding of elections (Annex 3), the establishment of a post of human rights 
ombudsman and a human rights chamber (Annex 6) and refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Annex 7). It also enumerates a vast array 
of human rights agreements that were to be incorporated into local law. It is 
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also clear that it follows the two basic contemporary peace-building principles 
of establishing a liberal democracy and a market economy. Thus the preamble 
of the constitution of the new state (at Annex 4 of the agreement) mentions 
both the desirability of democratic governmental institutions and the promotion 
of a market economy. Moreover, Article 1, paragraph 2 clearly states: 'Bosnia 
and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule 
of law and with free and democratic elections'. 
Given the wide range of tasks to be carried out the Dayton Peace 
Agreement also made provision for the unprecedented presence of international 
organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina by putting certain of them in charge of 
different aspects of the peace. Security, for example, was guaranteed by 
successive NATO forces (lFOR- Implementation Force, SFOR-Stabilisation 
Force) and since the end of 2004 has been in the hands of an EU force 
(EUFOR). The civilian aspects of the peace settlement were entrusted to such 
organisations as the UNHCR (refugee return), the OSCE, the ICTY (war 
crimes prosecution) and the World Bank (financial aspects), to name just the 
most influential. Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement recognises the 
complexity of the tasks entrusted to all these international organisations and 
agencies and therefore provides for the appointment of a High Representative 
to coordinate their activities. A Peace Implementation Council (PIC) comprised 
of 55 countries and agencies which support the peace process was subsequently 
established to oversee the overall implementation of the agreement. There is 
also an executive arm of the PIC, the Steering Board, 110 which provides 
political guidance to the High Representative. III 
110 The steering Board members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan. Russia, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Presidency of the EU, the European Commission and the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference represented by T\D'key. 
III While initially the HR had more of a monitoring, coordination and oversight role, in 
December 1997 the PIC, ftustrated with the lack of progress being made in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, gave the HR the so-called Bonn Powers which greatly extended his authority. It 
was now possible for the HR to impose legislation and to remove from office any individual 
who he deemed to be obstructing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It is 
these enhanced powers and their subsequent use by successive High Representatives that have 
led some commentators to talk about an international protectorate (Chandler, 1999) or even a 
European Raj in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Knaus and Martin, 2003). All these possible 
characterisations of the HR's role raise issues about the extent to which Bosnia-Herzegovina 
can be viewed as a democratic state given that the HR himself is an unelected official chosen 
by an unelected body (the PIC) but still has primacy in the political process. A discussion of 
the democratic nature of the HR or otherwise is, however, beyond the scope oftbis study. 
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While the Dayton Peace Agreement was successful in bringing to an 
end three and a half years of vicious conflict there is much about the state it 
created and the state structures it put in place that have militated against efforts 
to prevent a recurrence of conflict. Paradoxically, the Dayton structures have 
ensured that Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to be a deeply-divided state in 
which ethnic animosities dominate the political process. 
The institutional framework created by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement 
The agreement created the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the 
internationally recognised borders of the former Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and made up of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(hereinafter the Federation) (with 51 per cent of the territory) and the 
Republika Srpska (with 49 per cent of territory). The Federation had been set 
up in 1994 on the basis of the US-brokered Washington Agreement and has 
been vividly described by Bose as 'the troubled product of a shotgun alliance 
of waning Bosniacs and Croats' (2002:23). As Bose's description suggests, the 
creation of the Federation was to a certain extent an act of expediency as it was 
an attempt by the US to simplify the peace-brokering process so that it became 
a two-sided conflict rather than one with three waning sides. The Republika 
Srpska had been proclaimed in 1992 but was not internationally recognised. 
The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement) provides only what Bose calls a 'fairly skeletal' (2002: 61) 
framework of common-state institutions which is based on the equal 
representation of the three main ethnic groups conceived as collectively 
defined communities, although the competencies of these institutions are 
limited. They have responsibility for: foreign policy, foreign trade policy, 
customs policy, monetary policy (in conjunction with the Central Bank), 
immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation, international and inter-
entity criminal law enforcement, the establishment and operation of common 
and international communications facilities, the regulation of inter-entity 
transportation and air traffic control. In effect this creates a central government 
which Robert Hayden has characterised as a customs union with a foreign 
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ministry attached (2005: 243). All other governmental functions and powers 
are devolved to the entity level and in the case of the Federation as far as the 
canton or municipal level. 112 This means that policy on these issues is likely to 
be guided by the interests of the dominant ethnic group: in the case of the 
Republika Srpska the Serbs and in the Federation by the ethnic group dominant 
in a particular canton or municipality. 
At the state level, the political process revolves around the 
representation of the three constituent peoples so, for example, the three-
member Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of a representative of each 
of the constituent peoples elected by the respective people. The Bosniak and 
Croatian members are elected from the territory of the Federation and the 
Serbian member from the territory of the Republika Srpska. This means that 
anyone who is or does not identify as a member of a constituent people, such as 
a member of the Jewish community, is not politically represented in either the 
Presidency or the House of Peoples which is the second chamber of the 
Parliamentary Assembly. 113 As a consequence politics is focussed on the 
concerns of the three constituent peoples and the power play between them 
without being mitigated by the interests and concerns of other groups. 
Moreover, this arrangement encourages the electorate to think about their 
voting choices solely in terms of their ethnic group and its interests rather than 
on an individual politician's merits or what is best for the country as a 
whole. 114 
The state structure also has very strong elements of a consociational 
democracy. This model was put forward in the 1960s by Arend Lijphart as a 
way to develop a common political framework for societies that were divided 
112 According to the Constitution of the Federation (V.1.2.2), 'Each Canton may delegate 
functions concerning education, culture, tomism, local business and charitable activities, and 
radio and television to a municipality or city in its territory, and is obliged to do so if the 
majority of the population in the municipality or city is other than that of the Canton as a 
whole'. 
113 Elections to the first chamber, the House of Representatives, are based on a territorial 
principle and are free ftom ethnic considerations. The Constitutional Court is another state-
level institution which has an etbnically-based composition. 
114 This state of affairs came to the fore in December 2009 with a judgment by the European 
Court of Human Rights in response to a submission from Jakob Finci, a member of the Jewish 
community, and Dervo Sejdic, a member of the Roma community, regarding their ineligibility 
to stand for election to the House of Peoples and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina due to 
not being members of any of the three constituent peoples. The court ruled that the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina violated the European Convention on 
Human Rights and amounted to discrimination and breached their electoral rights. 
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along ethnic or communal faultlines and was seen as an alternative to 
partitionlls• According to Lijphart, every consociational democracy should be 
based on four principles: Government should be in the hands of a grand 
coalition of the political leaders of all segments of society with equitable 
distribution of high offices among the segments and in this regard it is essential 
that the elites representing the segments are willing and able to negotiate the 
differences between them; There should be 'segmental autonomy', that is to 
say, the delegation of as much decision-making power as possible to the 
segments; proportionality as the basic standard of political representation, civil 
service appointments and the allocation of party funds; and the protection of 
the vital interests of minorities through veto. Consociational principles are built 
into virtually every level of Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, the 
common state-level institutions are meant to operate on the basis of parity or 
proportional representation while the vital interest of all three communities is 
guaranteed with the provision of veto rights. A veto can be invoked by any of 
the groups on the basis of a violation of a vital interest of that particular group 
although paradoxically there is no definition in the state constitution of what 
would constitute a vital interest. I 16 
There are several factors specific to Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, 
which hinder the functioning of a wholly consociational democratic system. 
First of all, there has to be a strong desire among the segments for the 
particular state union to exist, and each of the segments must have a strong 
stake in the survival of the political system. Mirjana Kasapovic (2006) argues 
that this would then lead to a sense of loyalty within each segment (in the case 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina the ethnic group) to the wider political system outside 
the segment. According to Kasapovic this consensus does not exist in Bosnia-
Herzegovina primarily because the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was born of 
concession and compromise; for example, the legalisation of the Republika 
liS A classic example of such a state is The Netherlands oftbe 1950s and 60s which was split 
along religious cleavages so that society was divided into Roman Catholics, orthodox 
Calvinists and secular segments or pillars. These social divisions existed in all walks of life. 
Each segment was represented by its own political party and bad its own non-political 
organisations such as charity, cultural, sport and youth associations, and each segment 
developed its own education system and media. It was therefore possible for a member of a 
segment to only associate and socialise with other members of the same segment throughout 
their life. 
116 There are, however, very broad definitions of a vital interest in the entity constitutions. 
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Srpska was a concession by the international community to the Serbs to remain 
within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the will of the majority, and 
the inclusion of the Federation was also a concession to the Croats for the same 
purpose (2006: 65). Further, as Robert Hayden points out, because the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was not ratified in a popular referendum or by any elected 
representatives there is little identification with the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina among the general population (2005: 242). 
Relevant here also are the circumstances in which the agreement was 
negotiated since two of the ethnic groups were not directly represented at the 
talks in Dayton. The Serbs were represented by Slobodan Milokvic, president 
of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Croats by Franjo Tudman, 
president of Croatia, both of whom were keen to reach an agreement. This 
meant that the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina felt coerced into 
implementing something that they had had no input in negotiating. In his 
detailed account of the development of US policy towards Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Ivo Daalder also considers that the Bosniaks, though represented 
by Alija Izetbegovic, were also forced to the table by the Americans who 
portrayed the negotiations as their last chance for peace otherwise the US 
would withdraw its support from them (2000: 137). This coercion meant that 
there was weak support for the Dayton Peace Agreement among the political 
elites of all three warring sides on the ground. 
Furthermore, weak support for the Dayton Peace Agreement also meant 
weak support for the state it created, especially as the Serbs and Croats were 
drawn towards their respective kin-states outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. This 
potentially disintegrative situation was facilitated by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement itself as the Constitution allows each entity to establish 'special 
parallel relationships with neighboring states' (Article 01, paragraph 2a). This 
echoes the provisions in the Washington Agreement which foresaw the 
establishment of a confederation between the Bosnian Croats and the state of 
Croatia. These provisions mean that the Serbs and Croats do not have to be 
fully committed to the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as they can 
legitimately forge extensive relationships with Serbia and Croatia. Moreover, it 
also creates a form of inequality in the collaboration and cooperation process as 
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there is more pressure on the Bosniaks to implement the agreement as they are 
the only constituent people without a kin-state to provide its support. 
Another factor hampering the functioning of a consociational system is 
the lack of consensus among the political elites about the political system itself. 
A successful consociational democracy requires effective collaboration and 
cooperation at the level of the political elites in order to ensure that the separate 
segments intermesh and function jointly within an integral state. Lijphart 
emphasizes this as crucial for the stability of a consociational system. As he 
puts it, 'The leaders of the rival subcultures may engage in competitive 
behaviour and thus further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability, 
but they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and 
unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation' (1969: 211, his italics). Such 
efforts are absent in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the deep divisions that 
exist between the elites of the three ethnic groups in terms of their attitudes 
towards the state structure. According to Kasapovic, the Bosniaks are the main 
opponents of the current constitutional structure first of all because they feel 
that a state divided between two entities was forced upon them by the 
international community and secondly because they would prefer a unitary 
state in which, as the majority population of Bosnia-Herzegovina overall 
(making up an estimated 48 per cent of the population) they would hold more 
sway over the Croats and the Serbs (2006: 66).117 The Bosniaks also feel, 
according to Kasapovic, that the incorporation of the Republika Srpska into 
Bosnia-Herzegovina unjustly legitimised the ethnic cleansing on which it was 
founded (2006: 66). 
The Serbs, on the other hand, now seem to be most supportive of 
Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina and oppose any revision of the agreement as the 
asymmetric constitutional structure allows the Republika Srpska, a unitary 
centralised state, to exist alongside the highly decentralised federation. 
According to Kasapovic, the Serbs consider that the Republika Srpska was not 
1171be figure of 48 per cent is taken from the CIA world factbook and is only an estimate from 
2000. The corresponding figures for the other ethnic groups are: Serbs 37.1 per cent of the 
population and the Croats 14.3 per cent There are no official figures based OIl the population 
since 1995 as no census bas been conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991 due to disputes 
over the content of a possible questionnaire. The CIA world fiM:tbook is available at: 
bttps:/Iwww.cia.govllibrarylpublicationslthe-worId-factbookIgeosIbk.btml [Accessed 8 
February 2010] 
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created in the Dayton Peace Agreement but was only 'verified' by it and the 
entity cannot be scrapped just by revising the agreement (2005: 67). Moreover, 
because they have the status of a constituent people equal to that of the 
Bosniaks and Croats they know that decisions about them cannot be made by a 
Croat-Bosniak majority (Kasapovie, 2005: 67). The Dayton Peace Agreement 
therefore gives the Serbs what Bose calls a 'proto-state, semi-sovereign status' 
(2002: 75).118 Furthermore, the Republika Srpska is able to maintain relations 
with Serbia and at least act like a state in its own right. For example, in 
September 2009, on a visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Boris Tadie, president of 
Serbia, flew to Sarajevo but was driven directly to the Republika Srpska 
without meeting state-level dignitaries and spent his entire visit in the 
Republika Srpska. He even opened a new school in Pale which had been 
funded with a donation of two million Euros from Serbia 119 
The name Republika Srpska is also significant in this regard because it 
suggests a higher status for the entity than it actually has and at least 
rhetorically allows the Bosnian Serbs to talk about the entity in terms of a 
republic, thus putting it on an equal footing with the neighbouring Republic of 
Croatia and the Republic of Serbia.120 Up until 2002, when constitutional 
changes were imposed, the Republika Srpska constitution continued to refer to 
the entity as a state of Serbs. The name has important symbolic meaning 
because it also suggests that this entity is inhabited solely by Serbs and 
intended solely for them. This is not only important from the point of view of 
the equal status of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also 
because of the expected return of refugees and lOPs to this entity. Having been 
118 Although the Serbs support the constitutional and territorial 8I'I'8Ilgements in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement they are opposed to the continued presence of the OHR in the country. 
1l9See report at 
http://macedoniaonline.eU/index2.pbp?option=com_content&task=view&id=8193&p. The new 
school was named Srbija or Serbia. 
120 Linguistically, the name is unusual as the adjective 'Srpska' is placed after the noun even 
though adjectives are usually placed before them. This makes the name difficult to translate 
into English. Logically the translation should be Serbian Republic but this would confuse it 
with the Republic of Serbia. Some translators have interpreted the word Srpska as the actual 
name of the republic and produced the translation of ''Republic of Srpska'. The practice of 
international organisations is to leave the name in the vernacular. 
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driven out of this territory during the war this name does not suggest an 
environment friendly to returning members of other ethnic groups. 121 
Kasapovic considers that it is harder to pin down the Croats' attitude 
toward the constitutional structure because their fundamental political aims 
have never been 'clearly and consistently,l22 (2005: 67) articulated. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement meant that they lost the Croatian Community of 
Herceg-Bosna which they had set up in Croat-dominated western Herzegovina 
in July 1992. This was a quasi-state construct that had been integrated into 
Croatia so that Croatian currency, state symbols, educational curricula, police 
uniforms and car registration plates were used in the area and citizens had dual 
citizenship and the right to vote in Croatia (Woodward, 1995: 231). The 
decentralised federation agreed to in the Washington Agreement and in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement was meant to offset the loss of the Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bosna as a way of getting Croats to agree to the 
Federation (Bose, 2002: 75). They would though have preferred to have had 
their own entity and there was an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to create a 
third entity in 200 1 by uniting the cantons in the federation with a Croatian 
majority. No similar moves have been made by the Croats since then but a 
report by the think-tank, the International Crisis Group, published in March 
2009 suggests that the Croatian political leadership 'remains committed to 
some form of territorial autonomy' (2009, 10). 123 
The structure of the Federation is though favourable to Croatian 
interests as it devolves decision-making authority in most policy areas to the 
cantonal level. The Federation is divided into 10 cantons which have 'equal 
rights and responsibilities': five of these have a predominantly Bosniak 
population (Una-Sana, Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, Bosnian Podrinje and Sarajevo), 
three are predominantly Croatian (posavina, Western Herzegovina and 
Western Bosnia) and two have a mixed population of Bosniaks and Croats 
121 Acceptance of the name Republika Srpska was a concession that was ~ ~ from the 
Bosniak side during the negotiations. In To End a War, Ricbard Holbroolte concedes that this 
was more of a concession than he had first thought (1999: 363). 
122 Jasno i dosljedno. 
123 Commenting on a meeting held in Belgrade in August 2009 between Serbian President 
Boris Tadie, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and HDZ Bosnia-Herzegovina 
President Dragan Cavie, the Croatian daily Nacionol suggested that the creation of a third 
entity was still the goal of the Croats supported by the Serbs. Article available at 
http://www.nacional.hr/enlcIanakl503821hdz-bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-dodik-join-... 
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(Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva). The responsibilities of the 
Federation government mirror those of the state-level government (except for 
defence policy) and are therefore quite limited so all other responsibilities lie 
with the canton level either outright or shared with the Federation level. 124 This 
devolution of authority to the cantonal level is important because it means that 
decision-making is carried out mainly within mono-ethnic structures (except 
for in the three cantons where there is a mixed population) and policy is then 
formulated from the perspective of the interests of just one ethnic group, thus 
having negative implications for the members of the minority ethnic group. 
In a comparison of the consociational systems of Belgium and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Florian Bieber stresses Lijphart's view that a consociational 
society has more chance of succeeding if there are other social cleavages to 
supplement the cleavage along ethnic lines. In the case of Belgium, stability is 
helped by the existence of cleavages along class and religious lines (Bieber, 
1999: 87). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, 'the absence, or rather 
the weakness of other cleavages which would cut across national lines 
exacerbates the national divisions, making a consociational system more 
difficult to succeed' (Bieber, 1999: 84). This means that with no dilution of the 
cleavage along ethnic lines, ethnic identity becomes the most important 
political identity thereby further entrenching ethnic positions and making the 
consensus on which a consociational model depends for success difficult 
The above examination of the structures established by the Dayton 
Peace Agreement serves to demonstrate how these same structures have 
contributed to the continuation of the ethnic divisions present at war's end. In 
that respect, Ivo Daalder believes that the Dayton Peace Agreement failed to 
resolve the basic dilemma apparent during the negotiations as to whether 
124 The shared responsibilities include human rights, public health, environmental policy, 
communications and transport inftastructure and social welfare policy. The constitution of the 
Federation describes quite complicated arrangements for canying out these concurrent 
responsibilities but Bose points out that in practice it is the cantons which exercise most of the 
shared responsibilities (2002: 78). All other powers are in the bands of the cantons and these 
include inter alia 'establishing and controlling the police forces', making education policy, 
including decisions involving the regulation and provision of education; making and 
conducting cu1tural policy; making housing policy and policy on public services and 
implementing social welfare policy. The important thing to note here is that the cantons not 
only have responsibility for making decisions on aU these matters and implementing them but 
they effectively control matters that fall under the concurrent list of responsibilities (Bose, 
2002: 79). 
133 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should reintegrate or divide further. Partition was not an 
option as all the internationally-brokered negotiations that had taken place 
before and during the conflict were predicated on maintaining the integrity of 
the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina which had been recognised by the UN and 
admitted as a member-state in May 1992. It was thought that this approach 
would contain the conflict and prevent the violence from spreading to other 
European states (Owen, 1995: 10). Furthennore, the international community 
did not want to appear to be sanctioning the ethnic cleansing that had been 
engaged in during the war by agreeing to partition. The complex constitutional 
arrangements have meant though that 'By incorporating rather than resolving 
the fundamental disagreement among the parties about Bosnia's future, Dayton 
assured that its implementation would become little more than the continuation 
of conflict by other means' (Daalder, 2000: 180). This then is the political 
back-drop against which language issues play out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I 
will now look at how specific provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
impact on the language situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
What does the Dayton Peace Agreement say about the 
status of the languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina? 
The Dayton Peace Agreement gives very little guidance on how the 
language situation should be dealt with in the future state. For example, there is 
no article in the constitution stipulating what the officiallanguage(s) of the new 
state will be. The only time the languages are named specifically is at the end 
of the document where it is stated: 'Done at Paris, this 14th day of December, 
1995, in the Bosnian, Croatian, English and Serbian languages, each text being 
equally authentic'. This sentence, however, provided sufficient basis for the 
subsequent approach of the international organisations to the language issue. 
This approach was based on the full recognition of three separate and distinct 
languages. 
The lack of an explicit designation of the official languages of Bosnia-
Herzegovina suggests that there was very little or no consideration of the 
importance of the language issue during the negotiations at Dayton. This is not 
an issue that is treated in any great depth by Richard Holbrooke in his memoir 
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of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace process, To End a War, 125 and it is mentioned 
not at all by Ivo Daalder in his otherwise detailed account of US involvement 
in the peace negotiations. Interviewee 00 who was an interpreter at the talks 
does not recall any discussion of the issue as part of the substance of the talks. 
The language issue was however something that was considered by the 
organisers of the negotiations. For example, during the plenary sessions at the 
negotiations care was taken to ensure that each conference interpreter 
interpreted for the principal of their own ethnicity so that a Serb interpreter was 
assigned to Slobodan M i l o ~ e v i c , , a Bosnian to Alija Izetbegovic and a Croat to 
Franjo Tudman (interview with 00).126 
There are various possible reasons why the language issue was not 
given any special attention either during the negotiations at Dayton or in the 
agreement itself. The international negotiators, and primarily the Americans, 
may not have recognised the importance of the language issue for post-war 
reconciliation so may not have raised the issue during the talks, after all there 
were much more obviously pressing matters at stake, such as division of 
territory, the military aspects of the peace and the return of refugees. 
Alternatively, it may have been considered a domestic issue, and therefore the 
international negotiators left it to those negotiating on behalf of the warring 
sides to deal with the issue themselves. 
Another reason for this seeming lack of concern with language may be 
the fact that the Dayton Peace Agreement confers the status of a constituent 
people on the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, thus giving them equal rights. The 
category of constituent people was familiar to the representatives of the 
warring sides from the former state structure of the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
constituent peoples were at the top of the hierarchy of groups that was 
developed as a way of dealing with the presence of different groups in 
Communist Yugoslavia. As such each constituent people had greater rights 
than the groups lower down in the hierarchy, including, crucially, the right to 
125In To End a War (1999), Holbrooke mentions once the fact that in the meeting room 
negotiators could access interpretation using three knobs marked Bosnian, Croatian and 
Selbian although the interpletation was the same for all three. 
126 Aside from the conference interpret«s who had been hired by the organisers of the 
negotiations and interpreted the plenary sessions, each of the principals brought their own 
interpreters for other meetings. 
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national self-determination. Even though the Dayton Peace Agreement does 
not contain a definition of a constituent people, the term would have had 
meaning and importance for the representatives of the warring sides. For 
example, Susan Woodward maintains that the Bosnian Croats only signed the 
1994 Washington Agreement setting up the Federation 'when its constitutional 
agreement guaranteed their rights as a constituent nation, declared the 
federation to be an alliance between two national entities, guaranteed their 
survival as a nation by means of confederation with Croatia' (1995: 392). 
Therefore, it was crucial that in the Dayton Peace Agreement the three main 
ethnic groups were afforded equal status and that that status was at the higher 
level of a constituent people.127 Relevant here also is the link between a people 
and a language which, as we saw in the last chapter, was central in the 
language debates that took place in Yugoslavia from the 1970s onwards and 
which was highlighted by the political elites after 1990. By 1995, therefore, the 
designation of the former warring sides as constituent peoples in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement would imply, without it having to be stated explicitly, that 
they each had their own language as a marker of their separate ethnic identity 
and each had a right to their own language. 
Despite the absence of a clear stipulation of what the official languages 
would be in the future state, the Dayton Peace Agreement nonetheless 
recognised the existence of three separate languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Immediately after the agreement was signed, the international organisations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted the practice of producing documentation in three 
separate language versions even though all three versions could be understood 
by members of all three sides. The impetus for this policy came from the local 
authorities themselves who demanded the appropriate language version for 
their particular ethnic group (interview with RR, senior translator at the Office 
of the High Representative). Linguistically, and as discussed in the 
Introduction to this study, this demand is hard to justify because of the mutual 
intelligibility of the three language versions. Politically, though, it is a way of 
consolidating the differences between the ethnic groups. However, by adopting 
127 The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not give the constituent peoples the right to 
self-determination. Article X stipulates that changes to the constitution can only be made in a 
decision of the Parliamentary Assembly. 
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a policy of producing three language versIons m response to the local 
authorities' demands the international community helped reify the language 
differences between the three main ethnic groups, thereby becoming part of the 
divisive post-war ethnic politics. The importance of such a move was 
highlighted in an interview for this study with former High Representative 
Lord (paddy) Ashdown: 'It turns out not to be an insignificant thing because it 
entrenches the differences. You know, it is a physical representation of the 
difference. It is as much as a barbed wire fence between them, something that 
they hold on to and because it's there they cling onto it even harder'. This then 
creates a kind of vicious circle in which the former warring sides demand three 
linguistic versions because they can while international organisations fear the 
consequences if they do not provide them. Not providing a document in a 
language version corresponding to a given ethnic group (as perceived by that 
ethnic group) would risk that document not being read or signed by the 
recipient. In the long run, moreover, because the local authorities persist with 
their language demands this makes it all the more difficult for international 
organisations to modify their own practice and policy. 
The only other guidance the Dayton Peace Agreement gives as regards 
language matters is in the human rights instruments that are enumerated in it. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was supposed to sign up to, among other things, the 1992 
European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) and the 
1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Aside 
from this, the Constitution at Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
stipulates that no person can be deprived of citizenship on the ground of 
language (Article I. 7b) and no person can suffer discrimination on the ground 
of language (Article 11.4). Both the ECRML and the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities are intended to protect the rights of 
minorities or minority languages themselves so in theory should not apply to 
the three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ECRML bas as yet 
not been ratified by Bosnia-Herzegovina. 128 It was nevertheless invoked by the 
121 Ratification means first of all that the regional or minority Iaoguage(s) to be protected by a 
given state would have to be named and then the state takes on certain obligations as concerns 
the protection of that language or languages. This involves providing services in certain areas 
such as education, media and cultural activities. It also means that the state opens itself up to 
scrutiny from the Co1DlCil of Europe. 
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Constitutional Court in a July 2000 ruling regarding the constituent nature of 
the three ethnic groups which also concerned the status of the three languages 
and in effect consolidated their position as separate official languages. 
The Constitutional Court's decision (2000) concerned a request made 
by Alija Izetbegovic, the then presiding member of the Presidency of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, in February 1998 to evaluate the consistency of the constitutions 
of the Republika Srpska and the Federation with the Constitution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as the constitutions of the two entities had not been brought into 
line with the provisions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution after 1995. 
Izetbegovic's request revolved around the question of whether all three 
constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) had equal status throughout 
the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The provisions that Izetbegovic regarded as 
inconsistent included inter alia constitutional provisions on the official 
languages of the entity constitutions. At that time, Article 6 of the Constitution 
of the Federation stipulated that the official languages of the Federation would 
be the Bosniac language and the Croatian language and the official script the 
Latin alphabet. Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republika Srpska stated 
that the Serbian language of ijekavian and ekavian dialects and the Cyrillic 
alphabet would be in official use in the Republic, while the Latin alphabet 
would be used as specified by law. These language provisions echo the 
constitutional provisions related to the constituent peoples of the entities. 
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Federation constitution originally stated that only 
the Bosniaks and the Croats were constituent peoples of the Federation while 
Article 1 of the constitution of the Republika Srpska stated: 'Republika Srpska 
shall be the State of the Serb people and of all its citizens'. The linguistic 
provisions therefore underscore what the prefened ethnic make-up of the 
population of the respective entities was, according to the drafters of the two 
constitutions. The stipulation of the Bosniak and Croatian languages as the 
official languages of the Federation implies that there is no room in the 
Federation for any other ethnicity be it the Serbs or one of the pre-war ethnic 
minorities, such as the Roma. Similarly the Republika Srpska recognises only 
speakers of the Serbian language and in this case not just the Serbs from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina who use the ijekavian dialect but also those not native to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina who would use the ekavian dialect i.e. those from Serbia. 
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This establishes a linguistic relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs 
outside Bosnia-Herzegovina which would prefigure any attempt to reunite all 
the Serbs into one greater S e r b i ~ ~ which had been a wartime aim of extremist 
Serbian politicians from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia alike. In the context 
of the joint state of B o s n i a - H e r z e g o ~ ~ the constitutions' failure to provide 
linguistic equality for all the constituent peoples of the state undermines the 
more general constituent nature of all the three peoples, which is why the 
language provisions of the constitutions were included in Izetbegovic's 
submission to the Constitutional Court. 
Decision of the Constitutional Court 
The final ruling of the Constitutional Court of the 1 July 2000 on 
lzetbegovic's request found the contentious provisions to be unconstitutional as 
they failed to provide equal rights in both entities for all ethnic groups which 
had been recognised as constituent peoples in the Dayton Peace Agreement. It 
found that 'the express recognition of Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as constituent 
peoples by the Constitution of BiH can only have the meaning that none of 
them is constitutionally recognized as a majority, or, in other words, that they 
enjoy equality as groups' (para. 59). Therefore, linguistically privileging, for 
example, two constituent peoples in the Federation over the third undermines 
the equality of the constituent peoples and is therefore unconstitutional. 
Despite the fact that the Constitutional Court's decision was issued in 
July 2000 it was not until April 2002 that its provisions were incorporated into 
the respective constitutions of the Federation and Republika Srpska. Because 
of opposition from politicians in both entities (Greenberg, 2004: 156) they 
were finally imposed by the then High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch in 
April 2002. The language provisions were changed so that Article 6 of the 
Federation constitution now reads: 'The official languages of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be: Bosnian language, Croat language and Serb 
language. The official scripts shall be Latin and Cyrillic'. The revised wording 
of the Republika Srpska constitution is slightly different: 'The official 
languages of the Republika Srpska are: the language of the Serb people, the 
language of the Bosniak people and the language of the Croat people. The 
official scripts are Cyrillic and Latin' • 
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Noteworthy here is the different approaches to the naming of the 
language of the Bosniaks. In the amendments to the Federation constitution the 
name has been changed from the Bosniak language to the Bosnian language 
which is the designation preferred by the Bosniaks themselves although not by 
the other two ethnic groups. The amendments to the Republika Srpska 
constitution however avoided naming the language of the Bosniaks because at 
that time Serb politicians were opposed to calling the language of the Bosniaks 
Bosnian (Greenberg, 2004: 156). For the Serbs, the Bosniaks' use of the name 
Bosnian implies that it is the language of the entire population of Bosnia-
Herzegovina thus negating the Serbs' separate linguistic identity. The neutral 
wording that was imposed by the High Representative therefore avoided the 
ongoing debate about the proper designation of the language of the Bosniaks 
by stipulating the name of the constituent people (i.e. the Bosniaks), about 
which there is no dilemma, rather than the name of the language which is 
controversial. 
In considering the language issue, the Constitutional Court refers 
mainly to the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages 
(ECRML). At first sight, the Charter appears to be irrelevant to the status of the 
languages of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina as it is concerned 
with protecting the position of regional and minority languages. According to 
Article la of the ECRML, the charter cannot be applied to any language that is 
an official language of a state or a dialect of an official language. This then 
seems to rule out the three official languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is 
recognised by the Constitutional Court but it cites the explanatory report 
attached to the charter according to which 
the term minority refers to situations in which the language is spoken either by 
persons who are not concentrated on a specific part of the territory of a state or 
by a group of persons, which, though concentrated on part of the territory of 
the state, is numerically smaller than the population in this region which 
speaks the majority language of the state (para. 58). 
The Constitutional Court went on to say that 
It must thus be concluded that in the same way as the Swiss Supreme Court 
derived from the recognition of the national languages an obligation of the 
Cantons not to suppress these language groups that the recognition of 
constituent peoples and its underlying constitutional principle of collective 
equality poses an obligation on the Entities not to discriminate in particular 
against these constituent peoples which are, in actual fact, in a minority 
position in the respective Entity (para. 59). 
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The Constitutional Court is clearly saying that even though members of a 
constituent people may have a minority position in one of the entities they 
should nevertheless be treated as a constituent people in that entity and not as a 
minority. 
For an ethnic group to have a position as a minority means that that 
group is at risk of being either assimilated or segregated. Linguistically, in both 
cases a mono-lingual situation arises. So if the group is assimilated this means 
that only the language of the majority can be used and if the group is 
segregated the only language it uses is its o ~ ~ thus hindering the ability of 
members of the group to communicate with speakers of the majority language 
and keeping the groups apart. The Constitutional Court decision says however 
that 'the accommodation of cultures and ethnic groups prohibits not only their 
assimilation but also their segregation' (para. 57). It goes on to say: 'Territorial 
delimitation thus must not serve as an instrument of ethnic segregation, but -
quite contrary - must provide for ethnic accommodation through preserving 
linguistic pluralism and peace in order to contribute to the integration of state 
and society as such' (para. 57). The Constitutional Court's decision thus links 
linguistic pluralism not only with peace but also with the integration of state 
and society. This is in keeping with prevailing thinking regarding linguistic 
human rights and the accommodation of linguistic minorities. In linguistic 
human rights advocacy, 'Identification with a specific language is treated as 
essential to a community's identity and self-esteem, which in turn is seen as 
crucial to securing a community's well-being as well as fostering hannonious 
relations between communities and preventing violent conflict' (Pupavac, 
2006: 117). This position is clearly applicable to diglossic situations where two 
different languages are spoken by two different communities in the same area 
as it allows the speakers of both languages to freely use each of their languages 
across the area they both inhabit. Allowing language rights for both groups 
essentially creates bilingualism as the non-native speakers of each language 
would need to learn the other language in order for intercommunal 
communication to be facilitated. 
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where there is no diglossic situation 
and therefore no bilingualism as the languages are mutually intelligible, the 
question to be asked is whether linguistic pluralism. really does contribute to 
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the integration of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is to say, is it 
appropriate to deal in this way with languages that are different in symbolic 
tenns only? The recognition of three separate languages which are mutually 
intelligible means that the communicative function of language has been 
superseded by its symbolic function but still makes possible discrimination on 
linguistic grounds. Discrimination does not occur on the basis of a failure to 
communicate between members of the ethnic groups because the mutual 
comprehensibility of the languages means that all the speakers of all the 
languages in a multi-ethnic community are able to communicate and socialise 
freely and easily. Discrimination occurs, however, in more subtle ways. 
Vanessa Pupavac cites the example of members of a particular ethnic group 
having their teaching posts challenged because they supposedly did not speak 
the right language although their colleagues with the same local accent but 
from a different ethnic group had no similar problems (2006: 124). In this 
example, supposed language difference is used as an excuse not to employ a 
member of a particular ethnic group so the problem is not to do with how that 
person sounds but with the ethnic group they belong to. Similarly, in a 2006 
report on discrimination in the work place, Amnesty International found that 
vacancy announcements for one of the largest companies in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Croat-owned Aluminij company in Mostar, were published in 
Croatian only and in media with a Croatian audience thus tacitly discriminating 
against members of the population of Bosniak and Serbian ethnicity. 129 Prior to 
the war the Aluminij company had an ethnically-mixed workforce so there is 
no linguistic reason why only Croats should be employed now. Language in 
this case is being used to filter out the potential job candidates of Bosniak and 
Serbian ethnicity who would not now be welcome in a Croat-owned enterprise 
and appears to be a more palatable means of doing so than a more blatant 
advertisement specifying the requirement of workers of Croatian ethnicity 
only. 
The use of language in this way has a two-fold effect First, it is 
exclusionary: it deprives the members of a minority ethnic group of the feeling 
of belonging to the wider ethnically mixed community and makes it more 
129 Details of the report are avaiJable at 
http://www.amnesty.org.uklnews_details.up?NewsID=16770 [Accessed on 19 March 2010] 
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likely that the members of that particular group will nurture hostility to the 
majority ethnic group. This therefore undermines any efforts to nurture a sense 
of loyalty to the joint state. Secondly, it makes it more likely that the members 
of the minority ethnic group will nurture feelings of belonging not to the wider 
community but to their particular ethnic group where their particular language 
is recognised and respected. In the extreme case this leads to segregation. Thus. 
linguistic pluralism in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not necessarily foster 
'harmonious relations between communities' but is used to create animosity 
between the communities, thereby hindering overall reconciliation and 
integration. This then strongly suggests that the linguistic pluralism-state 
integration link made in the Constitutional Court's decision is unrealistic and 
may indeed be counter-productive for broader peace-building aims. 
The above discussion of language rights as conceived in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement has served to explain how the three language division came 
to be verified and legitimised in the post-war period by the international 
community, as well as the implications of this in a general context. The next 
section of this chapter will go on to investigate how the language issue feeds 
into the ethnicised political relations as created by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement and how the language issue can be used at a rhetorical level by 
political elites to mobilize support. By invoking threats to identity, and 
particularly linguistic identity, they can create a societal security dilemma as a 
way to maintain societal insecurity and ultimately undermine the stability of 
the state as a whole. This section will begin with a brief explanation of the 
concept of societal security before applying it to one specific case of a 
politician using the language issue to provoke a societal security dilemma 
between the different ethnic groups. 
Societal Security 
The concept of societal security was first advanced by Barry Buzan in 
his mongraph People, States and Fear (Buzan 1983) and was subsequently 
elaborated by Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre 
in their 1993 book Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe. 
The concept was initially developed as a response to the changing security 
agenda since the middle of the 1980s. During the Cold War, security was 
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viewed in the context of relations between states or blocs of states so that 
security threats were considered to be threats to a state's sovereignty. However, 
with the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent resurgence of 
nationalism and moves towards Western integration, the concept of societal 
security was advanced as a way of viewing security from a different 
perspective. In thinking about security, instead of having the state as the 
referent item, Buzan et 01 developed the idea of making society the referent 
object of security in which case societal security was concerned with relations 
within states rather than between them. 
In elaborating the concept of societal security Waever first ponders the 
meaning of 'society'. He says: 'At its most basic, social identity is what 
enables the word ''we'' to be used. A ''we'' can vary across a wide spectrum in 
terms of size of the group to which it applies, the intensity with which it is felt, 
and the reasons that create a sense of belonging together' (Waever, 1993: 17). 
Waever goes on to say that social groups range in size from small ones 
comprising just a few people (the family, friends, sports clubs) through 
communities at a national level to 'civilisational and religious identities (''we 
Europeans", ''we Muslims") numbering hundreds of millions' (1993: 11). All 
societies contain myriad social groups but according to Waever, 
a societal identity is one that is not only robust enough in construction, and 
comprehensive enough in its following, but also broad enough in the quality of 
identity it carries, to enable it to compete with the tenitorial state as a political 
organizing principle. A societal identity is able to reproduce itself 
independently of the state and even in opposition to the state's organisational 
principle (1993: 23). 
In this respect, significant ethno-national or religious groups are the two most 
likely social identities which become the focus of societal security. Paul Roe 
highlights that where the two group identities reinforce each other 'very strong 
identities can be formed' (2000: 140). Thus, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
Bosnian Muslims, the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs have strong dual 
identities (reflecting both religious and ethnic affiliation) which create three 
definite and recognisable societies. The robustness of the identity is important 
here. In traditional thinking on security where the state is the referent object the 
borders of that state are clear and easily identifiable but societal security relies 
on the vaguer concept of a society. As Linda Bishai argues 'it focuses on an 
abstract and contingent object "Society" can never be concretely defined, for it 
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exists within and is contingent upon the perceptions of an overlapping and 
unknowable multitude' (2000: 157). However members of a significant ethno-
national or religious group can have a sense of a collective identity tied to the 
group rather than to the state and feel insecure when that identity is threatened. 
As Waever puts it, 'Survival for a society is a question of identity, because this 
is the way a society talks about existential threats: if this happens, we will no 
longer be able to live as "us'" (1993: 25). 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina the nearness of the war means that members of 
the ethnic groups are very conscious of the threat to their identity but, as Buzan 
acknowledges, it is not necessarily easy to determine when there is a threat to 
society and further, the threat can be either real or perceived and yet still have 
real consequences (1993: 43). In this respect, the elites playa crucial role in 
highlighting a threat and in moulding a response to that threat from the 
members of the group. As Srdan Vueetic puts it, 'The point is that societal 
threats are not objectively given but socially constructed by government and/or 
the elite' (2002: 75). In general terms though, 
A societal identity can be threatened in ways ranging from suppression of its 
expression to interference with its ability to reproduce. In concrete tenns, such 
measures include forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through 
closure of places of education and worship, to the deportation or killing of 
members of the community (Buzan, 1993: 43). 
How a society reacts to the threat, real or perceived, depends on the kind of 
threat it is. Roland Kostic observes that different types of measures can be used 
to deal with the situation, 'ranging from institutional coercion, police 
oppression, and restriction on immigration to the launching of preemptive 
strikes to defend the group's way of life' (2007: 29). More often than not a 
group will not have the military resources to defend itself so non-military 
means are adopted to strengthen societal identity. As Waever et al point out, 
'This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce societal cohesion and 
distinctiveness, and to ensure that the society reproduces itself effectively' 
(1993: 191). This defensive approach could include 'language and religious 
teaching, observance of special days and rituals, maintenance of cultural 
symbols and dress, and suchlike' (Waever et ai, 1993: 192). 
Consideration of the different possible defensive approaches of a 
society leads on to the concept of a societal security dilemma. This is when 
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'the actions of one society, in trying to increase its societal security 
(strengthening its identity), causes a reaction in a second society, which in the 
end, decreases the first society's own societal security (by weakening its 
identity), (Roe, 2000: 142). Paul Roe gives an example of this in relation to 
language rights which he describes as follows: 
One society (the majority group) may consider homogeneity within the state as 
a requirement for its societal security. Thus, the majority group may attempt to 
deprive the state's minority group (a second society) of its language rights by 
closing the second society's own language schools. This makes the second 
society more determined to maintain them (as it would threaten the existence 
of its language). In tum, this might make the first society even more 
determined to close them (as it continues to threaten the homogeneity of the 
state). Thus an action-reaction process may develop (2000: 145). 
This 'action-reaction process' produces a societal security dilemma which may 
be self-perpetuating. In this case the different groups continually feel a sense of 
insecurity and in this case the state as a whole becomes unstable. 
Roland Kostic, in research on the existence of a societal security 
dilemma in Bosnia-Herzegovina130, concludes that there is 'ample evidence' of 
a societal security dilemma among the three ethnic groups in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2007: 343). According to ~ ~ 'all three communities remain 
highly mobilised around their ethnonational identities. In that r e g ~ ~ religion 
and language make up the key dimensions of the national boundaries 
separating Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks from each other' (Kostic, 2007: 343). 
All three ethnic groups experience societal insecurity but in different ways. The 
Serbs and Croats view the threat to their respective communities coming 
primarily from Bosniak political dominance and the imposition of a Bosnian 
identity, while for the Bosniaks threats to their existence are primarily 
experienced on the territory of the Republika Srpska as they consider that they 
are prevented from expressing their own identity in terms of language, 
education and use of symbols. Kostic concludes, 'Thus, in seeking security for 
their own national identity in terms of symbols, language and education, the 
130 Roland Kostic interviewed 22 representatives of political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and surveyed the opinions of 2,500 members of the public. His researob was focussed on three 
clusters of questions: societal security (the attitude of the elite and the population to group 
identity and threats to it, as well as the organisation of the state); external intervention 
(attitudes to international administrators and different elements of the peacebuilding 
endeavours) and reconciliation (opinions of the war, attitude to the international war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague and view of reconciliation between the edmonational communities in 
general) (2007: 44). 
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three BiH nations end up mutually threatening each other, thereby perpetuating 
a state of societal insecurity' (Kostic, 2007: 343). 
This perpetual state of societal insecurity makes it easy for political 
elites to manipulate the ethnic feelings of their constituencies by emphasising 
threats to their identity. This can be done at a rhetorical level whenever a 
politician feels political advantage can be gained by reminding their 
constituency of threats to it. To illustrate how this works I will analyse a 
statement that was made by Haris SilajdZic, presiding member of the 
Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in May 2008 just a few months before local 
elections were held. In it he used the language issue to remind his constituency 
of Bosniak voters in an oblique way that in his view the existence of three 
separate languages and therefore ethnic groups undermines the integrity of the 
state which the Bosniaks are most interested in maintaining. Thus, during an 
address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, 
SilajdZic made the following comment: 'I'm sure you know that in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, we speak three languages. That is official, but if you ask me, I 
think it is one language with three names' .131 Even though SilajdZic went on to 
talk about a number of subjects concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina's integration 
into the EU and NATO, it was this comment that was seized upon by 
politicians and the media at home. This fact in itself suggests that in Bosnia-
Herzegovina issues of ethnic identity are of more interest and are deemed more 
important than issues to do with the future of the common state that lies in 
membership of western alliances. SilajdZic's comment chimes with the 
advocacy of the Bosniak parties of a redrawing of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to create a centralised state without entities. By saying that there 
is only one language in Bosnia he also implies that there is really only one 
nation in the country which does not therefore need to be split into entities. By 
challenging the official position of the Serbs and croats that there are three 
languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 132 SilajdZic was at the same time 
challenging the existence of three separate ethnic groups, as well as the 
131 Address available at http://csis.org/fiIeslmedialcsisleventslO80520_silajdzi... [accessed 3 
February 2010] 
132 Kostic found that the majority of respondents &om all tbree ethnic groups in the pubHc 
opinion survey agreed that it was the same language with some small difl'erences although a 
'substantial portion' of Croatian respondents considered the languages to be separate (2007: 
340). 
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existence of three constituent peoples. He thereby undermined the other 
ethnonational communities' societal security. 
The Bosnian Croat party, the Croatian Peasants' Party-New Croatian 
Initiative accused SilajdZic of continuing to press for the majority rule of 
Bosniaks over the other ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dnevni avaz, 
2008). As the party considered that this aspiration was clearly being pushed in 
the media it called for the establishment of a separate Croatian TV channel to 
counter this tendency. Clearly, this Croatian party was trying to use cultural 
means to defend itself against the societal insecurity engendered by SilajdZic's 
comment. The Croats see having their own television station as a way of 
increasing societal cohesion, making them thereby able to more effectively 
defend themselves from perceived threats to their identity from the Bosniaks 
and Serbs. l33 
The Serbs, on the other hand, directly attacked SilajdZic's claim. For 
example, Rajko Vasic, executive secretary of the Alliance of Independent 
Social Democrats, the largest party in the RS to which the RS prime minister 
Milorad Dodik belongs,134 stated that there are only two languages in Bosnia -
Serbian and Croatian - and 'SilajdZic will have to understand that he speaks 
Serbian, that Bosnia does not exist and that the Serbs and Croats are not 
Bosnians nor Bosniaks and that Bosnia-Herzegovina will never be either 
Bosnian or Bosniak' (Oslobodenje, 2008b). In this one statement Vasic negates 
not just the existence of a separate Bosnian language but also the existence of 
the Bosniaks and even Bosnia itself. Vasic' s words are a reiteration of the 
hardline Serbian position which opposes the idea of a unitary Bosnia-
Herzegovina as implied by SilajdZic's statement Moreover, his comment 
creates a societal security dilemma because in parrying a perceived threat to the 
existence of the Serbs from the Bosniaks he has riposted with a threat to the 
existence of the Bosniaks themselves. 
133 Since the failure of the campaign of Croatian politicians for the creation of a third entity in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 200 1, their main demand has been for the establishment of a Croatian 
television station. 
134 Dodik himself said that Silajdtic's comment was 'an attempt to unitarise something that 
should be the subject not of political but scientific debate' (Oslob04enje, 20088). He also said 
that it was an unsuccessful attempt to create a picture intemationally of the existence of one 
Bosnian nation. 
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In a commentary in the moderate daily OsloboiJenje, journalist Mirko 
Sagolj accused SilajdZie of raising an issue that he was not competent to talk 
about in an expert way and giving it 'a serious political and ethnic dimension. 
And causing a new wave of assaults on the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina' 
(Sagolj, 2008). This comment implies that if the societal security of each of the 
ethnic groups is undermined at this rhetorical level this will lead to the entire 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina being undermined and rendered unstable. The 
reactions to SilajdZie's comment also throw into doubt the belief that linguistic 
pluralism in Bosnia-Herzegovina can bolster state stability because politicians 
use linguistic arguments to attack the very existence of the other ethnic groups, 
thereby creating societal insecurity. 
Sagolj went on to say that the language issue was not a new one and 
quoted linguists such as Josip Baotie and Milo§ Okuka as saying that the 
difference between the three variants amounts to only five per cent of their 
lexicons. However, he concluded his commentary with the question: 'Should 
blood again be spilt in this region for the sake of this 5 per cent?!,13S (Sagolj, 
2008). With this fmal question, Sagolj takes the societal security dilemma 
present in Bosnia-Herzegovina to its logical conclusion by implying that 
quarrels over language could not only lead to the state falling apart but also to 
renewed conflict. Raising the spectre of renewed conflict indicates further that 
the post-war peace-building process has not created a country secure and stable 
enough to withstand such threats to societal security. 
Thus we see a connection between societal security and state security. 
Because each of the three ethnic groups are experiencing societal insecurity 
and the actions of each of them to improve their societal security only increase 
the insecurity of the other groups, the state security of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 
undermined. As Buzan has observed, 
Unless society is secure within the state. The whole package of the state (here 
seen as government apparatus + society + tenitory) will be unstable. States in 
which society and government are at odds are weak as states and operate at 
considerable security disadvantage in the international system' (1983: 56). 
Therefore Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a stronger state if the societal security 
(national identity) of each of the ethnic groups could be strengthened without 
threatening the societal security of the other two ethnic groups. The dilemma 
135 Je li mog tih pet posto ponovo treba na ovim prostorima cia ~ ~ krv?! 
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lies in how to do this. The state structures established by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement militate against this as they have created a political system 
predicated on ethnic competition without ensuring that the will to collaborate 
and cooperate at an elite level, on which a consociational system depends, 
exists. Instead, a situation develops in which politics is reduced to a zero-sum 
game in which a gain for one group is perceived to be a loss for one or both of 
the others. Thus, attempts by one of the ethnic groups to strengthen its societal 
security can only lead to societal insecurity in the other groups. 
Approaching this dilemma from the point of view of human rights 
protections, current thinking on linguistic human rights would advocate the 
strengthening of minority language rights as a way of increasing the well-being 
of different groups, thereby enhancing their societal security. This is the 
approach taken in the Dayton Peace Agreement and in the post-Dayton period. 
As shown in this chapter, the problem is that emphasising language difference 
in an environment where the political process is dominated by ethnic interests 
can lead to discrimination on linguistic grounds. Moreover language difference 
can be used by political elites as part of their rhetoric in constructing threats to 
identity. In both cases the societal insecurity that may be felt by a given group 
is increased and the development of harmonious inter-ethnic relations is 
impaired. 
Conclusion 
Provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement fonned the basis of the 
peace-building efforts of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
after 1995. Seen in tenns of the Agenda for Peace the agreement was 
successful in ending the conflict and in ensuring that the militaries on all sides 
disanned and remained separated. Moreover, the Dayton Peace Agreement 
provided for the return of a million refugees and IDPs to their original homes. 
The external peace-building efforts have also ensured that so far, 15 years after 
the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, there has not been a recurrence of 
conflict. That notwithstanding the situation that prevails has been described as 
'No War, No Peace' (Mac Ginty, 2006) because of the basic instability of the 
post-war state. The consociational arrangements put in place after the war 
mean that the concerns of the fonner warring sides to do with power and 
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territory have not been mitigated by the state-building aspects of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. Instead ethnic cleavages have not been ameliomted and a 
political system has developed in which ethnic identity is the predominant 
identity in the political process. A situation therefore exists in which there are 
strong societies (represented by each ethnic group) present within the state, the 
security of which is dependent on the level of societal security experienced by 
each of these groups. If, as Kostic suggests, societal security is at a low level, a 
perpetual societal security dilemma is maintained which risks destabilising the 
state. 
Given the salience of ethnic identity in the political process, language 
as a marker of ethnic identity will necessarily be a factor in this perpetual 
societal security dilemma. It is therefore important to look at how the 
international community's approach to language issues impacts on this. As 
explained in this chapter, the de facto recognition of three official languages in 
the Dayton Peace Agreement gave legitimacy to the idea of significant 
linguistic difference between the three ethnic groups. This was then confirmed 
in the Constitutional Court's 2000 decision. The minority language rights 
provisions in the Dayton Peace Agreement which were invoked in this decision 
were intended to limit discrimination and facilitate harmonious interethnic 
relations, however, because of the ethnicisation of the general political process 
these provisions only feed into attempts by the elites to use language as a tool 
to divide the members of different ethnic groups. This then hinders the creation 
of an environment in which these groups feel safe, thereby undermining their 
societal security. Furthermore, because of the potency of language as a marker 
of identity, the language issue can be manipulated by elites at a rhetorical level 
to undermine societal insecurity in the every-day political arena, as we saw in 
the analysis of the comment by Haris Silajdfic and the ensuing reactions to it. 
The consolidation of the existence of three official languages has 
another consequence for people's self-identification and their commitment to 
the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in that it confirms the one nation-one 
language link familiar from nineteenth century Romantic nationalism and 
makes it possible for an individual to self-identify linguistically not with the 
overall state of Bosnia-Herzegovina but with their particular ethnic group. 
Identification with the language of a particular ethnic group suggests that 
lSI 
linguistically at least individuals may not feel they have a common destiny 
with the rest of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their loyalty to the state 
may therefore be weaker than to their ethnic group or indeed to a state outside 
the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
The discussion in this chapter has served to examine in general tenns 
the kind of political environment created after the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in which language issues play out. Sagolj' s comment about the 
possibility of renewed conflict for the sake of minimal linguistic difference 
also tells us something about the nature of language specifically in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, especially in an atmosphere of ethnically-based political 
animosity. He is suggesting that language is a powerful enough marker of 
identity to have the potential to reignite conflict. In this sense, the language 
issue may have the ability to shape events just as much as it is shaped by them. 
This is because the languages' strong symbolic value means that they stand for 
much more than 'just' the ability to communicate and the facilitation of inter-
communal dialogue. 
The next two chapters will narrow the focus of this study and examine 
in more detail the language policy of the international community as regards 
two different aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These are the reform of 
the education sector and defence reform which were treated in very different 
ways in the agreement and were subject to different approaches by the 
international community. The next chapter focuses on the first of these -
education reform - where the concept of societal secmity continues to be 
germane. The education system is seen by the political elites as a way of 
transmitting group identity and ensuring its survival. They will therefore make 
moves to strengthen the identity of their own group through education, which 
then impacts on the other two, and the language issue has become an important 
instrument in this. 
152 
Chapter 4 
International Community Language Policy in 
Education Reform 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I looked at how the language issue functions at a 
general political level in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how it can be used as a tool 
by political elites to increase societal insecurity among their constituencies and 
thereby undennine the stability of the state. In this chapter I look at the role of 
language in the specific sector of education reform and the ways in which the 
language issue is used to maintain the segregation that exists in this particular 
sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The education sector is an important sector for any government wanting 
to instil certain values, ideas and attitudes in members of future generations. In 
Britain, for example, children have in recent years been increasingly taught in 
schools about environmental issues such as global wanning, the wasteful use of 
natural resources and the benefits of recycling. In this way the government 
hopes that what is learned in the classroom will be transferred into future 
action outside of it in support of an environmental policy based on cutting 
carbon emissions and the more rational use of sources of energy. The British 
government has therefore recognised that future attitudes to environmental 
issues can be moulded in schools.136 
Given the power education has to influence future generations, it can be 
expected that the education sector would be particularly crucial in a post-
conflict situation. Endeavours in this sector can either support any peace-
building activities being undertaken or ensure the maintenance or renewal of 
hostilities but under peacetime conditions. In external peace-building the 
education sector is one sector through which the goals of dealing with the 
causes of the original conflict and the creation of an identity tied to the post-
war state can be achieved in the long term. This is recognised by Boutros-Ghali 
in the Agenda for Peace when he says: 'Reducing hostile perceptions through 
136 See UK Government website http://www.direct.gov.uklenlNIl/NewsroomIDG_067836. 
153 
educational exchanges and curriculum reform may be essential to forestall a re-
emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed 
hostilities' (1992: para. 56). In this sense, education has a positive effect in the 
peace-building process. Equally, however, it can be used to continue the 
original conflict but by other, peaceful means. In a post-conflict situation 
where societal insecurity is salient, the different groups will work to defend 
themselves from the perceived threat. As Kostic says: 'If ethnonational groups 
find themselves in a societal security dilemma, ethnonational identity is seen as 
vital for group existence. lbat is if members are prevented from maintaining 
their group identity and transferring group values to future generations, the 
group will cease to exist' (2007: 96). One vehicle for maintaining this group 
identity and transferring group values to future generations is through an 
education system that advantages a particular ethnic group so that its societal 
security is enhanced; this in turn may undermine the societal security of other 
ethnic groups and lead to a societal security dilemma. In this case, a 
discriminatory and divisive education system is created. where the separate 
ethnic identities have primacy over a new post-conflict identity tied to the state. 
If the aim of external peace-builders, as is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is 
to facilitate the latter over the former identity then education reform needs to 
be part of the peace-building process. 
The two opposing uses of education refonn have been summed up by 
Kenneth D Bush and Diane Saltarelli (2000) in the idea of the 'two faces' of 
education, one constructive and one destructive. They argue that whereas 
traditionally education has been seen as always a force for good it can 
nevertheless have the opposite effect, especially in an ethnicised state. For 
them, education can produce either a society that is 'based on tolerance and 
respect for difference' or one based on 'intolerance, jingoism, and a fear and 
rejection of difference' (2000: 6). These two faces are present in Bosnia-
Herzegovina with, broadly, the international community striving to create a 
constructive education system and local political elites favouring a destructive 
one. This chapter examines these two approaches to education refonn and 
investigates the way in which the language issue is manipulated in them. As 
with the previous chapter, I will begin by looking at how the refonn of the 
education system was dealt with in the Dayton Peace Agreement, as the 
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starting-point for the peace-building process, and then go on to examine the 
activities of the international community in this regard. I will look at how 
international reform endeavours have fed into attempts by local authorities to 
consolidate segregation in the school system. There are two practices in which 
language plays an important role through which segregation is maintained - the 
existence of so-called 'two schools under one roof' schools and the group of 
national subjects. I will therefore analyse both of these and the role of language 
in them. The 'two schools under one roof' schools are to be found in mixed 
Croat-Bosniak areas and their maintenance is justified by the Croatian 
community using societal security concerns so these will also be addressed in 
this chapter. There will then be a consideration of experience in carrying out 
education reform in the BItko District which is an area in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
where the education reform is deemed to have been a success by the 
international community; this will be followed by an assessment of the lessons 
from this experience that may be relevant to the rest of the country especially 
as regards language issues. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
role and importance of the language issue in the education reform process, 
making the case for language policy to be included in the education reform 
process in external peace-building. 
What does the Dayton Peace Agreement say about 
education reform? 
Education reform is not mentioned at all in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement The right to education is one of the human rights enumerated in the 
Constitution at Annex 4 (Article 11.3.1) and is also in the constitutions of the 
Federation and the Republika Srpska. In none of these constitutions, however, 
is there any more detail on how the responsibilities and obligations connected 
with this right are exercised. Adila Pdalic-Kreso, professor of education at the 
University of Sarajevo, argues that this imprecision in constitutional provisions 
has caused weaknesses and abuses in the education system and maintains that 
this very imprecision would make it difficult to argue that any dubious action 
by an education body could be deemed unconstitutional. She speculates, for 
example, that if a particular part of the Federation wanted to introduce school 
ISS 
fees it would not be possible to proclaim this act to be unconstitutional because 
of the imprecise nature of the constitutional provisions (2003: 4). Flesh is put 
on the bones of the right to education, however, by some of the international 
human rights documents that are enumerated in the Dayton Peace Agreement 
and which the future state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was meant to sign up to. 
Among these are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
Furthermore, the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina incorporates the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) and gives it priority over all domestic legislation. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina formally ratified the ICESCR in March 1992. 
According to the Covenant, the State has the obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfil the right to education, and in this respect the State is obliged to closely 
monitor education in order to identify any discrimination and take measures to 
redress any instances of this. The education system itself should also provide 
the following: availability, accessibility (the education system must be non-
discriminatory and physically accessible to all), acceptability (the form and 
substance of education must be relevant and culturally appropriate to both 
students and parents) and adaptability (the education system needs to be able to 
adapt to the needs of a changing society and respond to the diverse social and 
cultural needs of students). 
The ECHR also confirms the right to education, and Article 2 of its 
Protocol No.1 states: 'No person shall be denied the right to education. In the 
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to 
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education 
and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions.' The ECHR and its case law bolster this right by emphasizing that 
it aims 'at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education which is 
essential to the preservation of the '''democratic society" as conceived by the 
convention'. Case law also emphasises that the information included in a 
curriculum must be conveyed 'in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner' 
(OSCE 2005:3). 
It can be seen, therefore, that the rights framework set out in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement firmly establishes not only the right to education but also the 
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rights of children and parents as regards the content of that education. 
Education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been guided by the need to 
ensure the four qualities of education as cited above - availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and adaptability - highlighting thereby the necessity 
of providing pluralism in education without discrimination and taking into 
account the role of parents in educational choice. lIDs role is also stressed in 
the CRC in its provision specifically on language: 'the development of respect 
for the child's parents, his/her own cultural identity, language and values, for 
the national values of the country in which the child is living' (Article 29 (1) of 
the CRC). The issues of segregation that will be discussed in this chapter touch 
on all four of the qualities mentioned above. 
The other aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement that has a crucial 
effect on the reform of the education system is the asymmetric state structure 
that it put in place. According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, education 
provision in the Federation is decentralised and is the responsibility of the 10 
cantons (in line with the provisions of the earlier Washington Agreement) 
while in the Republika Srpska a centralised system exists and education is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Aside from these bodies there is a 
state-level Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Federation Ministry of Education and 
the education department in the internationally-supervised BItko District. This 
means that there are 14 bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina with responsibility for 
education. Such a large number of bodies requires an efficient system to work, 
but in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the consociational arrangements do not 
function properly, it is extremely difficult to reach consensus and establish a 
uniform education system across the country. As Pdalic-Kreso has put it, right 
from the very beginning this arrangement 'virtually makes impossible even 
the slightest unified approach to education, the nurturing of common values 
and the development of patriotism and positive feelings for the state and 
homeland,137 (2003: 3) (her emphasis). In the context of nation-building, this 
also makes it difficult to develop an identity tied to the new state. 
Part of the problem stems from the fact that there is no one body with 
overall responsibility for the education sector at state level with the power to 
137 lotovo ollemop&va lole jedlnstvea pristop obrazovaDjD, njegovanju zajedniekih 
vrijednosti, a potom i razvoju patriotizma i pozitivnih osjeaaja za svoju drfaw i domovinu. 
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devise and coordinate policy a n ~ ~ most importantly, ensure that policy changes 
are carried out. The state-level Ministry of Civil Affairs would appear to be the 
most appropriate body for this but it has limited authority. According to Article 
15 of the Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the competences of the ministry in the field of education 'relate 
to defining basic principles, co-ordinating activities and harmonising plans of 
the Entity authorities and defining strategy at the international level'. In 
practice this means, for example, that while it has the authority to sign up to 
international commitments on behalf of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
field of education, such as the Bologna Process and the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention, it does not have any political leverage to ensure that these 
commitments are met by the lower-level education ministries which have the 
real power in matters of education. 138 
The drawbacks to the lack of an over-arching state-level body are most 
obvious in the Federation where responsibility for education is devolved to the 
10 cantons and in some cases to the municipality level where the majority 
ethnic group is different to the majority ethnic group of the canton as a 
whole.139 According to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina (111.4 (b» the cantons have responsibility for 'Making education 
policy, including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of 
education'. How this works in practice is, once a law on education is passed, 
the local Ministry of Education must issue instructions on the basis of the law 
to schools, and school directors cannot act until they have received these 
instructions. In some cases the ministers will not act until the instructions have 
been approved by the local political party leaders (Sullivan 2004). If the local 
party representatives do not approve them then the process is either hampered 
138 Although not legally binding the Bologna process is a political commitment made by the 
ministries of education of 40 countries with the aim of creating a European Higher Education 
Area by 20 I 0; its purpose is to increase the mobility of students, academics and research staff 
throughout Europe. The Lisbon Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications Concerning 
Higher Education in the European region is intended to create a system for the recognition of 
~ ~ education qualifications throughout Europe. 
I According to the Constitution of the Federation (V.I.2.2), 'Each Canton may delegate 
functions concerning education, culture, towism, local business and charitable activities, and 
radio and television to a municipality or city in its territoty, and is obliged to do so if the 
majority of the population in the municipality or city is other than that of the Canton as a 
whole'. 
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or stalled altogether. In addition, local politicians have significant influence on 
such things as the appointment of school directors and school boards choosing 
appointees on the basis of political affiliation rather than skills and ability. 
Thus it can be seen that policy made at this level is more susceptible to 
interference from local politicians whose concerns are more likely to be based 
on narrow ethnically-based party interests rather than ensuring the best possible 
education system for all students in their locality. Moreover, if different 
cantons are controlled by different ethnic groups this leads to fragmentation of 
the Federation's education system (Bozic, 2006: 320) as de facto Bosniak and 
Croatian educational systems with different aims are established rather than a 
uniform system across the Federation. 
These differing aims were brought out in research conducted by Roland 
Kostic based on interviews with politicians of all parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. He found that all the Serb and Croat politicians argued for an 
educational system that allowed pupils of each ethnic group to study their own 
language, history and religious tradition (as the three subject areas considered 
to be the most important for identity formation) with the remaining subjects 
making up a common curriculum (2007: 160). He considered that 'this is very 
much in line with the views of Croat and Serb parties on threats to their groups, 
as well as the need to protect their national identity against Bosniak 
dominance' (2007:160). The Bosniak politicians, on the other hand, were in 
favour of a uniform system of education throughout the country. Such a system 
would advantage the predominant Bosniak population, which is also in line 
with the attitudes of Bosniak parties regarding the state organisation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in general. 
Structurally, therefore, we can see that the system of decision-making 
on educational matters established in the Dayton Peace Agreement hinders the 
achievement of some of the obligations set out in the international legislation 
detailed above. A fragmented education system, for example, makes difficult 
the nurturing of respect 'for the national values of the country in which the 
child is living' as foreseen by the CRC. There is thus a mismatch between the 
educational aspirations contained in the human rights documents that Bosnia-
Herzegovina was meant to sign up to and the system of governance that was 
put in place in which they were meant to be achieved. 
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Furthermore, the Dayton Peace Agreement did not contain any specific 
guidelines concerning the way in which an education system that was 
available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable would be established or 
concerning the international body which would lead education reform efforts. 
In her comprehensive investigation of the activities of the international 
community in education reform until 2002, Valery Perry attributes this failure 
to give an education mandate to an international organisation to several factors: 
the international negotiators were preoccupied with more obvious issues to do 
with security and state-building such as military stabilisation and policing; 
there was no international organisation present at the negotiations which would 
have lobbied for education reform to be included in some way in the 
agreement; education reform was seen as requiring a long-term commitment 
that the international community was not willing to make at the time of the 
negotiations, after all international engagement was initially only meant to last 
one year until elections could be held; finally, Perry suggests that after years of 
centralised education policy the warring sides were keen on creating their own 
education systems and were not willing to give up control of the education 
field to outsiders and therefore did not raise the issue at Dayton (2003: 42-44). 
There was therefore no advocate for education reform at the Dayton talks who 
would have put the issue on the table. 
Interviewees LA, UO and ce, all of whom wOlk in the field of 
education reform, made the point that it bad been a mistake to leave the issue 
of education reform out of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Because it was only 
vaguely defined as part of human rights it did not get the attention that other 
issues such as police reform or security received. As UO put it: 'You don't get 
anyone taking ownership of it'. This is important given the major problems 
facing the education sector in the immediate post-war period. First of all, it was 
necessary to physically reconstruct a large number of schools as 60 per cent of 
them had been damaged, destroyed or requisitioned for military use during the 
war (Perry 2003: 23). Moreover, the system bad to deal with a shortage of 
teachers or potential teachers given that between 100,000 and 300,000 people 
were estimated to have died from a pre-war population of just over four million 
and one and a half million more were internally displaced persons (lOPs) or 
refugees. Additionally there was a need to rethink an education system that had 
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been suited to the requirements of the pre-war communist regime but after 
1995 would have to be modernised to meet the needs of a modem, democratic 
and multi-party state that would eventually aspire to EU membership (perry, 
2003: 7). It was also clear that the former warring sides were working on 
creating their own, parallel education systems. This came to the fore in 1997, 
for example, when the Federation Ministry of Education circulated an 
instruction to all cantonal ministries of education to implement two separate 
curricula (Bosniak and Croat) across the Federation (Bender, 2000). It was 
revoked later that year under pressure from local NGOs, parents and some 
international organisations but this divisive action helped to concentrate minds 
within the international community on the need for reform (Stabback, 2004, 
50). 
Activities of the international community in education 
reform prior to 2002 
Despite the lack of a lead organisation, various international 
organisations were involved in a wide variety of education reform efforts 
immediately following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and a 
certain amount of funding was provided by the international community for 
school reconstruction, training, supplies and expert assessment and 
consultation. The focus of these activities was on the practical reconstruction of 
the sector. According to Council of Europe and World Bank figures, between 
1996 and 1998, a total of $172 million was spent on rehabilitating the 
education system with the level of funding declining in successive years ($110 
million was spent in 1995/96, $49 million in 1997 and $13 million in 1998).140 
Perry points out, however, that overall these figures were 'a drop in the 
proverbial bucket' compared to what was actually necessary to reconstruct the 
devastated education system (2003: 46). 
In her analysis of education reform in this period, Perry gives a detailed 
account of the activities of the OHR, the European Commission and other 
agencies in this area. There were also other initiatives taken by such 
organisations as the World Bank, the Council of Europe and UNICEF, as well 
140 From the 1999 report Education i" Bosnia and Herzegovina: Guvenumce. Finance and 
Administratio" prepared by the Council of Europe for the World Bank. 
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as various NGOs which dealt with a variety of issues ranging from the 
establishment of a standards and assessment agency to vocational and 
university education reform (see Perry, 2003: 70-76 for details of individual 
projects). Perry characterises the education reform efforts of the international 
community in the first few years after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed 
as 'a piecemeal approach involving many actors working on a variety of 
projects with varying degrees of cooperation and coordination and without a 
fIrm mandate. 1bis created an environment in which there was much talk, but 
little substantive implementation and change' (2003: 44). In her opinion, the 
organisations were hampered by systemic weaknesses that made meaningful 
reform impossible, such as an unwillingness on the part of the authorities to 
implement agreements signed by the entities, the lack of real initiative on the 
part of the authorities for change and the lack of a state-level organisation with 
powers of enforcement. Moreover, the plethora of international organisations 
working on different aspects of reform with no one organisation with a 
coordination role meant that these organisations could not present a united 
front to the local authorities which would have put pressure on them to 
implement change. 
The most notable achievement in this period was the Interim 
Agreement on Accommodation of Special Needs and Rights of Returnee 
Children which was signed by the ministers in charge of education in the 
Federation and the Republika Srpska in March 2002 with a subsequent 
implementation plan for the agreement being adopted by the education 
ministries of the Federation and the Republika Srpska, as well as the cantonal 
education ministries in November the same year.141 The purpose of the Interim 
Agreement was to improve conditions in schools in potential areas of return in 
order to entice back refugees and IDPs to their homes. As a 2007 OSeE report 
on catchment areas puts its: 'People with children do not normally wish to 
return to places where education is biased, discriminatory, or simply 
inaccessible' (OSCE 2007a: 10). The return of refugees and displaced persons 
was identified as a priority in the Dayton Peace Agreement and although 
141 The Implementation Plan for the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs 
and Rights of Returnee Children available at hUp:l/www.oscebih.orw'documentsI29-eng.pdf. 
[Accessed on 12 September 2010] 
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initially a large number of refugees and IDPs returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in 1996 and 1997 these were mainly those returning to areas where they would 
be part of the majority population in their area. After 1998 the international 
community refocused its returns policy on encouraging returnees back to areas 
where they would be in a minority. The availability of an acceptable education 
for returnee children in a friendly learning environment was seen as an 
important factor in the decision-making of potential returnee p a r e n ~ ~ and the 
international community supported the Interim Agreement to accommodate 
this. 
The Interim Agreement included measures to encourage the 
employment of returnee teachers in areas of minority return and to ensure that 
the ethnic composition of school boards reflected the composition of the school 
population. It also confirmed the right of returnee parents to request that their 
children be taught the so-called national group of subjects according to their 
ethnic group. This meant that certain subjects (history, language and literature, 
geography, nature and sociology and religious instruction) would be taught to 
pupils of different ethnic groups separately. These are subjects that are deemed 
to be most closely linked to cultural identity and therefore susceptible to 
varying interpretations and analyses. The idea was that children of differing 
ethnic groups could attend the same school and be taught together for most of 
the time but would be separated only for these more controversial subjects. 
Schools were required to provide lessons in the national group of subjects if 
there were 18 or more students from the minority population in any given year 
group although if there were fewer than 18 the decision on whether or not to 
provide these lessons was left to the competent ministry.142 
It could be said that the national group of subjects provides for an 
element of pluralism in the education system, deemed as a good thing in the 
international human rights legislation. The provision of these subjects is 
intended to alleviate the fear of assimilation that returnees may feel going back 
to areas where they are in the minority. It therefore helps to create a friendly 
142 The category of the national group of subjects was confirmed in the Inter-Entity Ministerial 
Agreement of 10 May 2000 signed by Fahrudin Rizvanbcgovit, Minister of Education, 
Science, Cu1tw'e and Sport of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nenad Suzit, Minister of 
Education of the Republika Srpska, and Ivo Milo Jovic, Deputy Minister of Education, 
Sdence, Cu1tw'e and Sport of tile Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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learning environment for returnee children who would otheIWise have to attend 
classes in which their ethnic group was ignored or even subject to bias and 
insult while at the same time ensuring contact between children of different 
ethnic groups during classes for general subjects. However, the negative side to 
the national group of subjects is that it creates what Gordana Bozic calls 
'ethnically correct education' which refers to 'the exclusivity and ineffability 
of one group in interpreting a common history, a shared geography and 
linguistics and literature' (2006: 327). In this sense it limits tolerance for other 
perspectives and creates the idea of the superiority of one ethnic group over the 
others. So even though the national group of subjects limits segregation in 
schools because it reduces the time children spend in separate classes it 
nevertheless serves to entrench this segregation. These subjects will be 
discussed in more detail further on in this chapter during consideration of the 
different practices which maintain segregation in schools. 
Activities of the international community in education 
reform after 2002 
The international community's approach to education reform changed 
in July 2002 when the HR gave the OSCE the mandate to facilitate and 
coordinate the reform effort on behalf of the international community. The 
stated goal of the OSeE mission as regards education reform is 
to promote political and legislative changes so that BiH develops an education 
system that accommodates diversity, embraces modern educational approaches 
and is no longer burdened by nationalist politics. The reformed system must 
ensure that the state can fulfil its obligations related to the basic human rights 
protections for all students, while fully respecting the identity and diversity of 
all students (OSeE website). 
A strong element of this is the encouragement of increased local ownership of 
the reform effort. To this end, soon after receiving the education mandate the 
OSCE devised an Education Reform Strategy (ERS) which was presented to 
entity and cantonal ministers of education for signature in November 2002 and 
then submitted by them to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) later the 
same month. 
The Education Reform Strategy (ERS) has the overriding objective 'to 
depoliticise education, while creating the conditions that will ensure equal 
access to a high-quality, modem education throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina' 
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(2003: 8). This sums up the concerns that are addressed in the five pledges 
contained in the strategy. Pledge 1, for example, immediately indicates the 
intention of doing away with segregation in schools when it starts with: 'We 
will ensure that all children have access to quality education, in integrated 
multicultural schools, that is free from political, religious, cultural and other 
bias and discrimination and which respects the rights of all children'. 
Interviewee CC described the ERS as a 'really good thing' which was 
'really useful' because it identified the main problems and goals in education 
reform. They also pointed out that even though it corresponded with the 
requirements and ideas of the international community it involved the 
participation of at least 80010 of local education stakeholders. However, this 
interviewee saw it more as a wish list than an actual strategy because according 
to them it was not detailed enough; it did not have a financial plan or deadlines 
or distribution of responsibilities. 143 
Interviewee UO assessed that the ERS had some success in the first 
year of implementation and they cited the adoption of the state-level 
Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in June 2003 as 
evidence of this. This law sets out requirements for a common core curriculum, 
nine years of compulsory education, the establishment of parent and student 
councils and greater school autonomy. However, interviewee UO made the 
point that in the first year there was a lot of high-level international interest and 
involvement in trying to get the ERS strategy implemented with considerable 
pressure put on politicians by representatives of international organisations. 
After the first year this interest and pressure waned and therefore the reform 
slowed with the consequence that implementation of the strategy remains 
incomplete. 
The ERS may actually have been superseded by other education policy 
documents of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. This is certainly the opinion 
of interviewee CC as regards the document entitled Strategic Directions for the 
Development of Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina with an Implementation 
Plan 2008-2015 which was adopted by the Council of Ministers in June 2008. 
143 This is not strictly true as most of tile tasks in tile ERS do have a deadline attached. 
However, with hindsight, given that much of tile ERS is yet to be completed, these have turned 
out to be rather ambitious. It is true tbrough that the ERS does not contain any financial 
planning for the strategy. 
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This document was one of the results of the EU-funded project 'Institution and 
Capacity Building of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Education System' in the context 
of EU support for Bosnia-Herzegovina's progress towards EU membership. 
The project was intended to facilitate the development of institutional 
capacities in the education sector by improving educational management and 
administration at all levels of decision-making. In this sense its focus is 
different to that of the ERS which concentrates more on curriculum 
development and what happens in the classroom. The Strategic Directions set 
out wide-ranging short, medium and long term goals for the reform of all 
sectors and areas of education focussing on the need to harmonise legislation, 
policy and practice at all levels. The document is quite detailed in the actions 
that need to be taken and it specifies deadlines for their completion. It is not so 
clear, however, on the bodies responsible for carrying out each specific task, 
and while it foresees the establishment of various coordination and advisory 
bodies and joint agencies there is still no enforcement mechanism to ensure 
that the lower levels of authority in education, particularly the cantons, meet 
their responsibilities within the set deadlines. 
The Strategic Directions also deal with segregation in the school system 
and set the objective of the elimination of various forms of segregation and 
discrimination by 2010. However, the most recent European Commission 
Progress Report assessing Bosnia-Herzegovina's progress in meeting its EU 
accession requirements, published in October 2009, assessed that progress in 
the 'two schools under one roof' issue, for example, has been 'limited' (2009: 
43). 
All three education reform documents discussed above - the ERS, the 
Interim Agreement and the Strategic Directions - were adopted on the 
initiative and with the urging of the international community. This is indicative 
of the education reform process in general where the impetus for the majority 
of moves towards reform has come from the international community rather 
than domestic authorities. 1be onus for implementing education reform is 
however on the local education authorities themselves and indeed the 
authorities at state, entity and cantonal level bave committed themselves to 
implementing these documents, as well as international commitments such as 
the 2002 post-accession requirements for membership of the Council of Europe 
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which included the elimination of segregation in schools. Implementation of 
these documents remains incomplete, however, primarily because there is 
insufficient political will at the local level to meet the objectives in them and 
no state-level body with sufficient influence at the local level to ensure these 
objectives are met. Implementation of education reform documents is where 
the limits of international influence on the reform process lie. Attempts to 
impose decisions by the ~ ~ notably Paddy Ashdown, did not work. 
Even at the micro level, at the level of a particular school, the 
international community seems to have no leverage. This was the experience of 
education expert Gwyneth Owen-Jackson during her research on international 
involvement in education reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. She tells of her 
experience of working with an (unnamed) international organisation in a Croat-
majority area to find a way of getting a group of Bosniak students accepted at a 
local school where the Croatian director had maintained that there was no room 
in the school for the few pupils this would have involved. As she puts it: 'It had 
been hoped that the presence of an external expert outsider [herself], presenting 
objective evidence, would have persuaded the school director to change his 
position' (2008: 86) but in the event, despite being presented with a solution 
the school director's opinion remained unchanged. Owen-Jackson concludes: 
'The international organisation had no power or authority to take any further 
action' (2008: 86). 
Interviewees for this study were generally pessimistic about the 
international community's ability to directly effect change. Interviewee UO felt 
that the only way now open was through the 'carrot' of membership of the EU 
although, as the negative assessment in the European Union Progress Report 
cited above suggests, even this may not be enough to ensure that segregation in 
schools is eliminated. Interviewee CC said that change depended on 'good 
will' but conceded that this did not really exist in the political system. Both 
these interviewees felt that for change to occur the debate about education 
reform would have to shift from the political elite to the level of ordinary 
people, as interviewee CC put it, 
It is down to people understanding that it is for bettering the futme of their 
kids, for bettering their chances to, you know, enable them to be a model 
within in Europe, to enable them some sort of mobility and employability in 
Europe. And, I hope, you know, it takes a long time. 
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The above discussion of education refonn activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
since the end of the war was intended to show how the international 
community has approached education refonn in general. This was necessary as 
it provides the context in which the international community's approach to 
language must be seen. The next section of this chapter will go on to examine 
the particular ways in which segregation is maintained in schools and the way 
in which the language issue is used and manipulated in this. 
How segregation works in the school system 
There are two practices that are characteristic of the segregated school 
system in Bosnia-Herzegovina which have a significant language component: 
the 'two schools under one roof' system, and the introduction of the so-called 
national subjects in the school curriculum. This section of the chapter will look 
at each of these practices and analyse the role the language issue plays in them. 
The 'two schools under one roof' schools are mainly to be found in areas 
where there is a mixed Croat-Bosniak. population so the discussion on this 
practice will also address societal security issues which are used primarily by 
the Croatian community to justify the maintenance of segregated schooling. 
The most obvious fonn of school segregation are the 'two schools 
under one roof schools. These are schools where the student body comprises 
members of two ethnic groups but the pupils are separated along ethnic lines. 
The creation of these schools was seen as a solution to the problem of returnee 
children being educated in ad hoc schools set up in non-school buildings such 
as private houses and restaurants and to allow for more interaction between 
students of different ethnic groups. In many cases the school buildings are 
physically divided so that the different ethnic groups use different facilities and 
different entrances. Alternatively, instead of being physically separated in one 
building pupils may be taught in different shifts during the day so that pupils 
from different ethnic groups do not come into contact. There is also 
administrative separation along ethnic lines so that there are two principals, 
two school boards, two staff rooms for teachers and even in some cases 
different drivers for the school bus. 
The first 'two schools under one roof school opened in 2000 and like 
the introduction of the national group of subjects was a response to the need to 
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make it possible for returnee parents to have their children educated in the 
same system as existed in their area of displacement. After all every parent has 
the internationally recognised right to an acceptable education for their 
children i.e. one where the form and substance are relevant and culturally 
appropriate (ICESCR). Returnee parents could therefore accept or reject the 
education offered in the area of return and the 'two schools under one roof 
system was seen as a suitable way of accommodating this. These schools were 
initially tolerated by the international community as a way to encourage 
refugee return but only as a solution for one school year. After three years, 
however, the OSCE decided that these schools only exacerbated segregation 
and in 2003 the local authorities were instructed to reunify these schools. 
Despite repeated attempts by the international community to get these schools 
to reunify there are still about 54 such schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina with 
another two opening in Stolac (Herzegovina-Neretva canton), Capljina 
(Herzegovina-Neretva canton) and ProzorlRama (Herzegovina-Neretva canton) 
as late as the 2004-05 school year (OSCE website), that is after the OSCE had 
acted to try to do away with this type of school. 
'Two schools under one roof schools are mostly to be found in the 
three Federation cantons with a mixed Bosniak-Croatian population: Central 
Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva and Zenica-Doboj (there are none in the 
ethnically-homogeneous Republika Srpska). This is because these are the 
cantons covering the area where the Muslim-Croat conflict was fought in 1994 
which saw the forced deportation of large numbers of inhabitants and the 
establishment of areas dominated by one ethnic group. In Capljina, for 
example, before the war the croats made up 54 per cent of the population but 
now form the vast majority of the population. These are also areas to which 
refugees and displaced persons have returned which means that the local 
authorities are supposed to meet the returnees' educational needs according to 
the Interim Agreement. 
A 2007 OSCE report on catchment areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes 
the point that the phenomenon of 'two schools under one roof schools is a lot 
more complex and widespread than would appear at first sight. It gives 
numerous examples where one curriculum. is taught in the main school and 
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another in the branch schools l44 but the report also cites a local primary school 
in Maglaj (Zenica-Doboj canton) where the main school is entirely Bosniak but 
its branch schools in Bradici and Tujnica have separate schools with different 
curricula for Bosniak and Croat students respectively which are administered 
by different bodies (OSCE, 2007a: 22). So even though the student body in 
these schools do not appear to be as obviously split as in the 'two schools 
under one roof schools based in just one location, students of different ethnic 
groups are nevertheless taught according to different curricula. 
Interviewee VO, however, put the phenomenon of the 'two in one 
schools' into an even wider context of segregation throughout the school 
system, making the point that segregation in one form or another exists 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
If you're in Sarajevo you can't get Catholic religion or Orthodox religion in 
the schools, it is not offered and this is the capital! So there is segregation 
happening everywhere. I mean, the 2 in I s get the attention you know because 
for a while they each had their own entrance and their own playground and 
that was like an apartheid-like situation. 
This is a point that bears stressing. Because Bosnia-Herzegovina is generally 
divided into mono-ethnic areas, the vast majority of school children in Bosnia-
Herzegovina share a classroom with members of the same ethnic group and are 
taught according to the curriculum tailored to that ethnic group. A Bosniak 
child in Sarajevo, for example, would therefore most likely be taught according 
to the Bosnian curriculum without necessarily being taught anything about the 
Croatian language or about the Catholic religion.14S Even if they were taught 
according to the common core curriculum the national subjects would be 
taught from the Bosniak perspective and not necessarily with reference to the 
Croatian and Serbian populations. 
It was pointed out by interviewee LA that the international legal 
instruments detailed above are invoked by nationalist politicians, particularly 
Croatian politicians, as a way to justify calls for mono-etbnic education. As we 
saw in the previous chapter the official status of three separate languages was 
144 A branch school is part of a main school, though in a different location, but is not a legal 
body and as such it does not have its own administration (definition from the 2007 OSeE 
~ ~ Tailoring Catchment Areas, School Catchment Areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
1 In 2003 when my SOD attended a state kindergarten in Sarajevo the children and teachers 
celebrated the Muslim festivities associated with Bajram but there was no mention of 
Christmas, either Catholic or Orthodox, which occurred only a few weeks afterwards. 
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confinned in the Constitutional Court decision of 2000 so the Croats can claim 
that they have their own language and they are therefore entitled to education 
in this language according to the provisions of the human rights documents 
enumerated in the Dayton Peace Agreement (see the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child cited above ).146 Furthermore, the ECHR stipulation of 'the right of 
parents to ensure such education and teaching in confonnity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions'(Article 2 of Protocol no. 1) provides a 
legal basis for establishing a mono-ethnic school system that would cater for 
these convictions. Finally, it can also be argued that the existence of separate 
schools or parts of schools offering each of the different curricula ensures the 
pluralism in the school system which is seen as a positive aspiration in the 
international legal instruments (ECHR case law). In the case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, however, this pluralism is skewed by nationalist politicians who 
use it to facilitate the segregation of school children along ethnic lines rather 
than the integration of the ethnic groups. In allowing the creation of 'two 
schools under one roof schools the international community thus provided for 
'a plurality of institutions, rather than plural institutions' (Gallagher, 2005: 
430)147 which in effect plays into the hands of those politicians who seek to 
keep the ethnic groups apart. In effect, it makes a travesty of the whole concept 
of pluralism in schools. As shall be demonstrated later on in this chapter in the 
discussion about the school system in Brtko District, it is nevertheless possible 
to engage seriously with the concept of pluralism in schools in an ethnically-
divided community. 
Societal security and segregation in schools 
The survival of the 'two schools under one roof schools can also be 
seen in terms of societal security; in this regard local politicians use arguments 
regarding threats to language to increase the societal insecurity of their 
constituents and thereby justify their failure to reunify these schools. For 
example, in 2003, the then High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, fined the 
146 Interviewee LA also pointed out that in her experience, in private conversation many 
Croatian politicians would admit the absurdity of the official Bosnian Croat positim on the 
Ianguage but politically they would stand behind it. 
147 Gallagher's comment was an assessment of schools in Northern Ireland but is no less 
pertinent to the Bosnia-Herzegovina context for that. 
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HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) 20,000 eW'Os for obstructing the unification 
process in the Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva cantons. Two years 
later, in July 2005, at a time when the OHR was pushing for the adoption of 
amendments to the Law on Primary and Secondary Education in the Federation 
which, among other things, would have finally unified the 'two schools under 
one roof schools, the High Representative removed from office Nikola 
Lovrinovic, the minister of education of Central Bosnia Canton, for failure to 
implement the amendments that had already been adopted by the cantonal 
authorities.148 In both these cases, the failure to act on the part of the HDZ and 
Minister Lovrinovic was justified by the fear that implementation of the 
legally-required reunification would 'destroy' the Croatian language. Speaking 
after Ashdown had imposed his fme on the HDZ, the party president BariSa 
Colak said that cantonal HDZ personnel were afraid that unification of the 
school system would mean the end of the Croatian language in areas where the 
Bosniaks are in the majority. 149 
This claim is obviously illogical because school is not the only venue 
where a language is maintained; for example, the existence of Croatian-
language media especially from neighbouring Croatia also plays a role in 
ensuring that the language does not die out. Nevertheless, the education system 
is seen by the Croats as the primary channel through which the Croatian 
language is transferred and therefore maintained (Hrotnadfic, 2006: 556). 
Therefore, by using the rhetoric of the destruction of a language Colak's 
comment had a resonance that could increase the societal insecurity that Croats 
may feel in certain areas because the implication is that if the Croatian 
language is destroyed so is the Croatian nation. This then makes the Croats 
more protective of their language and more inclined to defend their ostensibly 
threatened linguistic heritage by refusing to accept any reform moves, such as 
141 Decision removing Nikola Lovrinovic from office available ftom the OUR website at 
http://www.ohr.intlprintncontent_id=3S013 [accessed on 2 March 2008] Several years later, 
in 2007, his successor, Greta Kuna, continued to support the 'two schools under one roof' 
schools with the justification that 'you can't mix apples md pears'. Report available at: 
http://chalkboard.tol.orWbosnia-and-berzegovina [accessed on 12 February 2010]. 
149 See report 'Doing Away with Segregation' by Anes Alit of I September 2003 on 
Transitions Online at 
http://wwwltol.c7llooklBRRItolprint.tpl?IdLanguage=1&ldPublication=9&Nrlssue=1 
[accessed on 3 March 2008] 
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the elimination of the 'two schools under one roof schools, that would restrict 
education in Croatian. 
The issue of the societal security of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is made more complex by the relationship between this community and the 
Croats in the kin state of Croatia. Here also we see how this impacts on the 
issue of language, or rather the issue of the purity of the language in schools. 
Heiko Wimmen (2004) explains the position of the Croats as one of being in a 
'trapped minority,150 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats are trapped in the 
sense that they are 'a segment of a larger group spread across at least two 
states' and 'an appendix to the fully incorporated nation-state of Croatia, and a 
solid majority of them feels vocal and sincere frustration about this state of 
affairs, making it easy for nationalist ideology to cast them in the role of a 
disenfranchised community on the verge of "cultural genocide" aided in that by 
a few Bosniak chauvinists' (Wimmen, 2004). The role of language in this is to 
integrate the Croats into the 'imagined community' of the mother-nation 
'through performative acts of symbolic defense (securing a nationalized 
territory by asserting the hegemony of the language over it)' (Wimmen, 2004 -
citing Anderson) but also to draw a linguistic boundary between them and the 
other two ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Wimmen takes this further 
with the assertion that if the borders with the other communities need to be 
emphasised in order to reduce the border between the Bosnian Croats and the 
mother-nation of Croatia, and language is the device to do this, then it is not 
enough just to adopt the language norms of the mother tongue but the language 
must also 'be cleansed of everything that may smack of the Other (beyond the 
imagined border), and intrusions or contamination by his language must also be 
avoided at all cost' (Wimmen, 2004). From this point of view segregated 
schooling whereby Croatian school children are kept apart from the school 
children of the other ethnic groups so that they can receive 100010 Croatian-
language schooling makes perfect sense. This also makes sense in the context 
of societal insecurity as moves to increase their proximity to the kin state 
would be a way of increasing their societal security although it would also 
create a societal security dilemma if one of the other ethnic groups felt 
ISO Following Israeli anthropologist Dan Rabinowitz's concept of a trapped minority to 
describe the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel. 
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threatened by this. The Bosniaks, for example, may feel threatened if they 
interpreted these moves to undermine the integrity of the state of which they 
are the greatest champions. 
The importance of this striving to keep the Croatian language pure was 
highlighted in research conducted by Azra HromadZic regarding the integration 
of the Mostar Gymnasium (2008). This school is administratively unified but 
the mixed (Croat and Bosniak) student body are taught separately according to 
different curricula. HromadZic found that opposition from the Croatian 
community to the integration of the school where it had originally been 
foreseen that Croat and Bosniak students would sit together in the same 
classroom was based on threats to the pure Croatian language as the Croat 
pupils would be exposed to influences from the speech of the Bosniak pupils. 
This was seen in terms of rendering the Croat pupils illiterate. HromadZic cites 
the opinion of 'one of the most influential individuals in charge of education in 
west Mostar' lSI (2008: 557) who explained this view. In the following extracts 
'M' is the education official; it should be borne in mind that HromadZic is a 
Bosniak and both she and M were educated in the pre-war system: 
M: You and I are now talking mjesanac (mixed language) so that we can 
understand each other. We have to recognize the fact that both of us were 
educated under the old system, in the old language, Serbo-Croatian or Croato-
Serbian. That is how we learned. But that was an artificial language, neither 
Serb nor Croat. If one were to write an essay in that language today, it would 
be [judged as] illiterate .... We are speaking mjesanac now, but the children 
today, they'd have problems, they wouldn't understand each other. 
Mgoeson: 
if you teach these kids a little bit in this language, a little bit in that 
language ... use some of these words, and then some of the others, ... these kids 
would be illiterate, because they wouldn't speak any language but a mixture of 
languages ... and that means illiteracy (2008: 557). 
This view is interesting because aside from disavowing the pre-confiict 
approach to language what M is saying is patently not true. Children from the 
two ethnic groups understand each other perfectly well and are able to socialise 
with each other outside school hours despite the slight differences in their 
speech. Moreover, illiteracy is an extreme claim to make because the 
differences in the languages are so slight that the use of certain ethnically-hued 
lSI The Croatian part of Mostar which since the war has been divided between Croats and 
Bosniaks. 
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lexical items or syntax, for example, would not impinge on a student's ability 
to master their own language. Furthermore, by invoking the risk of some kind 
of handicap in the form of illiteracy M is inferring that not only is there no 
value in a pluralist education for Croats but it puts the academic future of the 
Croat youth in jeopardy. HromadZic found this view repeated by Croat students 
who feared that if they used words they had picked up from Bosnian speakers 
in their exams at Zagreb university they would fail. It should be remembered 
here that Croatian students from Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to go on to higher 
education in Zagreb or elsewhere in Croatia. As HromadZic notes, 'possible 
integration is interpreted as a road to a personal failure of performing Croatness 
at the capital of the imagined national community, Zagreb' (2008: 558). This 
'performance of Croatness' is important not only because Croat students from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to study in Croatia but also because of the 
relationship between the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats in 
Croatia. Wimmen makes the point that the latter have traditionally viewed the 
former as 'Croats of dubious national purity' and 'uncivilized country and 
highland ruffians' (2004). This has engendered a feeling of inferiority among 
the Bosnian Croats who now feel that they need to be more Croat than the 
Croats in Croatia in order to be accepted, thus their speech must be lOOper 
cent pure. 
The idea of preserving the purity of the language harks back to the 
Ustasha policy during the Second World War of creating a pure Croatian 
nation. At that time the impetus for the creation of this pure nation of Croats 
came from Zagreb in a bid to create as large a Croatian community as possible; 
now, however, it is the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina for whom membership 
of a Croatian nation is perhaps more important because relations with the kin-
state have changed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement During 
the war, the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina received significant military, 
political, financial and other support from the Croatian government and at the 
same time, hard-line Herzegovinian Croats exercised a certain amount of 
influence with the authorities in Zagreb. But since the end of the war and the 
subsequent death of President Franjo Twtman this relationship has changed, 
especially as Croatia moves towards membership of the European Union. As a 
result, the Bosnian Croats cannot count on support from Zagreb for any moves 
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to change the constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, in 
his memoir on his time as High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Paddy 
Ashdown describes receiving a message from Croatian President Stipe Mesic 
in November 2002 offering his support in dealing 'with the Croats' in Bosnia-
Herzegovina should he need it (2007: 256). 
This changed relationship with Croatia may make the Bosnian Croats 
feel more vulnerable because as the smallest ethnic group in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (making up around 14 per cent of the population of the state and 
30 per cent of the Federation) they would feel threatened by any attempt by the 
Bosniaks and Serbs that they perceive as denying them their status as a 
constituent people. Hroma<ffic, for example, found that Croats in Mostar felt 
threatened by talk of the integration of the Mostar Gymnasium as they saw 
integration in tenns of assimilation into the dominant Bosniak community and 
the 'related loss of ethnocultural identity' (2008: 554). She also found that 
once the OSCE, which was the international organisation working on this issue 
in Mostar, changed its vocabulary and started talking about 'reunification' or 
'administrative reunification' focusing on the return of the Bosniak students to 
the school rather than integrated classrooms and the common core curriculum, 
moves to change its structure were more palatable to the local Croat population 
(2008: 559). 
This fundamental societal insecurity felt by the Croats explains why 
they are so vocal in defending their linguistic rights in the schooling system. If 
they feel threatened by the two much larger ethnic groups and insufficiently 
supported by the kin state then they defend themselves by stressing their ethno-
linguistic identity as much as they can. Consolidating and protecting this 
identity within the schooling system then means that it is preserved for future 
generations. In their view segregation in schools is therefore justified and 
desimble. 
The idea of the purity of the language throws up the question of who 
the arbiter of language purity is in the sense of who decides whether someone 
is speaking pure Croatian or not. If we recall the discussion in the Introduction 
to this thesis about the territorial spread of dialects throughout the territory of 
the fonner Yugoslavia and the fact that a Croat in Mostar, for example, would 
speak slightly differently to a Croat in Zagreb, then the question to be asked is 
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which one would speak or at least be able to recognise 'pure' Croatian? This 
question raises several issues to do with the power relations between the 
speakers of the three languages particularly in a school setting and the person 
who is perceived or perceives themselves as the arbiter of language purity 
wields the most power. For example, Heilm Wimmen, recounts the experiences 
of a multi-national NGO which wanted to organise a workshop for students at 
the Mostar Gymnasium on reproductive health and sexually transmitted 
diseases. The director of the school allowed this on condition that it be held in 
'proper Croatian'. The members of the NGO agreed to this and its members, 
who were both Croatian and Bosniak did their best to speak this Croatian. 
Afterwards the director criticised the 'faulty' Croatian of both the Bosniak and 
Croatian members of the NGO and refused to sign the acknowledgement letter 
required by the foreign donor organisation funding the activity (Wimmen, 
2004). By rejecting the language in which the workshop was conducted the 
school director confirmed the linguistic barrier between the two ethnic groups 
for the Bosniak workshop leaders, thus reinforcing their alienation from the 
Croats, and at the same time implies to the Croatian workshop leaders that they 
have somehow failed in their 'performance of Croatness' (Hromadtic, 2008: 
558) thus making them 'bad' Croats. The implication here is that by socialising 
with the Bosniak workshop leaders the Croats have contaminated their own 
language and thus failed their own ethnic group. In this respect it is the school 
director who wields the power in deciding not only a fellow Croat's linguistic 
competence but their competence to be a Croat. 
This example also shows how language issues can overshadow all 
others. The school director seems not to have bad any objections to the content 
of the workshop which, surely, is an important one for teenagers of all ethnic 
groups. By emphasising an aspect of the form of the workshop the school 
director detracts attention away from its actual content and undermines its 
importance. The implication is that it is more important to be a 'good' Croat 
speaking 'pure' Croatian than it is to be a sexually responsible adult. 
Power relations between teachers and pupils can be disrupted in a 
different way over the question of the arbiter of language purity. Wimmen 
(2004) cites examples ofBosniak teachers having their speech openly corrected 
by Croatian pupils. This undermines the authority of the teacher and alters the 
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attitude of all the pupils to the teacher. Moreover, relations between Croatian 
and Bosniak teachers in a given school may be affected if Croatian teachers are 
seen to be more effective in the classroom than the Bosniak teachers. 
The above discussion served to show how the question of the language 
of instruction in a school can be used as a way to keep school children apart 
and how this is particularly manipulated in the 'two schools under one roof 
schools. The next section deals with the other way of dividing the student body 
using language but this time using language as a subject in the curriculum as 
one of the national group of subjects. 
The national group of subjects 
The national group of subjects appears on the face of it to be good 
practice because it allows pupils from different ethnic groups to at least attend 
school together and have some classes together. As education expert Philip 
Stabback has pointed out, 'in modem curriculum and school systems, these 
subjects are used to strengthen social cohesion, to encourage debate, to 
promote tolerance and understanding of students' own and other cultures, and 
to ensure the development of infonned, critical, personal views of the world' 
(2004: 53). But, as Stabback goes on to say, 
It could also be argued, however, that the creation of the category of national 
subjects in BiH gives narrow-minded ethnic ideologues the opportunity to 
stifle debate, to use education to promulgate narrow 'nationalist' philosophies, 
and to present young people with inappropriate and sometimes inaccurate 
views of other cultural groups (Stabback, 2004: 53). 
Thus we have the national group of subjects reflecting Bush and Saltarelli's 
two faces of education as both constructive and destructive. 
The latter view was borne out by a 2006 study conducted jointly by the 
Open Society Fund of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the proMente social research 
agency into the content of textbooks used in primary and secondary schools 
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina for the national group of subjects: language 
and literature (what the researchers called 'mother tongue'), history, geography 
and religion. The research focused on textbooks used in the fifth, sixth, 
seventh, eighth and ninth grade of primary school and all grades of secondary 
school in the 2005-2006 school year. All these textbooks had been previously 
approved for use by the appropriate ministries of education. The researchers 
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analysed the content of the textbooks, as well as their appearance, adherence to 
pedagogical standards and encouragement of the development of critical 
thinking. The study covered a total of 145 textbooks of which 61 were for 
language and literature. 
The basic question addressed in the research was to what extent the 
textbooks promote social cohesion and encourage a positive attitude among 
pupils towards their own state (2006: 11). Social cohesion and the 
encouragement of a positive attitude are two elements of the Education Reform 
Strategy and the 2003 Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education. 
The study showed that the textbooks of the national group of subjects 
encouraged segregation because they are mono-ethnic and do not provide 
knowledge and skills for life in a multi-ethnic society. Moreover, the majority 
of textbooks do not contribute to developing a feeling of belonging to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This is hardly surprising since the study found that most of the 
textbooks used in Bosnian Croat schools, for example, had been adopted from 
Croatia and the Croatian curriculum so that the point of reference for the 
material in the textbooks was Croatia and the Croatian people, language, 
literature and cultural heritage. One example cited in the study was approved 
by the ministries of education, science, culture and sport of five cantons IS2 even 
though it included the sentence: 
Moja zemlja zove se Hrvatska (My country is called Croatia) (2006: 
43). 
The study pointed out that textbooks for the Serbian curriculum were 
'borrowed' from Serbia but to a considerably lesser extent. The Bosnian 
curriculum also stressed only one people and language but it nevertheless 
highlighted belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina. A specific element of the 
Bosnian textbooks, however, was the tendency to 'ijekavianise' works of 
literature originally written in ekavian, for example, the works of the Serbian 
poet Branko Miljkovic (2006:72). The study considered that 'This process has 
the consequence of impoverishing the knowledge and vocabulary of 
students,IS3 (2006: 80). This is because this practice narrows students' 
experience of the world outside of their own ethnic group and implies that only 
lS2 Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Herceg Bosna, Posavina and Western Herzegovina. 
lS3 Ovaj proces ima :za posljedicu osiromdenje manja i rjemika ubmika. 
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works rendered in ijekavian are worth reading. It also creates the impression 
that works need to be translated from ekavian to ijekavian for the sake of 
comprehensibility when this is patently not true, thus bolstering the idea of 
separate and distinct languages. 
The study concluded, among other things, that: 
through the content of textbooks ruling ideologies are actively contributing to 
the creation of antagonisms and the further disintegration of society. Although 
not present to an equal extent in textbooks in the Bosnian, Croatian and 
Serbian curricula these textbooks especially in the mother tongue nevertheless 
serve as instruments for division on a national basis I S4 (2006: 184). 
It can therefore be seen that the teaching of the national group of subjects does 
not promote social cohesion, tolerance and an identity linked to the state rather 
than the ethnic group but, rather, consolidates the divisions between the ethnic 
groups and bolsters the separate ethnically-based identities. In this sense the 
pledge in the ERS of ensuring education 'that is free from political, religious, 
cultural and other bias and discrimination' (pledge 1) has not been met, nor has 
the objective in the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education of 
'developing awareness of commitment to the state of BiH' and 'learning about 
others and different by respecting the differences and cultivating mutual 
understanding and solidarity among all people, ethnic groups and communities 
in BiH' (Article 1.3). 
An effort was made in the Framework Law on Primary and Secondary 
Education to cut down the amount of time that school children spent in 
separate classes with the introduction of a common core curriculum. The aim 
of this common core curriculum was to hannonise the three ethnically-based 
curricula as regards the non-controversial subjects to the maximum extent This 
was in part intended to facilitate the mobility of school children, especially 
returnee children, throughout the system because if all school children were 
learning according to the same curriculum they could move from one part of 
the country to another without being educationally disadvantaged at least in the 
non-national subjects. It is, however, important to bear in mind that only the 
core of the curriculum is meant to be common for all pupils and not the whole 
1st vladajuee ideologije kroz sadliaj wHbenika aktivno doprinose stvaranju antagonizama i 
daljnoj dezintegraciji druAtva. Iako to oije u podjednakoj mjeri prisutno u udf.benicima u 
bosanskom, hrvatskom i srpskom NPP [cuniculum], ipak ovi udf.benici, naJ"()(!ito matemjijezik 
81m kao instrumenti za razdvajanje po nacionalnoj osnovi. 
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of the curriculum as the core does not include the national subjects. This means 
that 70-80 per cent of material is common to all the curricula but less than 50 
per cent in the national subjects so even though variation in instruction has 
been reduced school children are still spending much of their time in separate 
classes or learning different things according to their ethnic affiliation. 
Moreover, this curriculum has not been implemented throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina as it is mainly being used in the Federation while school children 
in the Republika Srpska are still being taught according to the Serbian 
curriculum so there is still limited consistency in school instruction across the 
two entities. 
The above discussion was intended to demonstrate the role that 
language issues play in the segregation that exists throughout the schooling 
system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this regard we have seen that language is an 
issue from the point of view of both the structure of the system in the sense of 
the kind of education and schools that are made available to pupils and the 
content of what a child learns in school once they get there. In this regard 
language appears to have a destructive function. This is not the case 
everywhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, though. In BItko District, for example, 
there has been a different approach to education refonn which has generally 
been successful in dealing with the language issue in endeavours to create an 
integrated school system. The next section of the chapter will therefore look in 
detail at the education reform that has been carried out in the district especially 
as it pertains to the language issue and examine the lessons of the B r ~ k o o
experience for education reform in the rest of the country. 
Breko District 
BItko is a municipality in the north-east of Bosnia-Herzegovina which 
covers an area of 493 square kilometres. It has rich agricultural land, as well as 
a port on the Sava river which provides trade links along the Danube with 
Belgrade (Jeffrey, 2005: 204). Prior to the war the municipality had a multi-
ethnic population which was 45% Bosniak, 21 % Serb, 25% Croat and 10% 
Yugoslav and others (OSCE 2007b: 5). During the contlict the Serbs 
considered it to be strategically important as a link between the two halves of 
the Republika Srpska and a route to the Serb Krajina region of Croatia, and in 
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April 1992 Serb forces occupied the municipality. At war's end B r ~ k o o had a 
majority Serbian population and a smaller Bosniak population with the Croats 
the smallest of the three main ethnic groups. During the Dayton peace 
negotiations the fate of B r ~ k o o was a highly contentious issue because the 
Bosniak and Croat delegates argued that awarding the municipality to the Serbs 
would be tantamount to rewarding ethnic cleansing and would also deprive 
them of access to the Sava River. The Serbs countered that without B r ~ k o o the 
Republika Srpska would be split in two and therefore would not be a viable 
territory (Jeffrey, 2005: 209). In the end a compromise was reached whereby 
B ~ k o o was put under international arbitration for one year after which a final 
decision on its status would be made. 
In the event it took four years to reach a final settlement. In the frrst 
year after the war, the focus of the international community was on practical 
issues to do with post-war reconstruction and after a year neither side could 
agree on a final settlement (OSeE, 2007b: 6). In February 1997, therefore, the 
international community set up a B ~ k o o supervisory body to be administered 
by a Deputy High Representative with authority over the running of the 
municipality; the Supervisor was subsequently awarded the same Bonn powers 
as the High Representative. The Final Award issued in March 1999 established 
the District of B r ~ k o o as a 'condominium' whose territory was both a part of the 
Federation and the RS so therefore did not belong wholly to either. The 
international community extended the international supervisory body until such 
time as the District Supervisor deemed the institutions were functioning 
'effectively and apparently permanently' OSCE 2007b: 6) The completion of 
the Final Award requirements is one of the five objectives and two conditions 
set by the PIC for ending the OHR mandate. 
As regards refonn of the education system, the international Supervisor 
was given a clear mandate to carry out refonn in an annex to the Final Award 
which stipulated that 'the Supervisor will integrate the District's educational 
system, harmonise curricula within the District, and ensure the removal of 
teaching material which the Supervisor considers to be inconsistent with the 
objective of creating a democratic, multi-ethnic society within the District' 
(Annex to Final Award, 18 August 1999, point II as cited in OSCE report). 
Need for refonn of the education system came to the fore though in 2000 after 
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riots by more than 1,000 Bosnian Serb students protesting against the 
introduction of multi-ethnic schooling. It is thought that these riots were not 
just about education reform but reflected the opposition of hardliners to 
integration in general in the District and their continued disgruntlement at the 
Final Award (Perry, 2003: 78). 
The Supervisor proposed a new law on education which carefully laid 
out integration of both the primary and secondary school systems and 
established a Department of Education. The law was opposed in the District 
Assembly by Serb delegates but was imposed by the Supervisor on 5 July 
2001. 
From the point of view of language, the education law contains the 
principle that the students have the freedom to express themselves in their own 
language and should be issued school documents in the language and alphabet 
they or their parents request. In addition, Article 9 of the law states that, 'The 
Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian languages, and the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets 
shall be used in equal terms in realisation of curricula and facultative activities 
in primary and secondary schools in the District' (OSCE 2007b: 7) This 
provision is reflected in the Code of Conduct that the teachers who were hired 
to work in the new system were required to sign. I 55 In signing this Code of 
Conduct the teachers undertake to teach using all three languages. In practice 
this means that each teacher is allowed to use their mother tongue in general 
communication but they must explain different words used and answer children 
with the appropriate national vocabulary. In a 2007 OSCE report on the 
education reforms in Bltko, the example given is that when a teacher is 
teaching geometry they must use two different words for the word 'angle' 
which is ugao in Bosnian and Serbian and /cut in Croatian (2007b: 17). This 
was the practice in classrooms in the former Yugoslavia where students 
essentially absorbed the different terminology without any special attention 
being paid to the ethnic hue of a particular word and without separate classes 
for the different norms. Interviewee LB, for example, who was at school in the 
fifties and sixties, related how dwing biology lessons the pupils were taught 
ISS Teachers in the existing system were fired and then re-hired on condition that they sign the 
Code of Conduct and thereby commit themselves to the reforms. 
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two options for the word for 'cell' (ce/ija and stanica) and how their biology 
textbooks came from Croatia and Serbia. 
The equal status of the two alphabets is also reflected in practice in the 
classroom. In the first grade of primary school, Serbian children are taught the 
Cyrillic alphabet first while the Croatian and Bosniak children are taught the 
Latin alphabet first but then each group of children learns the other alphabet in 
the first semester of the second grade. According to the 2007 OSCE report, 
both sets of students are taught the two alphabets at the same time with the 
blackboard divided in half with one script on each side. Once the students have 
learned both alphabets teachers use each script for all subjects in alternate 
weeks regardless of whether the class is mixed or mono-ethnic. 
This approach represents what is meant in the ECHR when it comes to 
pluralism in education. Teaching the three languages and two alphabets in this 
way means that not only do pupils have access and contact with the languages 
of the other two ethnic groups but they are also being taught that the languages 
are not dissimilar and there is no reason for segregation along ethno-linguistic 
lines. Moreover, they are not being taught a mono-ethnic view of the world but 
one that is commensurate with life in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state. 
Another key element of education reform was the development of a 
new curriculum, harmonising the three pre-existing ethnically-based curricula. 
This was achieved through the establishment of several working groups 
composed mostly of teachers from Btiko, as well as other education experts, 
rather than with input from politicians. The basic principle behind the 
curriculum was that students should spend as much time as possible learning 
together. This means that the content of the national group of subjects is 
harmonised to a greater extent than in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
According to the OSCE Education Officer for Btiko District, cited in the 2007 
OSCE report, on average students spend less than 25-30 per cent of their lesson 
time separated by nationality and in some cases students spend as much as 80 
or 90 per cent together. For mother tongue instruction students spend 50 per 
cent of their time in a mixed class and 50 per cent in separate classes 
(elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina students would spend more than 50 per cent 
of their time separated from students of another ethnic group). 
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The new curriculum was implemented at the beginning of the 2001-
2002 school year, and children of different ethnic groups began to attend 
school together for the fIrst time in more than a decade. Ethnic insignia and 
symbols were removed from all schools before the beginning of the year and 
all primary schools were given new, ethnically neutral names which were 
numbers or geographical or vocational designations (OSCE, 2007: 8).156 The 
new integrated schooling began immediately in primary schools but was 
introduced gradually over several years for secondary schools. By the 2004-
2005 school year there were no mono-ethnic classes in schools. 
Despite the successful establishment of an integrated school system in 
Brcko there is a percentage of students who still go to mono-ethnic schools. 
This is partly because in rural areas they live in mono-ethnic areas but it is also 
because a certain number of parents, as elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, still 
prefer to ignore catchment areas and send their children to a school which they 
consider may offer a better education or where their ethnic group is in the 
majority. The OSeE 2007 report argues though that the success of the 
integrated school system can be measured in the attitudes of the students 
attending the integrated schools. In interviews conducted with students it was 
found that 'although children still identify with a particular nationality and 
language, all those interviewed were very positive about integration at school 
and within Brcko, as well as about their futures. All said they were friends with 
children from other ethnic groups' (2007b:13). 
The OSCE is now pushing the Brcko experience as a model for the 
education system in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina however the conditions 
prevailing in the district may be too specifIc to make the Breko model easily 
applicable to the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. First of all, Breko District covers 
less than 1 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the education 
department has responsibility for only 15 primary schools and four secondary 
schools. The question then is how easily Breko practice could be applied in a 
much larger area where there are a lot more schools, teachers and students to 
deal with. 
156 Only the Vaso PeIagit Gymnasimn retained its name as it had not been changed during the 
war. 
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Secondly, as Perry points out, 'the Brcko Supervisor's powers have in 
many ways made the district an internal protectorate; an American "fiefdom" 
that has managed its affairs in a very different environment than that of the rest 
of the country' (2003: 80). The Final Award gave the Supervisor (who has so 
far been a US official) a clear mandate to refonn the education system and the 
powers to impose it if necessary without seeking the agreement of local 
politicians. Is7 He used precisely these powers when the District Assembly itself 
failed to pass the education law. Moreover, the 2007 OSeE report on education 
refonn in Brcko made the point that the Brcko refonn was helped by the fact 
that no elections were held between 1998 and late 2004 and the District was 
instead governed by an ethnically-balanced Assembly appointed by the 
Supervisor. This meant that there was no opportunity for local politicians to 
use education as a divisive campaign issue as has been the case in the rest of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
This suggests that the Brcko model of education refonn can only be 
implemented in conditions that are essentially undemocratic. Although it can 
be argued that the imposition of relevant legislation by the international 
Supervisor and the absence of elections meant that the local political parties 
could not use education refonn as a political football, thereby facilitating the 
smooth implementation of reform, the BItko experience nevertheless illustrates 
the disconnection between the avowed aim of the Dayton Peace Agreement to 
create a liberal democratic state and the apparent necessity of implementing 
reform in a controlled undemocratic environment to ensure success. 
Furthermore, the BItko experience highlights the organisational 
shortcomings of the education reform in the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Whereas elsewhere the international community's approach to education 
reform was unfocussed and ill-defined with no single organisation guiding the 
reform, at least initially, the reform process in BItko was facilitated by the fact 
that it was led by just one body with a clear mandate for reform and with 
specific and defined policies. 
IS7 Florian Bieber characterises the BItko District as 'a full protectorate' in contrast to the rest 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina which he terms an 'informal semi-protectorate' (2005: 426). This 
means that there were no parallel ethnically-based power structures which would have hindered 
the direct interventions of the Supervisor. 
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Thirdly, Brcko has also benefited from a high concentration of money 
from the international community, as well as attention and expertise (perry, 
2003:80). For example, the policy of hiring teachers at higher salaries to those 
in the rest of the country required increased funds as did teacher training to 
ensure teacher commitment to the new curriculum and a teaching approach 
sensitive to the different ethnicities. Now, 15 years since the end of the war and 
at a time of 'donor fatigue' and the international community increasingly 
looking to disengage from Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be difficult to 
generate the required level of financial support and interest from the 
international community as regards similar moves in the rest of the country. 
After all DO made the point above that the OSCE's Education Reform Strategy 
had most success in its first year when there was most international pressure on 
local actors to implement reform. Similarly, the OSCE 2007 report made it 
clear that continued pushing from the international community was crucial for 
the success of future reform and changes. Therefore it could be argued that any 
future absence of international interest in education reform in both Brcko and 
the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina would impact negatively on the successes that 
have been achieved so far. 
The interviewees for this study were generally positive about the Breko 
experience although interviewee RA felt that despite the success 'there is not 
really anywhere which has cracked integration'. Interviewee LA was very 
impressed with what they saw during visits to schools in the District in a 
professional capacity and thought that teacher training was key to the success 
of the Breko reform. Interviewees NA and RC thought that the Brcko model 
could be applied elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina with some modifications 
depending on the location. NA stressed, however, that it was essential to raise 
awareness among ordinary people that progressive changes are a good thing. 
This was done at the start of the reform process in Breko when public 
awareness campaigns were organised to help ensure support for the changes 
among the general population. Interestingly, none of the interviewees 
mentioned the very specific, essentially undemocratic conditions in which 
education reform was implemented in Breko. 
Possibly the most significant aspect of the Breko experience is that it 
proves that it is possible to establish an integrated school system in a deeply-
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divided state such as Bosnia-Herzegovina albeit with a high level of 
international funding and in conditions of a full international protectorate. It 
challenges the views of those nationalists who claim that multi-ethnic 
education leads to assimilation and loss of identity. As the OSeE's 2007 
report put it, education in Brcko 'shows that children of different nationalities 
can commingle in schools without losing their own national identities' 
(2007:25). From the point of view of language the Brcko experience shows 
that three different languages can be accommodated in one system without the 
necessity of splitting the student body into their different ethnic groups and 
keeping them apart as much as possible. lss It bears repeating in this regard that 
many of the strategies currently employed in the classroom in Brcko are similar 
to those used in classrooms throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1945-1990 
period when policy favoured the teaching of the common language and the 
idea was to accommodate the needs of the different ethnic groups without 
resorting to segregation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen that language is used in different ways to 
maintain the segregation that exists in schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Firstly, 
the three curricula that are used in schools - Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian -
are designated according to language; language thus serves to split the student 
body and allows members of one ethnic group to be excluded from schools or 
parts of schools attended by pupils of another ethnic group. It is also a tool 
which political elites use to justify the existence of segregated schools and 
defend their failure to integrate them. Furthermore, as a subject in the 
curriculum and as a medium of instruction it is used to provide students with 
the linguistic basis for a mono-ethnic view of the society they live in and 
influence their attitudes to social cohesion and life in the joint state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In short, language as it is used in the education system in most of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina has a destructive function. This function was brought out 
lSI Interestingly, this may not be a lesson relevant to anywhere outside the Balkans since one 
factor why the Bltko system works is the very closeness of the languages. It would no doubt 
be more complex in a school system where there are three very different languages which are 
mutually incomprehensible. 
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in the discussion of the attitudes of members of the Croatian community to 
integration in the case of the Mostar Gymnasium. 
This destructive function of language is contrasted with the experience 
of education refonn in Brcko District where the approach to the language issue 
is more constructive. All three languages are accommodated in the classroom 
so that all students are acquainted with not just their own mother tongue but 
also those of the other two ethnic groups, and although mother tongue 
instruction is still one of the national group of subjects students spend less time 
in separate classes than those elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, in de-
stressing the differences between the languages and providing a view of 
language that encompasses all three languages, this approach more 
constructively bolsters the identity-formation aims of the peace-building 
process. 
The international community's approach to the language issue stems 
from its approach to education refonn in general. Education refonn was not 
mentioned in the Dayton Peace Agreement as an area warranting particular 
international attention in the post-war peace-building process. The international 
community did not therefore initially have a well-conceived and coordinated 
approach to education reform, let alone a language policy specifically 
concerned with language issues in education. Rather, the international 
community dealt with language problems indirectly and only as they related to 
its other policies. Segregation in schools, for example, was addressed by the 
international community in the context of the return of refugees and IDPs. This 
was deemed to be an essential aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement (for the 
first time in international legal practice refugees and lOPs were given the right 
to return not just to their home country but to their actual homes) and an 
important indicator of the success of the agreement as a whole. Therefore much 
international attention was focussed on encouraging people to return to the 
homes that they had been forced to abandon during the war. The 'two schools 
under one roof' schools and the introduction of the national group of subjects -
two practices where language plays a crucial role in maintaining segregation -
were initially approved and supported by the international community in order 
to facilitate this aim. It was not foreseen by the international community, 
however, that these initially temporary measures would become 
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'semipennanent' (HromadZic, 2008:554) practices and would be subverted by 
local political elites in order to maintain the segregation that they were meant 
to help eradicate. The discussion in this chapter of societal security and 
attitudes to language among the Croatian community of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
demonstrated the emotional resonance that language and language issues have 
for individuals that helps these divisive practices endure. 
Throughout the research for this study a question that has come to the 
fore is, how important is language in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina? This was a 
question I put to fonner High Representative Lord (Paddy) Ashdown in an 
interview for this study in relation to education refonn and specifically the 'two 
schools under one roof' policy. His response was: 
So language was a second tier issue in comparison with those others but it was 
one that we knew we would have to come to sooner or later. The first thing 
was to get them into the same bloody class, actually the first thing was to get 
them under the same roof and then into the same classroom. And then teaching 
to a common curriculum, what language would that have been in? All those 
issues are important. 
At first sight Lord Ashdown seems to be suggesting that there is some kind of 
hierarchy of issues to be addressed when dealing with segregation in the 
education system and that the issue of getting pupils of different ethnic groups 
into the same classroom can be divorced from the question of what language 
they would then be taught in once they got to that classroom. I would argue, 
however, that the issue of language cannot be divorced from the issue of 
segregation and it is actually unhelpful to think of them as separate issues at 
different points on a list of priorities. As we have seen in this chapter, as a tool 
that is used to maintain segregation language is part and parcel of the 
segregation issue and needs to be dealt with as such. Therefore a lesson for the 
international community from the experience of education refonn in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is that in a post-conflict, ethnically-divided state where societal 
insecurity is salient education refonn must take into account the power that 
language has as a marker of ethnic identity. An appreciation of the way in 
which language issues feed into other policies targeted at non-linguistic goals 
is important for understanding how language issues can affect the achievement 
of other policy goals. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that in the 
education system language can be put to many uses to help exacerbate the 
problems that external peace-building endeavours are intended to solve. In 
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such circumstances an appropriate language policy would be designed to 
mitigate the possible detrimental effects of language issues in the education 
system. 
Having looked in this chapter at an aspect of post-confiict peace-
building in which the interplay between language and the issues of societal 
security and identity formation are crucial we will now move on in the next 
chapter to look at the language issue from the perspective of another aspect of 
post-confiict reform, namely, the defence reform. Here, the issue of language is 
not reflected in issues to do with the international community's approach to 
identity formation but in the translation and interpretation practice of the 




International Community Language Policy in 
Defence Reform 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I looked at the area of education reform in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the role of the international community in this, focussing on 
the impact its actions have on the interplay between language issues and 
broader peace-building aims. lIDs chapter will deal with language issues as 
they relate to military aspects of the peace. The aim is to contrast the approach 
of the international community to language issues in this area of reform with its 
approach in the field of education reform. 
There are differences in the general approaches that were taken by the 
international community to each of these areas of reform. For example, 
education reform received scant mention in the Dayton Peace Agreement and 
no international organisation was specifically given the mandate in 1995 for 
guiding it. In contrast, and as can be expected of an agreement to end a 
conflict, military issues are dealt with in detail in the Agreement (in annexes 1-
A, 1-8 and 2), with responsibility for ensuring implementation of the military 
aspects of the Agreement entrusted to a NATO-led Implementation Force 
(IFOR).159 
Similarly, in the field of language policy, there are differences too in 
what the focus of such a policy would be in the two sectors. In the field of 
education reform because the issue of three languages feeds into issues of 
identity formation and nation-building, had the international community had a 
language policy it would have related first of all to the international 
community's approach to language as a significant marker of ethnic identity. It 
would therefore have impacted on the existence of the practices that 
159 IFOR was succeeded by SFOR (the Stabilisation Force) in December 1996 which in tum 
was followed by EUFOR (the European Force) in December 2004 with the launch of 
Operation Althea. EUFOR initially bad 6,300 members but now numbers 2,200. Members of 
the force come from 25 nations most of which are EU member states although a number, such 
as Albania, Chile and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are not member states of 
theEU. 
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consolidate segregation such as the 'two schools under one roof schools and 
the national group of subjects. In this regard a language policy would influence 
the substance of the refonn and therefore what the school children of Bosnia-
Herzegovina are taught in the classroom. This in tum means that a language 
policy would touch on the concerns of a vast array of stakeholders (including 
local politicians, teachers and parents) who may have different attitudes and 
interests when it comes to identity and the protection of their particular ethnic 
group. For example, as argued in the last chapter, local politicians approach 
language as a tool to maintain the ethnic segregation in schools and hinder the 
peace-building process. A language policy specifically related to education 
would therefore have a more far-reaching impact going beyond the confines of 
the internal procedures of the international organisations involved in this 
sphere. 
In contrast, the language issue has a different role to play in defence 
refonn than in the education reform. It does not impact on the substance of 
defence refonn in the way that it influences, for example, what is in the school 
curricula. Language is an issue, however, when it comes to the production of 
official documents and the translation and interpretation practices of the 
international military force in its dealings with the local military and 
governmental authorities and local people. In this sense language policy in the 
force can be seen more as an institutional language policy. However, it 
nevertheless revolves around the question of whether the language 
requirements of the three former warring sides are accommodated in the 
international military force's dealings with local actors, and in this sense policy 
is influenced by the identity politics outside the institution itself. There is 
therefore an interaction between an internal language policy and external extra-
linguistic circumstances. 
This chapter traces the development of a language policy at the level of 
the HQ of the international military force only. The NATO force that took over 
operations post-Dayton from the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection 
Force) peacekeeping force was made up of about 60,000 troops from 31 
nations. They were initially located in three Multi-National Divisions (MND) 
each of which was headed by one nation: Britain in MND-South West, France 
in MND-South-East and the United states in MND-North West. As time went 
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on and the force was reorganised and down-sized the Multi-National Divisions 
became Multi-National Battalions and eventually pulled out with the 
transfonnation of the force to the EU Force in December 2004 and the 
beginning of Operation Althea Scores of locally-hired linguists were employed 
by the different nations represented in the force which had their own hiring and 
language practices. 16O For example, the Dutch contingent in Bugojno alone 
employed 62 interpreters in 2003 (Bos and Soeters, 2006: 263). The focus of 
this chapter is on the force HQ because this is the highest level at which 
negotiations on the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the 
subsequent defence reform took place. Issues regarding a three-language policy 
would be more relevant to the linguists at this level as the HQ deals with all 
three main ethnic groups rather than one or two which would be the case at the 
lower levels. 
As detailed in the methods section of the Introduction, much of the data 
for this chapter was collected during a field trip to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
May-June 2008 and is based on interviews with 13 members of the Linguistic 
Service of the European military force (EUFOR) Headquarters based in 
Sarajevo. 161 The service has a total of 22 linguists162 located in Sarajevo and 
Banja Luka The linguists were chosen as interview subjects because a number 
of them have been employed by the international military since before the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and therefore have the 'institutional 
memory' as regards the development of language policy in the force. This is 
important in tracing the development of language practices because the military 
members of the force spend on average six months in theatre so few current 
force members would be aware of how decisions regarding language came to 
be made or would have taken part in the decision-making process. Moreover, 
160 The US forces used a private contractor, TRW Incorporated. to hire linguists. Depending on 
the required level of security clearance these would be either locally-hired employees or hired 
from North America. 
161 All the linguists interviewed were former colleagues of mine. I was the chief of the 
language service between 2000 and 2004. The implications of this prior professional 
relationship with interviewees is discussed in more detail in the section in the Introduction on 
methods. 
162 The term linguist will be used throughout this chapter to denote any person employed 
primarily to translate, interpret or revise. Translation means the written conveyance of meaning 
from one language to another, interpretation means the spoken conveyance of meaning from 
one language to another and revision relates to the checking of a written translation by a senior 
translator to ensure inter alia accuracy of meaning, style and register. 
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because of the transient presence of the officers and the more than ten years 
that had elapsed since the most important decisions were made, the linguists 
themselves could not recall the names of the officers who had made specific 
decisions and, furthermore, even if they had, as a multi-national force, it would 
have been difficult to track down these officers in their different countries. 
The chapter will begin with a brief overview of the provisions of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement as related to the military sphere and the role of IFOR 
(and subsequently SFOR and EUFOR). It will then outline the development of 
defence reform activities which saw a shift in focus after 2001 towards 
unification of the armed forces in preparation for the country's eventual 
membership of NATO and the EU. This overview is necessary as it provides 
the context in which the linguists employed by the international military 
force's HQ worked and an introduction to the next section which will look 
more closely at the translation and interpretation practices of the international 
military force and their development since the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. The discussion of how linguists have influenced language policy 
leads to a consideration of the motivations of the linguists for the linguistic 
decisions they make. In this context there will be a discussion of translator 
ethics. This is particularly important because of the issue of trust between 
members of the military and the civilian linguists. Here I draw on current 
thinking on translator ethics and apply narrative theory as suggested by Mona 
Baker in her book Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account (2006). The 
chapter will conclude with an assessment of how language policy was 
formulated in the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and what 
the experience might tell us about language policy formulation in general in an 
international military intervention situation. 
The Military Aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and 
Defence Reform 
As stated elsewhere, the Dayton Peace Agreement should primarily be 
seen as a peace treaty. Its basic aim was to consolidate the cease-fire agreement 
that had been reached three weeks before the negotiations at the Wright-
Patterson air base in Dayton began. As Annex IA, which deals with the 
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military aspects of the peace settlement, states, the obligations of the parties 
were 'to establish a durable cessation of hostilities' (Art. I, para. 2a), 'provide 
for the support and authorization of the IF OR' (Art. I, para. 2b) and 'establish 
lasting security and arms control measures' (Art.l, para. 2c). The initial task 
was to separate the warring sides and ensure that they remained separate. The 
agreement thus includes detailed instructions for this to do with the exact 
location of the line of separation and the inter-entity boundary line, as well as 
deadlines for compliance with the provisions in the Agreement. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement clearly gives authority to ensuring 
implementation of its provisions to a NATO-led Implementation Force to be in 
situ 'for a period of approximately one year' (Annex IA, Art. I, para. I). The 
force was to be directly answerable to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and 
most significantly was authorised to use all means 'including the use of 
necessary force, to ensure compliance' (Annex lA, Art. I, para. 2b). The 
Agreement also envisaged the establishment of a Joint Military Commission 
(JMC) 'to serve as the central body for all Parties to this Annex to bring any 
military complaints questions, or problems that require resolution by the IFOR 
Commander, such as allegations of cease-fire violations or other non-
compliance with this Annex' (Annex IA, Art. VIII, para. 2a). It was also 
intended to receive reports and agree on specific actions to ensure compliance 
with the military provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement and assist the 
IFOR Commander in 'determining and implementing a series of local 
transparency measures between the Parties' (Annex lA, Art. VIII, para. 2c). 
The JMC was to be chaired by the IFOR Commander (or his representative) 
and would be composed of the senior military commander of the forces of each 
of the former warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as two civilians 
selected by each Party to the Annex and the High Representative or his 
representative in advisory roles. Although the JMC was meant to be a 
consultative body for the IFOR Commander the agreement nevertheless 
specified that all final decisions on military matters were to be made by the 
IFOR Commander. Over time the role of the JMC changed and 'soon became a 
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framework for military assistance, in particular concerning the efforts to bring 
BiH into PiP (partnership for Peace)' (Vetschera and Damian, 2006: 37) .163 
Defence and military matters were not mentioned in the Constitution 
(Annex 4 of the Agreement) as a competence of the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Vetschera and Damian consider that this made it easier for 
the entities to claim defence as an entity matter and therefore maintain the 
separate armed forces that they had established during the war (2006:29). 
Indeed the only body given any kind of competence in the field of defence was 
the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) which was part of the 
state-level Presidency and was intended 'to coordinate the activities of the 
armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina' (Annex 4, Art. V, Para.5b). The entity 
split was further complicated by the existence of the Croatian Defence Council 
(HVO) as part of the federation forces, thus retaining the three-sided hostility 
of the wartime period. 
Even though the cease-fire was consolidated by the end of 1996 
(Cousens and Cater, 2001: 54) with the military forces having been separated 
and progressively demobilized and arms control had also been embarked upon, 
Cousens and Cater assessed in 2000 that despite these notable successes 
joint ventures between the ABiH [Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and HVO 
have gone no deeper than the surface, leaving both forces essentially separate. 
Each services its respective national leadership, with doctrine, capabilities, and 
intentions relatively opaque to one another and to the international community. 
There is even greater distance between them and the VRS (Army of the 
Republika Srpska). Thus, five years after Dayton, Bosnian territory remains 
clearly divided among the effective control of each of the country's three 
annies and related paramilitaries (2001: 64). 
The international community did, however, attempt to bridge this military 
divide by initiating the adoption of two agreements in 1996 (an Agreement on 
Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
between the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the two entities and an 
Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control between all parties from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the neighbouring states of Croatia and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia). It also set up fora to coordinate the activities of the relevant 
163 The Partnership for Peace is a programme of cooperation between NATO and individual 
Partner countries. Its purpose is to "increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build 
strengthened security relationships between individual Partner countries and NATO, as well as 
among Partner countries" (NATO website at 
http://www.nato.intlcpslenlnatoliveJtopics_S0349.htm [Accessed on 29 March 2010]. 
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international organisations: m 1999 the OHR. SFOR and the OSCE 
established the Common Security Policy Working Group which was 
superseded in 2002 by the Institution Building Task Force that was set up by 
the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council. 
Defence refonn can be seen in the context of what Gearoid 6 Tuathail 
calls the OHR's 'grand strategy' for Bosnia-Herzegovina which had the twin 
goals of removing war and violence from political life and moving the country 
towards a capitalist market society (2005: 55). The framework for this strategy 
was provided by activities to move Bosnia-Herzegovina toward eventual 
membership of the EU and NATO and the starting point was the Stabilization 
and Association process launched in 1999. As 6 Tuathail puts it, 'Key to 
moving Bosnia towards Europe, as far as the OHR was concerned, was the 
consolidation of BiH statehood through the creation of centralized, responsive, 
state-level institutions' (2005: 56). This, of course, applied to the divided 
military institutions too and in 2001 the NATO Secretary General outlined the 
most important requirements of these which were the creation of an 'effective 
and credible state-level civil command and control structure, which would 
include a state-level ministry responsible for defence matters ... [and] the 
merger of the entities' anned forces into one state anny' (Vetschera and 
Damian, 2006: 31). In January 2003, the Presidency stated the intention of 
joining the European Union and Euro-Atlantic defence structures and 
becoming a candidate for Partnership for Peace. In this context the targets 
recognised that defence reform was essential and pledged to carry out the 
refonns necessary to establish effective state-level civilian command and 
control and parliamentary oversight over all defence matters (ORC, 2003: 34) 
As a way to move defence refonn forward in the wake of the Orao affairlM 
which weakened the Republika Srpska government, High Representative 
Paddy Ashdown set up the Defence Refonn Commission (ORC). The DRC 
was made up of the Secretary General of the SCMM and his two deputies; two 
civilian representatives appointed by the President of the Republika Srpska and 
164 During the Orao aftBir it was discovered that the Orao aircraft factory in the Republika 
Srpska bad been selling weapons to Iraq in contravention of the UN embargo. This meant that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was also at risk of sanction ftom the UN. As a consequence of 
investigations RS President Sarovic was forced to resign and Paddy Ashdown took advantage 
of a weakened RS government to push ahead with defence reform, arguing that there had to be 
state control of the defence sector (Ashdown, 2(07). 
198 
the President of the Federation; the two entity Ministers of Defence; one 
member designated by the High Representative and one delegate each from 
NATO, SFOR and the OSCE. It was chaired by former US Assistant Secretary 
of Defence James Locher III who had had experience managing legislation in 
the US to restructure the US armed forces in the 1980s and developing the 
Pentagon's special operations capabilities (Ashdown, 2007: 283).165 
Its recommendations published in September 2003 focussed on the 
legislative changes needed to ensure effective civilian command and control of 
the armed forces while still maintaining separate entity armed forces and 
ministries of defence albeit more restricted in scope than hitherto. l66 Within 
this it recommended a law on defence which was adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2003. The law established 
operational and administrative chains of command. Supreme operational and 
administrative command and control was assigned to the Presidency. A state 
Ministry of Defence was also established headed by a civilian Minister of 
Defence and two deputies and including a military Joint Staff. The DRC was 
given a second mandate in 2005 to find solutions to increase the state's 
authority in administrative areas and day-to-day running of the armed forces 
(DRC report, 2005: 1). It recommended doing away with the entity ministries 
of defence and military structures and the establishment of a Support 
Command at state level to deal with personnel management, logistics and 
training which would bolster the existing state-level command and control 
arrangements. It also recommended the full professionaiisation of the armed 
forces (scrapping conscription, for example), the 'rightsizing' of forces to 
achieve active duty armed forces of 'somewhere between 9,000 and 10,000' 
(DRC, 2005: 8) and a new approach to organising a reserve force. 
The legislation required by these recommendations was passed by the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly and the entity parliaments at the 
end of 2005, and in January 2006 all competencies in the realm of defence 
were transferred to the state level. In May 2006 components of the NATO HQ 
16S Paddy Ashdown considered Locher to have been 'a brilliant chair with that combination of 
subtlety, quiet persuasive power and toughness where necessary, which made things happen in 
the Balkans' (2007: 283). 
166 NATO had dropped the requirement for a single state army in 2002 but still required a state-
level defence ministry and a joint General Staff. 
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were moved to the same building as the Ministry of Defence in Sarajevo. 167 
One of these is the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) whose purpose is to achieve 
closer cooperation between NATO and the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Staff 
and the Operational Command. In December 2006, Bosnia-Herzegovina fmally 
joined the Partnership for Peace. 
The above overview of defence reform activities is intended to illustrate 
several aspects of the defence refonn process. First of all, it is clear how far 
Bosnia-Herzegovina progressed after the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement in the military sphere; from having separate armed forces totalling 
more than 430,000 men168 with a vast array of armaments at the end of the war 
the former warring sides were able to establish joint armed forces with state-
level command and control and an effective and efficient structure suitable to 
the requirements of the PiP. The second aspect is the role of the international 
community in these reform moves. With a clear mandate as stipulated in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement the international military force was able to guide first 
the immediate post-war obligations of separating forces and the cantonment of 
weapons and then the longer-term refonn requirements of PiP membership. 
The progress made is attributable in part to the fact that the reform process was 
guided by SFOR, NATO and the OSCE working together in a coordinated 
way. As interviewee VO put it, 'One reason defence reform succeeded was 
because it had NATO behind it, it had the United States embassy behind it and 
the UK embassy behind it and under no circumstances, under no uncertain 
terms, I mean, they knew what they wanted and they got it'. Along with this 
concerted push from the international community, progress is also attributable 
to a change in attitudes among the local military authorities in recognition of 
the stated desire of Bosnia-Herzegovina to move towards integration into the 
EV and NATO and the concomitant need for greater cooperation between all 
three components of the armed forces. 
167 When SFOR was replaced by EUFOR in December 2004 NATO retained a ] SO-strong 
command in Sarajevo to assist the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the defence reform 
process and in preparing for accession to the PfP and NATO membership. It also provides 
operational support in counter-terrorism, intelligence and the arrest of war criminals (NATO 
Parliamentary Report 2006: 11). 
168 Figure from the SFOR Informer Online website available at 
http://www.nato.intlSFORlindexinflI27/p03a1tOI03a.htm [accessed 9 March 2010] 
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Finally, the overview of defence refonn activities puts into a wider 
context the next section on the language policy of the international military 
force. All communication between the international military force and the 
fonner warring sides had to be mediated by an interpreter or translator. The 
JMCs, as the most important forum for communication between the IFOR (and 
then SFOR) Commander and the military authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
were interpreted fIrSt of all in the consecutive mode and then, much later on, 
simultaneously.169 The interpretation of these and the translation of documents 
were provided by the linguists working at HQ IFOR and then SFOR. The 
interpretation and the translation for meetings of the nine working groups 
established within the DRC were provided by linguists from the OSCE (as the 
organisation administratively in charge of the commission) and HQ SFOR with 
the latter providing simultaneous interpretation for the plenary sessions. The 
linguists employed by the international military force therefore played a crucial 
role in the defence refonn process and, as shall be shown, influenced policy 
regarding the language situation in the country. The next section will therefore 
look at how the language policy of the international military force evolved and 
the part played by the linguists in this. 
Language policy as translation and interpretation policy 
The peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the frrst of its 
kind for NATO. It was the first time that NATO countries had put so many 
troops on the ground in support of a peace operation and, from the point of 
view of language provision, it was the first time that a large number of linguists 
working with languages that were not official languages of NATO had to be 
employed. Up until 1995, language policy at NATO HQ and SHAPE level 
involved the provision of translation and interpretation from and into the two 
official languages of the organisation, English and French.170 At the 
169 There are basically three modes of interpretation: liaison interpretation where the interpreter 
interprets a short passage of speech after the speaker has spoken without the aid of notes; 
consecutive interpretation where the interpreter does the same as for liaison interpretation but 
for longer passages and with the aid of notes, and simultaneous interpretation where the 
interpreter interprets almost at the same time as the speaker is speaking and for this mode of 
interpretation a booth and other equipment is needed. Simultaneous interpretation requires a 
~ ~ level of knowledge and skill. 
1 SHAPE is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe which provides the strategic 
command and control for NATO operations. It is based at Mons, Belgium. 
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subordinate HQs there are small language units with very few linguists 
(between one and five) working with the two official languages, as well as the 
language of the country where it is located. For example, at the HQ Allied Air 
Command in Ramstein in Germany there is one translator working with 
English, French and German. For the operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina which 
would involve extensive contacts with the local population, the individual 
contingents were required to provide their own linguists. Many of these were 
taken over from the UNPROFOR mission which ended with the arrival of 
IFOR but the increased extent of IFOR activities meant that more linguists had 
to be recruited. In part this need was met by military personnel in the 
contingents who already knew the local languages and could be used as 
interpreters or language trainers (British forces had four of these in 1992) but 
in general language requirements had to be met by hiring local people. The 
elements that made up the HQ and were located throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina were left to hire their own linguists in whatever way they wanted 
and as a consequence there was no HQ-wide language policy regarding 
recruitment procedures from the point of view of the requisite qualifications, 
pre-employment language testing (which was not as rigorous as during the time 
of UNPROFOR) or training. Thus the linguists employed by the HQ varied 
considerably in their level of ability, skill and knowledge. 
None of the linguists employed by the HQ fitted the profile of what is 
generally understood to be a 'professional interpreter' by international 
organisations and professional bodies of interpreters notably AIIC, the 
International Association of Conference Interpreters. For them a 'professional 
interpreter' is an interpreter who has a degree in languages or interpreting and 
has taken certain courses in interpretation at recognised institutions and gained 
employment in an international organisation where they are expected to reach 
internationally recognised standards. These interpreters therefore have a 
recognised career path. In contrast, not all the linguists at SFOR HQ had 
university-level education. One interviewee, for example, had worked as a 
manual labourer before being employed as a linguist. Those who had university 
degrees had not necessarily studied languages and very few had any kind of 
interpretation experience prior to working for the international force. The 
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implications of employing 'non-professional' linguists will be explored later on 
in this chapter in the discussion on translator ethics. 
In the context of this study, we are interested in language policy as it 
relates to the international military force's approach to the three newly-
recognised official languages in its relations with the fonner warring sides. 
This was especially important at the HQ level where IFOR and then SFOR 
commanders had dealings with senior military and political representatives 
from all three fonner warring sides rather than with one or two which was 
more common in the MNDs. It is at this level that negotiations in the 
framework of the JMCs and the defence refonn were conducted. 
Adherence to a three-language policy is demonstrated in several ways: 
the most obvious being the production of all relevant documentation in three 
separate language versions, taking care to make clear distinctions between the 
three. Less obviously, even if a particular element of the forces uses only one 
version, for example Serbian in the Republika Srpska, this still implies 
recognition of the existence of three language versions because otherwise only 
one version, some kind of syncretic 'all-Bosnian' which would most likely 
correspond to the idiolect of the particular linguist would be used throughout 
the force. Likewise, attempts by an interpreter to tailor their speech according 
to the ethnic identity of the interlocutor also represents tacit recognition of the 
existence of more than one language version. 
A three-language policy is more clearly manifested in translation than 
interpretation as it is possible to create three versions of a written text while it 
is almost impossible and totally impracticable to attempt to create three 
versions of an interpretation. Furthennore, the three-language issue is more 
important with the written word because the different language versions are 
easier to identify when they are written down than when they are expressed 
verbally. For example, if nothing else, the official Serbian language in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is distinguished by the fact that it is generally written in Cyrillic 
rather than the Latin script; in this case it is immediately obvious which 
language version is being used. Moreover, interpreting as the oral conveyance 
of infonnation possesses a certain impermanence or evanescence which means 
that certain aspects of the language used may not be immediately recognised 
(and objected to) by the interlocutors. As Michael Cronin has put it, 
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In writing, the mind can concentrate on moving ahead in a linear fashion 
because the written text is there to remind it of what has already been said. In 
oral discourse, the situation is different because there is nothing to refer to 
outside the mind, the oral utterance vanishing as soon as it has been uttered 
(2006:92). 
This chapter will now focus on the development of this language policy and, 
drawing on field interviews with linguists working for what is now EUFOR 
HQ, explore the influences and circumstances that moulded this approach to 
the three languages. 
Linguists as language policy-makers 
It is clear from the field interviews that both during and after the 
conflict there were different approaches to the issue of the three languages in 
translation and interpretation practice. These depended primarily on where a 
linguist was based both in the sense of the type of element they were in and the 
actual geographical location of that element. In the field, in locally-based 
elements in areas where just one ethnic group was represented, only one 
language version was used during the conflict. This was the case, for example, 
in the UNPROFOR liaison office in Pale in the Republika Srpska where the 
linguists who had worked there reported that they always used Serbian in 
dealings with the General Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska and 
multiple language versions of translations were not required. Interestingly, in 
this case, the two linguists interviewed who worked in the office cannot 
remember using Cyrillic and thought that this was for technical reasons 
because they simply did not have the proper font as part of their word 
processing programme. What is more important, however, is that according to 
one of the linguists (QQ) this lack of font 'did not bother' any of the local 
recipients of correspondence and documentation. 
On the question of whether they used ekavian (elcavica) as another way 
of differentiating the Serbian version, one of the linguists (QQ) recalls using 
this version in the period when it was official (September 1993 to November 
1994) while the other linguist (RF) remembers things a little differently: 
RF: What we did at that time out of spite because they were, officials, and the 
official language on TV was started, started to be e#ravica and then we dido't 
have to, it wasn't in accordance with the Constitution that we had to use 
ekavica but just for fun or out of spite we started because there were people 
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saying Beljina171 for towns and we started it as ajoke and it was easier, to tell 
you the truth. But I regret it now because I have lost the feeling for ije and je. 
Before we started doing that I was always, I never thought what is it ije or je, 
before that, and after that I had a problem, I wasn't sure any longer which one 
is correct every time. So that is why I regret our joke. 
LA: So how long did you do that for, produce them in ekavica, the 
translations? 
RF: I would say a couple of years maybe until the war finished, not later, 
because it wasn't the trend any more, maybe in 94 or 95, I can't remember 
when it happened and then we quit and started to translate into normal 
language. 
The above excerpt shows how language decisions were left to the individual 
linguists in an office with no involvement from the military personnel and that 
these decisions could be based on notions of fun or spite. This linguist's 
mention of 'normal language' highlights their disdain for official attempts to 
impose a language that was not natural for inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Linguists in areas where more than one ethnic group was represented 
during the conflict had somewhat different concerns when it came to language. 
This is borne out by the testimony of interviewee AG, who worked for eight 
months at the beginning of the war with the French Battalion in Kakanj, which 
had dealings with both Bosniaks and Croats. The following excerpt is their 
reply to whether she had to work with three language versions during the 
conflict. 
Well, in the field we didn't do that, in Kakanj we didn't do that. We would just 
translate into whatever was our language at that time, which was Serbo-
Croatian. And no one really made much fuss about it but the fact is it was in 
the field so you wouldn't, these translations wouldn't go up to the upper 
channels of the military structures who would normally complain, as they 
complained all the time, later when I came to work to Sarajevo at the 
Headquarters. But in the field it wasn't really a big issue unless you go 
somewhere to a headquarters or, you know, we did mostly go to INO 
Headquarters in Vard or Kiseljak etc. and then you had to speak very 
Croatianly Istarts laughing!, so to say. You really did and I was good at 
pretending, you had to be and I was good at not saying my name a lot. /I would 
introduce myself by saying! 'I'm the interpreter' !laughs!. Really, I mean, that 
was the reality. 172 
171 The proper name of the town is Bijeljina. By removing the ij the name is ekavianised i.e. 
Serbianised. Bijeljina is the second largest town in the Republika Srpska. Prior to the war, 
according to the 1991 census, the population was 60 per cent Serbian and 34 per cent Muslim. 
172 In Bosnia-Herzegovina a person's name is usually, but not necessarily always, an indicator 
of the ethnic group they belong to. 
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In answer to the next question whether they ever received any negative 
reactions from people because of their perceived ethnic affiliation, they had 
this to say: 
Many times, many times. Well, during the war it was a regular, a regular thing. 
If you did not want anyone to object to you then you would nonnally just try 
to avoid saying your name, and you were lucky if they didn't know you. If 
they knew you then it was a different thing. But then it's also true that once 
people knew you, even if you are of a different, even during the war, even if 
they were of a different ethnic background once they realised that you know 
what you are doing in tenns of the language, that you really do your job, then 
it becomes acceptable. It surely does. 
They elaborate this further: 
I think, you know, if, if even during the war if people had the chance to realise 
that you were only interested in what you were supposed to do and that your 
demeanour was professional then it worked even if you were of a different 
ethnic background. But that only applies really to situations where everybody 
is, everybody is sitting down but if it's in the field and it's some kind of 
trouble then you can't really count on that. 
The above quotes confirm that language issues were left to the individual 
linguist and depended on their readiness and ability to tailor their language 
according to the ethnic identity of the interlocutor. But why would an 
interpreter in the field do this especially if they were not explicitly instructed to 
do so by military personnel? They would be aware that in the wartime situation 
of heightened tensions, an interlocutor of another ethnicity may object to the 
presence of someone (the interpreter) that they could perceive as being on the 
enemy side, even though that person is working for the international military 
force. In the best case, the interlocutor may question the objectivity of the 
interpreter in their interpretation but in the worst case the interlocutor may 
display open hostility to the interpreter and to the foreign military personnel. In 
both cases, the course of the encounter would be disrupted to a greater or lesser 
extent. Aware of this possibility, AG felt it necessary to tailor their language in 
order to reduce the risk of a negative reaction from the interlocutor. In their 
mind, also, not drawing attention to themselves as a member of a specific 
ethnic group and striving to remain neutral is connected with the issue of 
professionalism as they are aware that once they are seen as a 'professional' 
rather than the representative of a particular ethnic group the communication 
will run more smoothly. AG's account highlights, though, that it was not 
always easy to be seen as a professional and much depended on the context in 
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which the communication took place. The situations where everybody was 
'sitting down' can be seen as what Norbert Elias in The Civilizing Process calls 
'pacified social spaces' which in a conflict situation 'are normally free from 
acts of violence' (2000: 369). It is only in these 'pacified social spaces' away 
from the conflict that people can act in more of a non-violent way and notions 
of professionalism can override concerns about ethnic affiliation. Questions of 
neutrality and professionalism are important issues when it comes to translator 
ethics and a discussion of these will follow further on in this chapter. 
As regards the policy at the level of UNPROFOR Headquarters there is 
some discrepancy in the testimony of the linguists working there during the 
conflict as to whether it was necessary to adhere to three language versions or 
not. Interviewee AG moved to work at the UNPROFOR HQ in 1994 and 
explained the policy thus: 
At the level of the headquarters it was always the policy. It was actually 
imposed by the warring factions, as they were known, and they IUNPROFORl 
simply accepted it but I really honestly at that time thought it was ridiculous. 
But from this point in time I think they didn't have much choice, you know. It 
simply was something that had to be done, unless you wanted to have, you 
know, unless you really wanted to have complaints all the time and then have 
to solve those complaints etc. But I do remember people who actually refused 
to do that and that worked as well. I mean, not interpreters and translators 
naturally but I remember officers who simply said, no, I'm not going to bother 
with that, if you want I'll send it to you in English and then you do with it 
whatever you want to do with it, and that worked as well, you know. 
Another linguist, ZS, who also worked at UNPROFOR HQ from October 1994 
remembers the policy differently. When asked about whether they adhered to 
the three-language policy they said: 
During UNPROFOR times no, we didn't. Actually we didn't even have 
Cyrillic, any fonts or anything that would support that and then we started 
actually, I think it was IFOR, when IFOR arrived, when they deployed, that 
they actually for political correctness, they insisted on that. And I think we 
actually got that font from Naples, 173 to our surprise, but they had it, so ... but 
it, we didn't have any converters so you would need to basically retype 
everything and yes, at that time, it was really everyone was insisting to have 
everything in three languages, even if it was just the basic letter or anything. 
In answer to a question about where this insistence on three languages came 
from at IFOR, ZS explained the situation thus: 
ZS: I think it was due to the Dayton Peace Agreement that these were 
officially, and then like in our constitution, three, three official languages and 
\73 Naples is where the AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe) base was located. 
AFSOUTH was one of two major NATO commands in the Mediterranean area. 
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they insisted actually to have everything in, for political correctness, to have 
everything in three versions or in three local languages, I should say. 
LA: So, was the insistence from the IFOR side or from the local politicians' 
side? 
ZS: I think it was from our chain of command because they wanted to be 
politically correct and it was of course from the parties, the three, let's say 
from the local side, actually they insisted to get everything in their own 
language so basically they got accustomed to that and it was not only our 
organisation, I think it was the same throughout. 
Despite the contradiction between the two interviewees regarding when the 
three-language policy started, it can be said that it was being implemented at 
least from the beginning of the IFOR mandate and it was a response on the side 
of the international military force to insistence from the former warring sides 
that their particular language be accepted and used officially, particularly after 
the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and its de facto recognition of the 
three languages. ZS's mention of political correctness could represent an 
attempt by the military forces to take the subject of language 'off the table' as 
it obviously had become an issue in negotiations after the end of the conflict. 
Doing this, however, risks reifying the slight linguistic differences that 
distinguish the three language versions which in tum contributes to efforts by 
the representatives of the ethnic groups to distance themselves from each other. 
Moreover, as the practice became established it was difficult to change the 
policy. Not only did the representatives of the three former warring sides 
demand separate language versions, as ZS points out, but the officers on the 
NATO side would also have become used to thinking in terms of three distinct 
languages. With successive rotations of military personnel the established 
practice was just reproduced and not questioned. As we will see later on in this 
chapter, it was not until 2001 or 2002 that the policy of providing three 
language versions was modified. 
From the interviews with the linguists employed at the Liaison Office 
in the Republika Srpska - RF and QQ - it is clear that the procedure regarding 
translation and interpretation in the field remained the same after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement was signed and IFOR was set up in that only one language 
version needed to be produced. Likewise, linguists who were hired after the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and were employed in other elements 
outside the HQ report that there was no policy to adhere to three language 
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versions. The reason for this was mainly to do with the nature of the work of 
these offices. One linguist, ZG, was employed in January 1996 to work for 
Civilian Military Affairs which worked with local authorities on projects to 
reconstruct the country's damaged infrastructure (the water supply, the power 
network, roads, bridges and so on). According to them the four linguists in the 
office did more interpreting than translation and most of the translation was 
into English. He did say, however, that they would 'tailor' translations into the 
local languages according to who it was intended for. So a translation of a 
document for a project in the Republika Srpska would be in Cyrillic and the 
linguists would use 'their Ithe Serbs' I vocabulary, their words' . 
Asked about how this practice came about and whether they were told 
to do this by the military personnel, ZG said the following: 
No. They would basically come, the frrst 10 days of their deployment, they 
would come to us and ask us, like, how many languages do you speak? Do you 
speak Serbian or do you speak Croatian? And we would explain them that 
basically, yes, we do even though they are three different languages. And, but 
no one actually told us, like, you have to do this, in this way because they were 
soldiers, they were military personnel, they had nothing to do with interpreters 
or with interpretation or translation so they didn't have knowledge of that so, 
as I said, we did it, or speaking of myself personally, I did it because it was a 
proper and right thing to do, to the best of my knowledge. 
Translation and interpretation policy and practice more or less remained the 
same until about 200 1 after which there was gradually less insistence in the 
headquarters on having all documents in three versions and there was more 
flexibility in which language versions were produced. ZS explains it thus: 
I would say with S F O ~ ~ I think in 200 I or 2002 we managed to sort of 
convince them that if it were a technical document or if it was /?so to sayl 
politically sensitive or if it were not for such public distribution that we can do 
only one version. And now one version is widely acceptable, I would say, only 
if it's, yes, only if it's like official, if it's a translation like if it would be 
gazetted or something of the sort then yes, we would still do it in three 
versions but if it is, for example, a PowerPoint presentation or something of 
that kind, we just do one version. 
Again, the above quote shows that language policy was guided by the linguists 
themselves as they were able to 'convince' the requester of a given translation 
that three versions were not necessary. 
A significant development at the HQ at this time was the creation of a 
Linguistic Services Branch (LSB) which was formally established in 
November 2001. This was initiated by SHAPE with the primary cost-cutting 
goal of rationalising the provision of language services throughout the HQ. 
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This was in tandem with the general downsizing of the SFOR forces to about 
half their original number. The rationale behind the establishment of the branch 
was to centralise the services as much as possible so that the activities of the 
linguists could be managed and coordinated better. Up until then small groups 
of linguists ranging in size from two to seven members were located in 
different elements of the HQ with limited contact between them. With the 
reorganisation, many of the linguists who had been based in different offices in 
Sarajevo itself were placed in a central office located at Camp Butmir, the 
SFOR HQ just outside Sarajevo. Nineteen linguists were based there 
supervised by the chief and deputy chief of the branch who were both 
international employees with experience in translating and interpreting from 
and into English and the languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This arrangement 
was unusual for Bosnia-Herzegovina as the LSB was the only language service 
in the country headed by internationally-hired civilians who were experienced 
linguists and working according to recognised professional standards. 
There were two other aims of the establishment of the LSB: to 
professionalise the service and to increase the standard of the services 
provided. In part, this was done through the provision of translation and 
interpretation training for the linguists and the establishment of a system of 
revision. Revision means that once a translation has been done it is looked at 
by a senior translator to ensure that the language of translation is used 
correctly, the translation conveys the correct meaning of the original text and 
in-house conventions as regards terminology and style are correctly applied. A 
system of revision is common practice in the language services of all 
international organisations. The revisions that are made by the reviser are either 
inserted by the translator themselves or by a third member of staff usually from 
the administrative staff. In the LSB the translators put in the corrections to their 
texts themselves; this was a way of improving the language knowledge and the 
skills of the translator as they would be able to learn from the changes. This 
was especially important for translations into English where the translators 
were working into a foreign language but the LSB also established a system of 
revision for the local languages with two of the best and most experienced 
locally-hired linguists taking on this role. In the context of the situation of three 
official but mutually intelligible languages these revisers have the 
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responsibility of deciding how the three language versions will be 
differentiated throughout the LSB. They do this on the basis of their own 
knowledge and experience of the three language versions and, especially in the 
case of Bosnian, the new orthographical manuals and dictionaries for the 
language versions. The Bosnian language version is more difficult to 
distinguish partly because of lack of agreement among Bosniak language 
planners on what constitutes the Bosnian standard language (as discussed in the 
Literature Review). 
While some of the interviewees thought that it was relatively easy to 
make three language versions of a given translation, one linguist (QQ) in 
particular talked about the difficulties they had with producing a Bosnian 
version. This was a linguist who up until 2001, when they were relocated to the 
SFOR HQ, had worked exclusively to and from Serbian. They recalled how 
when producing their first Bosnian language version of a translation they had 
followed the advice of their colleague, who they described as 'a true Bosniak' 
and who had said that the language was similar to Serbian but had to be in 
Latin script and care needed to be taken with '-iratil-ovati' verbs (verbs ending 
in -irati are considered to be Bosnian or Croatian and those ending in ~ v a t i i
Serbian). The linguist took the colleague's advice and sent the version for 
revision but when it came back it was 'totally corrected'. The interviewee 
explained their difficulties in the following way: 
It was easier with Croatian because it was quite, you could sense where 
you'd ... this is going to be difficult, you will have to use quite specifically 
Croatian words. With Bosnian, I was never sure ... I can see when I read a text I 
can feel somebody's intention to be different. But to know the natural 
difference specifically, especially between Serbian and Bosnian I'm not quite 
sure that I am able to feel it. 
The role of the revisers in differentiating the three language versions also has 
implications for language policy outside the force. If three versions of an 
SFOR document go into the public domain they are then contributing to 
efforts by the language planners of the three ethnic groups to mould the three 
separate languages. Thus, HQ SFOR language policy not only feeds into local 
language politics because of the actual policy to produce three language 
versions but it also contributes to the corpus of the three language versions and 
bolsters the linguistic claims for the three standard languages. 
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One consequence of having a language service organised in such a way 
was that it increased the standing of the linguists employed by the HQ. The 
central office became the focal point for all matters to do with the provision of 
translation and interpretation services and particularly for the defence refonn 
negotiations since, for example, it was central office linguists who provided the 
simultaneous interpretation for sessions of the JMCs and the plenary sessions 
of the DRC. The service could also call on a large number of linguists to 
interpret and translate for the nine working groups of the DRC. Additionally, 
this organisational structure acted as a kind of gate-keeper for the linguists in 
the central office as requesters of services did not necessarily have direct 
access to them and had to go through certain organisational procedures in 
requesting their services. Having fonnalised procedures meant that the branch 
and therefore its members were treated in a more professional way. It had been 
apparent during research conducted prior to the establishment of the LSB that 
there was a tendency for linguists to be used for activities that did not 
necessarily involve translation and interpretation and a tendency to ignore 
professionally-recognised standards as regards such things as the length of time 
that an interpreter can reasonably be expected to interpret for without a break. 
Another factor that enhanced the standing of the linguists was having a 
chief who was an international employee with professional experience. An 
important consideration here is that both the chief and deputy chief had NATO 
security clearance unlike the locally-hired linguists. Having this status means 
that the chief and deputy chief are automatically on an equal footing with the 
force's military personnel and are immediately trusted by them. If the chief and 
their judgment is trusted then this is reflected onto attitudes towards the 
linguists themselves. Allied to this, is that any complaints or concerns about a 
particular linguist from the military can be addressed to a third party i.e. the 
chief. 
Finally, another consequence of the establishment of the LSB was that 
in tracking the output of the linguists it became apparent how much time was 
spent on producing three language versions of documents. For example, 
producing the translation of a long document like a training manual in three 
language versions requires double the man hours, taking into account the time 
needed by the translator and the reviser to make and check the requisite 
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modifications to produce three distinct versions. The timing issue is an 
important one from the point of view of meeting deadlines because obviously 
producing only one version takes less time and the requester receives the 
document more quickly. The policy of producing three versions therefore had 
an impact on the organisation of the operations of the LSB. 
By 2003 when defence reform activities were under way, there was a 
greater tendency to produce translations in only one version and SFOR HQ 
participants in the DRC decided that all working documents would be 
produced in only one language version while the final official documents were 
produced in three. This was readily accepted by all sides involved in the 
talks.174 The change of attitude among both the local and the foreign military 
authorities can also be seen as a reflection of the changing circumstances of 
defence reform. After 2001 and the international community's moves to push 
Bosnia-Herzegovina towards ED and NATO membership the former warring 
sides were required to increase their cooperation with each other and the 
international community. This general atmosphere of cooperation would have 
therefore made untenable demands for separate but mutually intelligible 
language versions of documentation. The reorganisation of the international 
military force with EDFOR taking over from SFOR and the final outcomes of 
the defence reform process of a single ministry of defence and joint armed 
forces meant that language policy relaxed further. When the NAT moved to the 
Ministry of Defence building three linguists went with them and their 
interviews bear out this further change in policy. 
In the following excerpt QQ explains how the three linguists at the 
NAT now work. The JMA that they refer to is the acronym for the old office at 
SFOR HQ that had primary responsibility for defence reform: 
QQ: We started working somewhat differently to what it was in JMA. We are 
very active and produce things that are no longer, you know, a letter that you 
would copy-paste, adapt, it's like Srdan will tell you, he currently translated a 
scenario for a war, some crisis somewhere in an imaginary country and they 
!Bosnian military personneV will work on that scenario and they will have a 
whole seminar on that and that is 80, 80 pages, 80 plus pages and to produce 
three versions would take so much time that ... so we no longer produce ... 
LA: What do you produce when you produce a translation? 
174 This occurred at a meeting at which I was the interpreter. 
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QQ: Something that we consider to be a neutral version. We use Latin script 
for everyone, very rarely do we use Cyrillic, very rarely, if we, you know, it's 
out of courtesy, if somebody is writing to a, I don't know, some, a Serb 
general and they want it to be in this and they specify that they would like it to 
be very ... then we do it but very rarely now. So it's something that I would call 
a neutral version that's something that everyone will understand because it's 
now very ... we are very often time-limited. There is no time to, you know, you 
wish to give your stuff that you've translated to somebody as soon as you 
fmish it so we rely on feeling, on what everyone will understand and in that I 
think we are using something that is somewhere in between Serbian and 
Bosnian. And not Croatian Ilaughs! I mean there is no way you can mix too 
much. 
The above excerpt suggests that the change in policy was an initiative of the 
linguists themselves and the following excerpt from an interview with IR who 
also works with the NAT appears to confirm this. When asked if they were told 
to do a 'universal' version, as they called it, by anyone they say: 
I don't know. It was .. J don't know. It happened recently. You know, it's a 
waste of time, it's a waste of paper, everybody understands it anyway. And so 
I guess we tried, we went for it. So, let's go for it and see if anyone minds. No 
complaints. OK. 
It is worth here considering what it means to produce what the linguists cited 
above refer to as either a 'universal' or 'neutral' version. This is not a separate 
language version that has been officially established in the language service as 
an alternative to an ethnically-hued version of a translation. It is, rather, a 
version produced by any given translator endeavouring to remove from the 
translated text any characteristic that they judge might be instantly identifiable 
with one of the ethnically-hued versions. In this process they are doing the 
opposite to what they do when they produce a version for a specific ethnic 
group which entails stressing the written markers that characterise each version 
rather than minimising them. This means that there is nothing in the text that 
would strike the reader as inappropriate to a version specific to their ethnicity 
and lead them to reject it as the 'wrong' language version. In this sense the 
importance of the communicative function of the language is restored to the 
translation as it is the meaning of the text that has greater significance than the 
actual language version it is written in. 
To a certain extent the current translation policy at the NAT is a 
reflection of the flexibility of the changed policy in the Ministry of Defence 
itself. This is clear from what QQ says below: 
We get letters from the Armed Forces or the Ministry of Defence. Their policy 
is that whoever drafted it, they use their own language. So we get letters in 
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Cyrillic, Serbian, and I think everyone is accommodating that right of the 
others to use their own language. So a letter comes from Mr. Cikotic Iminister 
of defence/ who is Bosniak and it's written, it's drafted in Serbian, Cyrillic and 
he signs it. That's become their own policy. Somebody in a department in the 
ministry drafted it for him, he just signs without. .. and it comes in Cyrillic. The 
same happened when a Serb was the Minister of Defence so people are quite 
flexible now. 
Interviewee KM puts this down to the fact 'They work in the same office, 
Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Bosniaks. They share the office, they speak the same 
language'. While RK suggests another reason for this change: 
It has to do with the, it also has to do with the change of the people that these 
letters are actually going to, because, I mean, the soldiers and the officers 
NATO was writing to like 6,7,8 years ago are now totally different. Most of 
them are gone and even now, even those that are still here have changed 
annually but they behave differently. No one will actually make a big fuss of a 
letter sent to him not being in this language or that language the way he sees, 
you know, he feels that language. People, I would say are trying to be more 
pragmatic so as soon as they get the message and understand the message they 
don't make a problem about that.175 
Several things can be concluded about language policy from the above 
discussion of the developments in language practice in the SFOR HQ since 
1995. First of all, there has been no uniform language policy across the force. 
The different national contingents had their own policies based on the language 
requirements in the location in which they were operating (they also had their 
own practices as regards language requirements, the recruitment of linguists, 
employment conditions and the organisation of the linguists' work). The 
situation was the same in the different elements within the HQ itself. Practice 
and policy were essentially left to each element until 2001 and the 
establishment of the LSB. It can be said therefore that there was no formalised 
language policy document that laid out practice and requirements as 
determined either at the level of HQ SFOR or SHAPE. If we view language 
policy in a less formalised way though it can be said that language policy was 
based on the decisions that were made immediately following the signing of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. From the evidence it appears that once the war 
was over and three official languages were recognised the former warring sides 
demanded that their language rights be respected and they receive 
175 Interviewee RK also said that they had heard Bosnian Serb officers using ekavian words but 
they thought that this was because they had been officers in the Yugoslav People's Army in 
which ekavian had been 'kind of the official dialect'. Serbo-Croat was the official language of 
the Yugoslav People's Army. 
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documentation in their particular language version. In response, the decision 
was made within HQ SFOR to produce three language versions of each 
document. Once this decision was made it became established practice for the 
next five or six years and in that sense a policy was created. 
Second, policy changed in around 2001 and became more flexible as a 
consequence of a combination of external and internal factors. The LSB was 
established which provided the organisational framework within which 
language issues were addressed. This then made it easier for the linguists 
themselves to influence the approach of military personnel to the three-
language version policy. In tandem with this, outside the force there was a 
general move towards closer relations with the EU and NATO which required 
closer cooperation between the three former warring sides. A consequence of 
this greater cooperation was a softening of attitudes towards issues of 
separation along ethnic lines so that a relaxation of the three language version 
policy on the part of SFOR HQ was accepted. After 2005 the linguists 
continued to be the initiators of a further relaxation of language policy as they 
reacted to changes in the organisation of NATO and EUFOR forces and their 
closer cooperation with the local forces. In this sense, the linguists are the 
drivers of language policy. 
If the linguists shape language policy, as I am claiming, then this raises 
various issues to do with the position of the linguists, as locally-hired civilian 
employees, working in an international military force, and the power 
relationship between them and the military personnel. The relationship is a 
complex one. On the one hand, the military personnel have to trust the linguist 
as they facilitate communication between them and the local people and 
authorities. In this sense the military personnel have to trust that the linguist 
has the skill to be able to interpret and translate correctly and objectively. 
Additionally, the linguist is a repository of knowledge about the local 
community, local culture and past events even before a particular member of 
the military arrived in theatre. The military personnel are therefore dependent 
on the linguist for their wider insider knowledge which will hopefully facilitate 
the smooth course of operations. This dependence may also foster loyalty to 
the linguist on the part of a member of the military especially in offices where 
the two work closely together. So, for example, as the LSB was being set up 
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and there was the prospect of job losses certain supervisors did their best to 
justify their need for their particular linguist because they were aware of the 
poor chances of alternative employment outside the force should the linguist 
lose their job and they wanted to protect the linguist. 
On the other hand, as touched upon earlier in this chapter when 
discussing the establishment of the LSB, there is always the risk of an element 
of suspicion or mistrust in the attitude of a member of the military to a linguist. 
As a member of the local population the linguist is in the military force but is 
not of it. In the eyes of the military personnel they may not share the same 
values or attitudes as them and their allegiance may not be wholly to the force. 
Thus, the linguist may be seen in terms of their ethnicity and considered to be 
more loyal to their ethnic group than to the force. Moreover, as a member of 
one of the three main ethnic groups, they may be seen in simplistic terms as 
representing the interests and the ideas of their particular ethnic group. This 
perceived loyalty to the ethnic group, as well as other issues relating to their 
family or local community, meant in the words of one British army language 
trainer who was in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the conflict and was 
interviewed by Catherine Baker that the linguists would 'normally bring some 
form of baggage [ ... ] in terms of values, [] contacts' and as Baker explains, 
'Their "baggage" might include personal conflicts, family matters, blackmail 
pressures or even plans for revenge' (Baker, 2010: 166). Therefore because of 
this 'baggage' a linguist cannot be completely trusted. Their situation is made 
more difficult by the fact that locally-hired linguists do not have NATO 
security clearance. Only a member country of NATO can give this clearance so 
citizens of non-NATO Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be able to obtain it. 
Even though all locally-hired personnel are required to be interviewed by the 
force's Security section every six months, this procedure falls short of full 
security clearance so there is still some residual suspicion of the locally-hired 
linguists. 
Given the influence of the linguists on language policy and the complex 
relationship between them and members of the international military force, it is 
worth trying to gain a deeper insight into the motivations of linguists for the 
linguistic decisions they make and in the process question whether it is 
reasonable to essentialise the ethnic identity of a linguist. The next section will 
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therefore consider translator ethics. This is an issue that has been dealt with in 
the scholarship on translation theory particularly in the field of literary 
translation (Venuti, 1995; Jones, 2004; Chesterman, 2001) but nothing has yet 
been published about ethics in the context of translation and interpretation for 
an international military force in a conflict and post-conflict situation. This 
section therefore will go some way to fill this gap in the scholarship. 
Translator ethics 
As a starting point for considering translator ethics in the context of 
translating and interpreting for the international military force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina it is instructive to look at four basic models of translation ethics 
put forward by Andrew Chesterman. These models can be differentiated as an 
ethics of representation, an ethics of service, an ethics of communication and 
norm-based ethics. In essence the ethics of representation is concerned with 
representing 'the source text, or the source author's intention, accurately, 
without adding, omitting or changing anything' (Chesterman, 2001: 139). The 
ethics of service is focussed on translation as 'a commercial service performed 
for a client' and in this regard 'A translator is deemed to act ethically if the 
translation complies with the instructions set by the client and fulfils the aim of 
the translation as set by the client and accepted or negotiated by the translator' 
(Chesterman 2001: 140). Three important aspects of this ethic are loyalty (to 
the client, as well as the target reader and the original writer), efficiency (the 
translator values the client's time and therefore meets deadlines) and the 
invisibility176 of the translator (Chesterman 2001: 140). In the ethics of 
communication the emphasis is 'not on representing the Other but on 
communicating with others' and 'the ethical translator is a mediator working to 
achieve cross-cultural understanding' (Chesterman 2001: 141). Norm-based 
ethics has arisen from descriptive translation studies and norm theory and 
'investigates the norms that detennine or influence translation production and 
176 Invisibility is a concept advanced by Lawrence Venuti relating to the role of primarily the 
literary translator. Venuti asserts that a translation is judged to be acceptable if it is deemed to 
read fluently i.e. 'wben the absence of any linguistic or stylistic peculiarities makes it seem 
transparent, giving the appearance that it reflects the foreign writer's personality or intention or 
the essential meaning of the foreign text - the appearance, in other words, that the translation is 
not in fact a translation but the "original'" (1995: 1). In short, 'The more fluent the translation, 
the more invisible the translator, and, presumably, the more visible the writer or meaning of the 
foreign text' (Venuti, 1995: 2). 
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reception' (Chesterman 2001: 141). According to this model, 'Behaving 
ethically thus means behaving as one is expected to behave, in accordance with 
the norms, not surprising the reader or client' (Chesterman 2001: 141). 
The first two models - the ethics of representation and the ethics of 
service - are most relevant to translation and interpretation for the international 
military force. They neatly encapsulate the two primary angles from which 
translator ethics can be viewed in the context of the international military force: 
fidelity to the text or utterance and loyalty to the client, that is to say, the 
organisation employing the linguist. In both models the linguist is expected to 
be invisible or 'erased,' as Zrinka Stahuljak (2000) has put it. In the former 
model, the importance of the message being conveyed and accuracy in the 
process over-rides the opinions and attitudes of the agent conveying the 
message, that is to say, the linguist. A major element of this invisibility for a 
linguist working with the international military force is the maintenance of 
neutrality in conveying the message. As Chesterman says, by representing the 
source text or source author's intention 'faithfully and truly' the linguist is 
acting 'like a good mirror' (2001: 140). In the latter model, focus is on the 
international military force as the organisation requiring the services of the 
linguist and setting the conditions for the provision of those services. 
The question of neutrality has been linked in the scholarship with 
professionalism. For example, the late Danica Seleskovitch, the most well-
known teacher of French-Serbo-Croat conference interpreting, formulated three 
prerequisites of professional interpretation, the most important of which she 
considered to be a professional methodology acquired through training so that 
a professional interpreter is 'fully aware that (s)he is a neutral mediator in 
someone else's communication, that mutual understanding should be 
prioritised and that the professional mediator's own opinion and stance should 
never be either evident or communicated' (Dragovic Drouet, 2007: 29).177 
This link between professionalism and neutrality is also made by AG in the 
quote earlier in this chapter. It is especially important for linguists working for 
international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina because they are hired 
locally (or to use Michael Cronin's term hired in a heteronomous system of 
177 The other two were knowledge of the source and target languages and knowledge of the 
subject under discussion. 
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recruitment) and therefore they can be seen not just as linguists but also as 
members of one of the ethnic groups represented in the country. As such, their 
objectivity and neutrality can be questioned by either one of the former warring 
sides or the organisation that has employed them. There is a further link here, 
also touched upon by AG above, because neutrality manifested by a linguist 
engenders trust in the linguist's professionalism on the part of the interlocutors 
which in turn facilitates smooth communication between the sides. 
The effects of a failure to maintain neutrality and therefore 
professionalism are considered by Stahuljak in her analysis of the experiences 
of volunteer interpreters working for the EC Monitoring Mission in Croatia in 
1992 and 1993178 who were all ethnic Croats. She ponders the motivations of 
those who volunteered and concludes that an interpreter does so because 'she is 
politically involved in the conflict. She volunteers out of "patriotism," because 
she wants "to do something, " "to help" by using her language skills' (2000: 
41). (The passages in italics are quotes from interviews with the volunteer 
interpreters themselves.) In the context of ongoing conflict between the Croats 
and the Serbs the wish to be politically involved in at least some way is 
understandable, but political involvement is at odds with the necessity to 
maintain neutrality. Other quotes from the ECMM translators illustrate how 
this failure to be neutral is manifested: 
'A translator cannot and should not be just a "transmitter". One needs to have 
unofficial conversations. ' 
'R£gardless of the official function, I try to play the role of an unofficial 
representative of the Republic of Croatia, I explain the situation in this part of 
the world to the monitors' (Stahuljak, 2000: 42). 
Stahuljak sees this as the desire of the interpreter to be a witness and to be part 
of the process of testifying to what happened in the conflict between the ethnic 
Croats and Serbs even if the interpreter was not an actual eye witness to events. 
But in the context of neutrality the two roles of witness and interpreter are 
incompatible and as soon as the interpreter abandons the role of neutral 
intermediary the interpretation is disrupted along with the process of 
information gathering conducted by the ECMM monitors. Moreover, trust 
between the linguist and the monitors is also undermined which may have 
171 Stahuljak bases her analysis on 24 interviews conducted by the Croatian social psychologist 
Ivan Magdalenic between autumn 1992 and spring 1993. Ten translators were female aged 
between 19 and 50 and 14 were male aged between 18 and 40. 
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serious consequences for the linguist, as evidenced by one linguist quoted by 
Stahuljak who was 'recalled from duty after "[mJostly translating, although I 
was explaining to them what was happening there'" (2000:44). 
The question of the interpreter's allegiance is a pertinent one here. If an 
interpreter has volunteered to work with the ECMM out of a sense of 
patriotism it could be assumed (as suggested by the above quotes) that their 
loyalty would be to the Republic of Croatia since all the interpreters considered 
by Stahuljak were ethnic Croats. There is therefore a danger that their 
interpretation would favour the Croatian side over the Serbian and the picture 
gained by the ECMM monitors would be skewed towards the Croatian 
interpretation of events. This is a particularly important issue in this context as 
the interpreters were interpreting in situations mainly involving ethnic Serbs. 
Furthermore, as volunteers, i.e. not formally employed by the ECMM and 
therefore not bound by any code of conduct, their allegiance to the ECMM may 
be rather weak and certainly less strong than to their country. 
This is the situation with linguists who volunteered to work for the 
particular ECMM mission however there are two other aspects of the question 
of allegiance and how it is nurtured which are more relevant to organisations 
that formally employ locally-hired linguists. The first aspect is to do with the 
financial imperative of employment In her general consideration of 
interpreting and translation issues arising from the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999, Dragovic-Drouet stresses that potential 
linguists were attracted to working for international organisations (as well as 
non-governmental organisations, media outlets and the peace-keeping forces) 
by the 'High unemployment brought about by the civil war, and the proffered 
high pay rates' (2007:33). The local economic situation is extremely important 
in this regard as it not only provides the linguist with the initial impetus to 
apply for a position with an international organisation but it also keeps the 
linguist locked into their employment because a linguist is fully aware that if 
they lose their well-paid position they may not find another one. Fear of 
unemployment could therefore influence the behaviour of a linguist and their 
adherence to certain behavioural norms expected from a professional neutral 
intCfrmediary . 
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The other aspect to nurturing a sense of allegiance is the existence of a 
code of conduct that a linguist or indeed any employee is required to sign on 
commencing employment with an international organisation. All civilian 
employees, both international and local hires, of the international military force 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina are required to sign a declaration of loyalty such as the 
one below for the SFOR HQ: 
I solemnly undertake to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the 
functions entrusted to me as a staff member of SFOR, and to discharge these 
functions with the interest of SFOR only in view. I undertake not to seek or 
accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any other 
authority other Isicl than HQ SFOR. (My own document) 
The first sentence of this declaration makes it clear where the allegiance, or 
loyalty, of the employee should lie while the second underscores the primacy 
of SFOR over any other authority. While this is not a code of conduct that 
specifically governs the activities of the linguists working with the 
international military force, it nevertheless chimes with Chesterman's model of 
ethics of service as discussed above. It is at odds, however, with the model of 
ethics of representation if the linguist is required to carry out their duties 'with 
the interest of SFOR only in view' since according to this model it is the source 
language and the intention of the source writer that have primacy. 
In view of this ethical conflict it is worth asking where the linguist 
working for the international military force is therefore positioned in an 
interpreter-mediated situation. Their allegiance to the organisation requires 
loyalty to that organisation and yet this may conflict with the professional 
requirement of maintaining neutrality and invisibility. This conflict is drawn 
out by Mona Baker in her book Translation and Conflict which views 
translation through narrative theory, making use in this regard of work by the 
social theorists Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson. Baker elaborates on their 
four kinds of narrative: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives. 
The two kinds of narratives most germane to our particular discussion of 
translator ethics are the ontological and public narratives. 179 
179 For Baker conceptual narratives are 'the stories and explanations that scholars in any field 
elaborate for themselves and others about their object of inquiry' (2006: 39) and she suggests 
the concept of the Clash of Civilizations posited by Samuel Huntington as one of these. In 
descnbing meta-narratives or master narratives Baker quotes Gibson and Somers who see these 
as narratives 'in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history ... Progress, 
222 
Ontological narratives are 'personal stories that we tell ourselves about 
our place in the world and our own personal history. These stories both 
constitute and make sense of our lives' (Baker, 2006: 28). Baker points out, 
however, the interplay between these narratives that are focussed on the self 
and the collective narratives in which they are situated and on which they 
depend and which inform them (Baker, 2006: 29). This interplay is important 
because if 'ontological narratives are used to define who we are; this in turn is 
a precondition for knowing what to do' (Somers and Gibson quoted in Baker, 
2006: 30) and the way we act naturally impacts on those around us (Baker, 
2006: 31). Baker concludes: 'In the final analysis we have to negotiate our way 
around the various incompatibilities or conflicts between our ontological 
narratives and those of other individuals with whom we share a social space, as 
well as incompatibilities with collective narratives, in order to be believed, 
respected, trusted' (2006: 31). 
Drawing on Somers' (1992, 1997) and Somers' and Gibson's (1994) 
model, Baker defmes public narratives 'as stories elaborated by and circulating 
among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the 
family, religious or educational institutions, the media, and the nation' (2006: 
33). To illustrate these she gives examples of the public narratives concerning 
11 September 2001 and the war on Iraq launched by the US-led Coalition in 
2003. In the Bosnia-Herzegovina context, it could be said that one public 
narrative that is circulated widely is concerned with the need for each ethnic 
group to have its own distinct language as a marker of its identity. 
If we apply Baker's ideas about narrative theory to the linguists 
working for the international military force we can see how different personal 
and collective narratives interact to dictate the behaviour of the linguists. Each 
of the linguists has their own personal or ontological narrative situated within, 
among other narratives, the collective narrative of their professional lives in 
which there are several important elements which may conflict. Firstly, this 
collective narrative dictates that a linguist should be a neutral intermediary 
when translating and interpreting but in conflict with this is a second element 
Decadence. Industrialization. Enlightenment, etc.' (2006: 44). Baker suggests the War on 
Terror as one of these meta-narratives. 
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which dictates a firm allegiance to the international military force over any 
other authority. Thirdly the professional narrative also increasingly favours a 
policy of producing just one 'universal' or 'neutral' language version of a 
translation rather than three even though this is at odds with the particular 
public narrative of the importance of three separate languages distinguishing 
the three ethnic groups. 
The way the linguists interviewed negotiate these conflicting narratives 
can be seen in the responses that they gave to two questions - What language 
do you speak? and What language did you speak before the war? The 
responses to the first question are varied and quite convoluted in some cases, 
suggesting an effort to fit their own ontological narrative into the wider public 
narrative and to make sense of where they are situated in this public narrative: 
Linguist KM: 
LA: If somebody were to ask you what language you spoke what would you 
say? 
KM: Serbo-Croatian, still. Well, sometimes I say, like to foreigners, I say local 
language. To locals I say our language, nai jezik, or my language, sometimes 
Serbo-Croatian. I just don't feel comfortable saying I speak Serbian, I speak 
Bosnian. I defmitely don't speak Croatian. My mother tongue should be 
Serbian but I live in Bosnia and it's kind of a mixture of Bosnian and Serbian, 
I don't know, maybe it's Serbo-Bosnian /laughs!. 
Linguist CA: 
LA: If somebody asked you what language you spoke what would you say? 
CA: Privately or professionally? Because there is a difference. 
LA: Yeh, well, tell me both. 
CA: Privately, I speak Sarajevan. /laughs! No, yeh, the local dialect. It would 
be, well, heavily influenced by Serbo-Croat, defmitely, because I simply don't 
want to spend my days and especially my time off putting in an effort. So I 
will speak in Serbo-Croat with a heavy, heavy influence of local, well, dialect, 
slang, I would say. Professionally, when I am addressing someone in local 
language it is always either Bosnian, Serb or Croat and I strive to be very 
correct. I do, I hope. 
Linguist IR: 
LA: So if somebody were to ask you which language you spoke what would 
you say? 
IR.: Oooph. I'd say I speak the same language I spoke in 1990 so it would be 
Serbo-Croat /laughs! I don't know, I guess it's the same language, it hasn't 
changed. 
LA: But if somebody, if a soldier, I don't know. a foreign soldier. an 
American you had never met and he came and asked you what language you 
speak what would you say? 




LA: So if somebody were to ask you, what language you spoke what would 
you say? 
LB: As you know, I am too old, and I was raised, I was born in something that 
is today in the Republika Srpska, Trebinje, but I was there until I was 5. I was, 
I went to school in some areas where the majority are Croats and from my 
early frrst grade in primary school until I finished university it was Serbo-
Croat. We usually say s-h, just the abbreviation. And I cannot say, I don't 
know how someone can say that when he is 50 or over now he speaks another 
language. /thoughts on learning English! I cannot just say today that I'm, my 
language is Bosnian, Serbian, Croat, if you divide them, or you can call it 
Esperanto. Anyone can name it how they would like but I am speaking Serbo-
Croat. 
Linguist ZS: 
LA: So if somebody were to ask you what language you spoke what would 
you say? 
ZS: I would say Bosnian. 
LA: And would you say that every time? Would it depend on who was asking 
you? 
ZS: No, I would say that each time because I don't speak Croatian, it's a 
different dialect and it's, I mean, the dialect that I speak is different from 
Croatian language and the accent and everything and I definitely don't speak 
Serbian so it's like I would say in between and then it is Bosnian. I am a proud 
Bosnian and therefore I am proud in saying that I speak Bosnian. 
It can be seen that some of the interviewed linguists use various ways to avoid 
designating the language they speak according to one of the official languages 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In their explanations they were most likely to use the 
pre-war designation of Serbo-Croat despite the awareness that that designation 
no longer officially exists. CA illustrates well the dilemma of linguists 
negotiating conflicting narratives. In their ontological narrative they prefer to 
describe their language in terms of the city in which they live, as opposed to 
the ethnic group they belong to, or the town in which they were born or one of 
the official languages. Professionally though they strive to be 'very correct,' 
naming the language according to the current official designations. 
Linguist ZS, as one of the linguists who unequivocally stated that they 
spoke one of the official languages (rather than Serbo-Croat), is also caught 
between narratives but in a slightly different way to CA. Having stated that 
they speak Bosnian it could be expected in view of the public narrative of 
Bosnian being the language of the Bosniak ethnic group that they would call 
themselves a 'proud Bosniak'. Instead they call themselves 'a proud Bosnian' 
meaning that they see themselves as a citizen of the country rather than a 
member of a particular ethnic group. This is their way of negotiating between 
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their own ontological narrative and the public one of the three languages 
designating the three ethnic groups. 
In contrast to the answers given above, the answer that all the linguists 
interviewed gave in response to the question of which language they spoke 
before the war was always Serbo-Croat and given without hesitation. Such an 
unequivocal response suggests that before the war there was no dilemma for 
the linguists between their ontological narrative and the public narrative when 
it came to the question of the language they spoke. The public narrative was 
based on official government policy that the Croats, Muslims and Serbs 
throughout the fooner Yugoslavia spoke one language which was called either 
Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian and that there was no narod-Ianguage link. 
Moreover, from the point of view of the linguists' ontological narratives, 
calling the language Serbo-Croat did not conflict with how they felt about 
identifying with either their narod or the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
two types of narrative were therefore not in conflict. 
The question of 'the right thing to do' 
Now that we have looked at narrative theory as elucidated by Baker and 
how this can facilitate understanding of the actions of the linguists working for 
the international military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina we can examine the idea 
of courtesy and 'the right thing to do' as mentioned by the linguists in the 
interviews cited earlier on in this chapter. One of these was ZG who considered 
it 'a proper and right thing to do' to translate project documentation into the 
particular language of the recipient of the documentation rather than just a 
'neutral' version. In doing this they are demonstrating awareness of the public 
narrative concerning the three official languages in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the possibility that a translation in the wrong language may be rejected by the 
recipient, which in turn may negatively impact on operations. This public 
narrative mayor may not correspond to his ontological one. 
Furthennore, ZG is also aware of the collective narrative of their 
working environment and the fact that their actions may affect how an outsider 
will view the international military force. If they put the translation into a 
'neutral' language version the recipient may feel that the international forces 
are not respecting him and his rights as a member of one of the ethnic groups 
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and this may influence the way in which he interacts with them. Using a 
particular language version, on the other hand, avoids the possibility of this 
happening and becomes a question of respect for that person's ethnicity and 
thus a question of courtesy. 
For the linguists working at the NAT with the newly reformed armed 
forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina the situation is slightly different. By producing a 
'neutral' version of a translation they are respecting the collective narrative not 
necessarily ofEUFOR but of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina which in 
turn does not correspond to the public narrative of three official languages. 
And again this mayor may not correspond to the ontological narrative of the 
linguists themselves but they nevertheless consider that this is the right thing to 
do. 
The purpose of the above discussion was to show how linguists 
working for the international military force have to negotiate varying and often 
conflicting narratives when making linguistic decisions in their professional 
lives. It is therefore simplistic to view the linguist solely as a member of a 
given ethnic group and therefore embedded in the public narrative of each 
ethnic group having its own separate and distinct language. It is more helpful to 
view a linguist caught between the public narrative, the professional narrative 
of their place of work and, additionally, their ontological narrative when 
considering their motivations for their actions. This therefore gives us a greater 
understanding of translator ethics and the motivations of linguists working in a 
conflict and post-conflict environment. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to shed light on the factors that 
influence the formulation of language policy in the context of the international 
military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has been shown that this policy has 
developed in response to circumstances outside the force. During the war little 
attention was paid to issues regarding the differentiation of three language 
versions but immediately after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and 
its de facto recognition of three official languages policy changed to 
accommodate the demands of local military and political authorities for their 
language rights to be respected. Thus the decision was made by members of the 
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military personnel, particularly in the HQ, to produce three language versions 
of every document and this formed the basis of the language policy that 
prevailed at the force HQ until about 2000. Over time, however, it was the 
influence of the linguists themselves that led to a modification and relaxation 
of this policy. This has been a progressive change starting with the translation 
of long documents or conference presentations, and now it can be said that 
more often than not just one version of a translation will be produced. This is 
especially clear from the interviews with the linguists working for the NAT 
who work most closely with members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed 
forces. 
It can be said that the initial reasons for this relaxation were pragmatic. 
The production of three versions is a drain on resources and is hard to justify in 
a practical sense. As time has gone on, however, especially within the wider 
context of the defence reform and establishment of unified armed forces, the 
practice is also a reflection of attitudes among the members of the local 
military and their own administrative practices. Whereas immediately after the 
conflict the different militaries were operating in an environment in which the 
ethnic groups were to be distinguished from each other as much as possible, 
even linguistically, after 2001 their environment gradually changed to one in 
which cooperation and collaboration were emphasised in striving towards the 
common goal of achieving NATO and EO membership. Thus language policy 
has been modified in line with these changed attitudes. 
Although they did not make the initial decision on the three-language 
policy we have seen in this chapter that the linguists themselves have over time 
had most influence over language policy. They have also been influential in 
another sense. In implementing the three-language policy required by the 
former warring sides and the international military force they have been 
responsible for finding ways to distinguish the three language versions and 
making one language three. They have thus contributed to efforts outside the 
force to consolidate three distinct standard languages and thereby fed into the 
essentially political idea that these languages are distinct. Because the precise 
features of these languages are still unclear the influence of the linguists of the 
international military force, as well as those working for other international 
organisations who have the same concerns, is essential in moulding them. This 
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is particularly important for the Bosnian language where there is still 
disagreement among the Bosniak: language planners over the precise profile of 
the language. Seen in sociolinguistic terms, the linguists have therefore 
contributed to both the status and the corpus planning aims of the language 
planners. 
The experience of the linguists employed with the international military 
force HQ tells us much about language policy formulation. For example, a 
language policy does not have to be written down and formalised at the highest 
level. I would argue in this particular case that the fact that the process of 
policy formation occurred at a lower level and in an essentially ad hoc fashion 
made the policy more flexible and able to adapt to the changing outside 
environment. But this is perhaps only possible because it was guided by 
experienced linguists working on the ground rather than military personnel 
with little knowledge of the language situation in the country. As experienced 
linguists they have the 'institutional memory' to be able to put language issues 
in the context of past practice and experience. Moreover, as locally-hired 
linguists they understand perfectly well issues surrounding the mutual 
intelligibility of the three languages and the symbolic function of language as a 
marker of ethnic identity. Finally, having to negotiate complex and conflicting 
narratives they understand the fluidity of the language situation and 
implications for policy and policy change. 
The experience of the international military force holds several lessons 
as regards language policy formulation in the context of external peace-
building. First of all, it is advantageous to include the input of linguists in 
formulating language policy as they are the ones who are most knowledgeable 
about the language situation in the given conflictlpost-conflict environment. 
Second, any language policy should be flexible enough to respond to changes 
on the ground especially because in a post-conflict peace-building environment 
the hope and expectation is that these circumstances will over time move from 
belligerence to conciliation. Here, again, the input of linguists who are in post 
for periods far longer than a six-month rotation is important. Third, it is useful 
to have a separate organisational structure run according to recognised 
professional standards in which the linguists can be employed. As shown in the 
SFOR HQ example this means that linguists are more likely to be trained as 
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professionals and treated as such and therefore taken more seriously in the 
policy-making process. During the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bulk of 
linguists were non-professionals, recruited on an ad hoc basis with little regard 
for their level of knowledge, ability and interpretation and translation 
experience. Having an organisational framework in which the linguists can be 
employed means that they can be tested, trained and their performance assessed 
and evaluated. Moreover, this instils a sense of translator and interpreter ethics 
and enhances the professionalism of the linguists. 
Finally, language policy developments in the international military 
force demonstrate the way in which a language policy can interact with moves 
to achieve wider peace-building aims. The rigid language policy established 
after 1995 reflected wider socio-political attitudes but did not reflect the peace-
building aims of the international community but the changes since 2001 have 
been in tune not only with changed attitudes within the domestic military force 
itself but also with the defence reform goals. In this sense we can see that even 
though an institutional language policy may not by itself be able to effect 
positive change in the wider society it nevertheless reinforces the social 
attitudes that prevail at any given time. In that sense it can still nevertheless be 
used to aid the achievement of peace-building goals. 
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CONCLUSION 
Much of this thesis has been concerned with examining the implications 
of language being seen as a barbed wire fence. In the original quote Lord 
Ashdown suggested that each of the fonner warring sides in Bosnia-
Herzegovina clung on to this metaphorical barbed wire as a way of keeping 
themselves apart from the other ethnic groups. The goal of this thesis has been 
to investigate how the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
dealt with a situation where language is used almost as a weapon to achieve 
wartime aims in a peacetime situation. To this end, I have examined the 
language policy of the international community since war's end in 1995. There 
has been an exploration of whether the international organisations present in 
the country have had an identifiable language policy and. if not, what approach 
they have taken to language issues. This language policy has been put in the 
context of the peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the study has 
sought to offer an answer to the question of whether the approach of the 
international community to language issues in the country has helped or 
hindered this process since 1995. 
My research questions revolved around whether the international 
organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a language policy and if so what 
fonn this took. how it was fonnulated and conducted and by whom. If they did 
not have a policy the question was how they have approached the language 
issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to answer these questions I looked at 
three areas gennane to the peace-building project in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
where various international organisations have played a lead role. The first of 
these was the constitutional-political framework that was put in place in the 
Dayton Peace Agreement of December 1995 and has to all intents and purposes 
been overseen by the Office of the High Representative. Second, I looked at 
the reform of the education system which, since 2002. has been guided by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The third area under 
consideration was the defence reform that was led by the NATO Stabilisation 
Force. In my research I also looked at the language issue from a historical 
perspective because the language issues that are of concern now are not new 
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and different approaches have been taken in the past to deal with these. The 
research into all these areas threw up various issues when considering the 
question of the language policy of the international community which make the 
answer to the question of its impact on the peace-building process a complex 
one. 
This concluding chapter will start by answering the question of whether 
the international community has had a language policy. The short answer to 
this is no. No policy document exists detailing the approach of the international 
community to language issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the intended 
outcomes of policy . Yet the literature review in Chapter 1 indicated that the 
concept of language policy (and planning) is a broad one. A language policy, 
for example, does not have to be a formalised policy containing rational 
planning goals and disseminated to the relevant levels for implementation. 
Rather, a language policy can be discerned in the decisions that are taken 
which deal with or influence language issues in some way in a given 
environment. Following Spolsky (2005), therefore, policy can be ascertained 
by looking at the actions taken by the relevant authority in language matters 
which directly apply to language issues. In this view, then, by investigating the 
actions of certain international organisations in dealing with language issues 
this study has revealed that the international community in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has had a language policy. The first decision in this policy is 
readily discernible in the de facto recognition of three official languages -
Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian - in the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, thus 
giving equal status to the three languages. My research indicated that this 
decision may not have been made deliberately by the negotiators at the Dayton 
negotiations but it was clear from the field interviews with linguists working 
with the NATO Implementation Force at the time that this recognition of the 
equality of the three languages had an immediate impact, heralding a change in 
attitudes both among the local military forces and, as a response to their 
demands, among members of the multinational military force. After the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the representatives of each of the three former 
warring sides felt that they were entitled to have their own language respected 
and therefore demanded documentation in their specific language version. 
This initial Dayton decision affected not just the NATO force but also the other 
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large international organisations present in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the OSCE and 
the OHR, for example, both adopted the policy of providing documentation in 
three language versions. 
The other decision contained in the Dayton Peace Agreement which can 
be viewed indirectly as a language policy decision is the decision to require the 
post-war state to sign up to international legal instruments designed to protect 
minority language rights, such as the 1992 European Charter for Regional and 
Minority Languages and the 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. The significance of this is that the former was used in the 
2002 Constitutional Court decision on the constituent status of the constituent 
peoples or narodi which, among other things, consolidated the status of the 
three separate languages and their equality. It also supported the claims of the 
three main ethnic groups to linguistic and ethnic distinctiveness. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of these international documents related to linguistic human rights 
in the Dayton Peace Agreement has also allowed local nationalist politicians to 
invoke these in order to justify, for example, their failure to do away with 
segregation in schools. 
How is international community language policy 
formulated? 
If the Dayton Peace Agreement marks the beginning of the language 
policy process of the international community, as I have suggested, then the 
next question is how is it developed and implemented. In order to investigate 
this question I focussed on the two areas of education reform and defence 
reform. I chose these two areas because they were treated in different ways in 
the Dayton Peace Agreement: education reform was mentioned hardly at all 
while the bulk of the agreement is devoted to the military aspects of the peace. 
I also thought that investigation of these contrasting sectors would highlight 
different approaches to the language issue and demonstrate the different 
implications that language policy can have depending on the sector concerned. 
I will consider the results of my research in these two sectors separately below. 
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International community language policy in education 
reform 
We saw in Chapter 4 on language and the education reform that the 
international community has not dealt with language issues as issues in 
themselves. Rather, decisions on language issues have been made as part of 
other policies. The language issue is important both as a subject in the 
curriculum and as the language of instruction but decisions about these two 
aspects are made only in the context of facilitating the aims of a wider policy, 
for example, the policy to encourage the return of refugees and displaced 
persons which was a priority for the international community in the post-war 
period. The intention here was to create a friendly learning environment for 
returnee children who would find themselves in a minority position in their 
communities and schools. Policies in the education sector in this regard 
initially facilitated the establishment of 'two schools under one roof' schools 
and the introduction of the national subjects. Both these aspects of policy have 
a strong language element which has been used to frustrate the original aim of 
promoting integration and to maintain segregation. I argued that this is because 
of the emotional power that language has as a marker of ethnic identity in a 
state where the population experiences societal insecurity. This was 
demonstrated by the fact that local politicians justify their failure to do away 
with segregation in schools by invoking the spectre of language death and 
therefore the death of the nation if they do. As this research has demonstrated, 
where societal insecurity is salient, as it is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such claims 
find fertile ground among local populations and this makes it difficult for the 
international community to effect change in policies which directly impact on 
issues of identity, such as education refonn. 
In the education sector language has not been the object of policy but it 
is nevertheless inextricably linked with education reform moves and is 
implicated in the achievement of education reform goals. My research suggests 
that the international community failed to appreciate the importance of the 
language-ethnic identity link for education issues and did not understand how 
language issues fed into the conduct of other policies. In short, the international 
organisations dealing with education refonn failed to comprehend how 
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language could be manipulated to maintain ethnic segregation, thus frustrating 
the overall peace-building goals of the international community. 
International community language policy in defence 
reform 
Language policy decisions taken in the NATO force demonstrate a 
different kind of language policy. In this environment language policy relates 
to an institutional policy concerning the production of documents and 
translation and interpretation practices. It differs from language policy in the 
field of education reform because language was not a subject in the post-war 
negotiations and is therefore not implicated in the conduct of other policies as 
we saw in the field of education reform. 
As I suggested above, policy was set in the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
The decisions taken immediately after it came into force were made by senior 
military officers. Thereafter, however, and particularly at the level of the HQ, 
which guided the defence reform process, language policy was left to the 
linguists themselves. I argue in this study that this had the consequence of 
making language policy more flexible than it otherwise might have been had it 
been guided by non-linguist members of the foreign militaries. As relations 
between the three former warring sides became less tense and more 
cooperative, especially once Bosnia-Herzegovina had declared its intention to 
join NATO and the EU in 2001, language policy as regards the translation of 
three language versions could be relaxed. The impetus for this relaxation came 
from the linguists advising the members of the international military force 
especially during the crucial work of the Defence Reform Commission. The 
force could then move away from the practice of producing three language 
versions of any given document to working increasingly with one syncretic 
'all-Bosnian' language version. 
Does the experience of international community language policy in the 
defence reform hold any lessons for the area of education reform? The research 
demonstrated how in the language policy process in both the defence reform 
and education reform language issues and social circumstances are closely 
intertwined. Attitudes within each area of reform are crucial for the success or 
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failure of each refonn process in general and for language policy in particular. 
Attitudes in the local military forces toward ethno-linguistic issues relaxed as 
attitudes generally moved towards increased cooperation under the influence of 
endeavours to meet the criteria for closer cooperation with NATO. Had this not 
happened and the three fonner warring sides had remained separated along 
ethnic lines it would have been far harder to modify the language policy that 
was predicated on three language versions. We can contrast these 
circumstances with those that are gennane to education refonn. In education 
refonn the language issue strikes at the heart of identity politics where the 
symbolic function of language has primacy. The societal insecurity felt by each 
of the ethnic groups means that attitudes to identity issues, including linguistic 
identity issues, are more rigid which in tum means there is less room for 
flexibility in dealing with language issues. Therefore it is more difficult to 
change language policy. 
I pinpointed in the research that international community language 
policy in the defence refonn could change because there was a general desire 
in the forces and at state level to work towards membership of NATO. In the 
non-military sector of education refonn the international community has tried 
to use the carrot of membership of the EU as a way of getting local authorities 
to do away with segregation in schools. So far, this has remained ineffective 
because it is not in the interest of local politicians and elites to put the interests 
of the state above their own narrower political interests, and there is no state-
level body that can impose this on them. Moreover, unlike the defence refonn, 
education refonn concerns a wide range of stakeholders (teachers, parents, 
pupils, school boards and politicians) many more than in the area of defence 
refonn all of whom influence the refonn process. Furthermore, whereas the 
defence refonn was led by just two international organisations (NATO and 
OSeE) the area of education refonn has been, especially before 2002, the 
concern of a plethora of organisations and agencies often with competing 
agendas. Because of these different factors, it has been difficult to create an 
environment where issues of identity do not override all other education issues 
and which would facilitate the eradication of segregation in schools. 
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Has international community language policy hindered 
the peace-building aims of the international community? 
Having considered language policy in the two areas that were the focus 
of this research we must now address the contention put forward at the 
beginning of this study that the language policy of international organisations 
has hindered their peace-building aims. 
One essential aspect of the peace-building process is the reconciliation 
of conflicting ethnic identities to embed the entire population into the integral 
post-conflict state and thereby ensure its stability. As a marker of ethnic 
identity, language is a crucial element in this process. In considering the 
historical experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina as regards language issues, this 
research demonstrated that since the nineteenth century past authorities have 
recognised the significance of language for inter-ethnic relations and have 
therefore conducted specific policies to manipulate this language-ethnic 
identity link in order to achieve wider political aims. Had representatives of the 
international community looked to the past, they would have realised the 
importance of the language issue not only for the regulation of inter-ethnic 
relations but also for identity formation. They would also have realised, as did 
the regimes in the three historical periods that were under scrutiny, that the 
language issue can also be seen as a security issue. 
This research conflnned the finding of Greenberg (2004) and 
Monnesland (2005) that the language policy of the international organisations 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina has essentially rested on the recognition of three 
distinct languages and their equality. This stems from the wording of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement but it also reflects the policy of domestic language 
planners and elites as regards the language issue. It is also a reflection of 
current thinking on minority linguistic rights which advocates the preservation 
of endangered and minority languages and respect for the rights of the speakers 
of these languages. This policy is compatible with the idea that respect for a 
group's language rights increases the feeling of well-being of that group in the 
wider society and enhances its feeling of attachment to the wider state. This 
study challenges these assumptions in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
research on societal security and education reform showed that the advocacy of 
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separate languages bolsters claims to linguistic difference which, in turn, 
supports the idea of ethnic difference which not only is central to the divisive 
ethnic politics in the country but also frustrates the creation of an all-inclusive 
Bosnian identity. The international community's language policy therefore 
only supports the idea of linguistic and ethnic difference which is manipulated 
by local political elites to nurture the loyalty of their constituents to the ethnic 
group rather than to the integral state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was clearly 
demonstrated in the chapter on education reform where local politicians and 
other power-holders use language divisions to hinder the integration of pupils 
of different ethnic groups in schools and classrooms. In such segregated 
environments schoolchildren do not socialise with school children from other 
ethnic groups and receive an education based on a mono-ethnic view of the 
world. This hinders not only the reconciliation of conflicting identities but also 
the creation of an identity tied to the state. In this sense, I would argue that the 
language policy of the international organisations has hindered the peace-
building process. 
Parts of this research can, however, be given a different interpretation. 
If we look at the fmdings regarding the language policy of the NATO 
Stabilisation Force since the beginning of the defence reform we might make 
the opposite assessment. Language policy in this area moved away from strict 
adherence to the production of three language versions and towards a more 
flexible approach that allowed for the production of just one, syncretic, version, 
at least for working documents. In this, language policy was adapting to the. 
changing environment as the different armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
moved towards increased cooperation and unification in preparation for joining 
NATO and the Partnership for Peace and responding to the more flexible 
practice among the armed forces themselves. Given this greater spirit of 
cooperation it would have been inappropriate for the NATO force to continue 
to cling on to the linguistic 'barbed wire fence' and carry on the original policy 
of producing three language versions. Doing so may not have actually hindered 
the defence reform process but it would not have contributed to facilitating it 
either. In this sense, then, it can be concluded from this part of the research that 
ultimately the language policy of the international community has reinforced 
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the greater spirit of cooperation within the military and has thereby not 
hindered the peace-building process. 
These two opposing conclusions might be construed as highlighting a 
limitation of the overall research in that I have compared two very different 
areas of post-confiict reform and ended up with a chalk and cheese situation. 
Another approach might have compared different international organisations or 
concentrated on the language policy of just one. But I would argue that looking 
at two contrasting areas has added to our understanding of the different forms 
that a language policy might take in a post-conflict environment and 
demonstrated the complex interaction between language issues and socio-
political circumstances which is heightened in conditions of post-confiict 
peace-building. 
Contribution to scholarship 
This study contributes to knowledge in several fields of scholarship. As 
primarily a study about language policy it adds to our understanding of how 
language policy is developed in a post-conflict peace-building situation and the 
relationship between language policy and other policies important for the 
peace-building process. Within this it contributes also to scholarship in the 
field of linguistic human rights. Whereas current thinking and practice focus on 
the rights of the speakers of a minority language vis-a.-vis those of the speakers 
of a majority language in a given community, this study investigates the 
implications for linguistic human rights of a specific situation where the 
languages in question are mutually comprehensible and have equal official 
status. 
This study also contributes to scholarship in the field of translation 
studies. Little has been published hitherto on translation and interpretation in a 
multinational military force in a peace-building environment. Translation 
studies scholarship has tended to concentrate on the experiences of professional 
linguists without regard for the experiences of those linguists who find 
themselves working as translators and interpreters almost by accident Given 
the sheer numbers of these heteronomous (to use Cronin's term) translators and 
interpreters employed by the international military force since the beginning of 
its involvement in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it is important that the 
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scholarship addresses the particular issues raised by the employment of 
translators and interpreters in this specific environment. This study is 
particularly valuable as it draws on interviews with the linguists themselves 
and adds to our understanding of issues related to identity and the ethics of 
translators and interpreters who occupy a grey area as employees of the 
international military force but also as representatives of the ethnic groups that 
the force deals with. 
Finally, little has been written in the scholarship on peace-building that 
directly addresses the issue of language in this process. In the extensive 
literature on every possible aspect of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina 
attention is very rarely given to the language issue in its own right. This study 
has attempted to rectify this by putting language at centre stage and making the 
case for a consideration of language issues to be part of peace-building 
research. 
Contribution to practice 
At a recent conference at which I gave a presentation on the linguistic 
aspects of the peace-building process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, my fellow panel 
members and I were accused of 'international community bashing' by a former 
US official who had held a senior position in the Office of the High 
Representative. 180 It is a shame that this kind of attitude is held by 
practitioners working on the ground because my intention is not to make a 
blanket criticism of the activities of the international community in language 
policy in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina but to offer insights into the lessons 
that are to be learned from this example for future interventions by the 
international community in a post-conflict situation. My research has shown 
that consideration should be given at some point, preferably at the beginning of 
the entire peace-building process, to the question of language in the post-war 
environment. In a different context, there may not even be a language issue as 
such but I would argue that there should at least be an understanding among 
peace negotiators and other representatives of the international community that 
language may need to be addressed. In this it is necessary to have an 
180 This occurred at the inaugural conference of the Exeter Centre for Ethno-Political Studies at 
the University of Exeter, 'Ethno-Politics in a Globalized World,' 27-30 June 2010. 
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appreciation of the ways in which language issues can impact on other policies 
and the ultimate peace-building goals and vice versa, as well as on ways to 
prevent or mitigate the possible harmful effects of this. In exploring some of 
these issues, this study is intended to contribute in a practical sense to the 
understanding among non-academic practitioners of the linguistic implications 
of international peace-building actions. 
In my interview with Lord Ashdown he explained that in his experience 
the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina saw the language issue 
and the need to adhere to a policy of equality for all three languages as 'an 
irksome thing to do amongst many irksome things in Bosnia'. This attitude 
only minimises the importance of an issue that, as this research has shown, has 
far-reaching implications for the stability and security of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
This study demonstrates that in an international peace-building environment 
language should not be seen as 'irksome' but, rather, as something deserving of 
a serious, deliberate and considered approach. 
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Appendix 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Interviewee Organisation Date of interview 
RA NGO 26 May 2008 
RR OHR 27 May 2008 
LA OSCE 28 May 2008 
AG HQEufor 29 May 2008 
ZG HQEufor 29 May 2008 
CA HQEufor 29 May 2008 
ZS HQEufor 29 May 2008 
UO OSCE 30 May 2008 
KM NATO 2 June 2008 
RK NATO 2 June 2008 
QQ NATO 2 June 2008 
CC OHR 3 June 2008 
IR HQEufor 4 June 2008 
RF HQEufor 4 June 2008 
LB HQEufor 4 June 2008 
NA NGO 6 June 2008 
RC NGO 6 June 2008 
00 US State Department 3 August 2008 
(formerly) 
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